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Trans-frontier conservation areas (TFCAs), large cross-border areas dedicated to biodiversity 
conservation, multi-national co-operation and development are expanding in southern Africa, 
fast becoming the dominant conservation solution in the region. TFCAs adopt a celebratory 
discourse of ecological, community, economic and political gains, while the reality is often 
far more complicated. This thesis situates the expansion of TFCAs within a critical political 
ecology approach, and argues that they represent a neoliberal solution to a complex series of 
development, environment and political challenges. Drawing on five and a half months of 
fieldwork to Mozambique along with policy and discourse analysis it examines the first 
marine reserve to be linked to a TFCA in Africa, the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve 
(PPMR) in southern Mozambique.  It makes three arguments: First, it argues that 
Mozambique’s embrace of TFCAs represents the neoliberalisation of conservation through 
novel tourism-based products, techniques of governance, creation of subject positions based 
on entrepreneurialism, and new arrangements of space. At the same time, the adoption of 
TFCAs also stems from Mozambique’s post-war politics, especially the ways in which elite 
state actors have sought to reconstruct and reorder the country through engagement with 
donors.  Second, the thesis uses a combined governmentality and assemblage framework to 
explore how neoliberal conservation is made to cohere as a truth discourse, how it materially 
co-produces human and non-human life in the marine reserve, and how it is fragile, partial 
and contested. Third, it critiques the increasingly close relationship between the extractive 
and conservation sector at a policy, state and donor level, exploring how and why marine 
conservation is increasingly intertwined with Mozambique’s resources boom through its 
green economy discourse. Through these three points of engagement, the thesis contributes 
to debates around the intensifying relationship between extraction and conservation, 





In this thesis I explore the relationship between conservation and neoliberalism. While 
conservation is often presented as a necessary response to protect nature from the worst 
excesses of capitalist development, it is also clear that conservation practices and ideologies 
are themselves increasingly articulated in market-based terms. From payments for ecosystem 
services, financialised products like carbon credits and the steady growth of conservation-
based tourism, the adage that you must save nature by making it financially valuable 
dominates mainstream conservation institutions. To explore these dynamics, I travelled to 
Africa’s first trans-boundary marine protected area, the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine 
Reserve in southern Mozambique. I adopted a political ecology analytic lens and 
methodology, that is, an approach which starts from the perspective that ecological issues are 
fundamentally also political ones, and seeks to deeply understand these issues through in-
depth engagement with people and places. The PPMR is part of a Peace Park, the Lubombo 
trans-frontier conservation area (TFCA). Peace Parks put forward celebratory claims of 
cross-border co-operation, regional biodiversity and habitat protection along with 
community development – a ‘triple win’. Since its establishment, the reserve has 
commenced a successful turtle monitoring and research programme, established community 
development schemes based on ecotourism and livelihood support, and had regulated the 
behaviour of tourists and residents within the reserve boundaries. However, in order to 
produce the kinds of pristine animal and tourist-centric landscapes demanded by the Peace 
Parks vision, there are contradictory and ambiguous interventions into communities’ and 
animals’ lives. In addition, conservation is increasingly entangled in Mozambique’s 
resources boom in a variety of ways. The PPMR may be the site of a proposed deep water 
coal port. In addition, due to recent policy changes, conservation areas are now involved in 
biodiversity offsetting for the extractives sector. The intention of the thesis goes beyond the 
idea that conservation is often far more complicated than its romantic and idealised 
portrayals by conservation NGOs – this is fairly well-known. Rather, I want to show that the 
reserve’s complications are directly produced by global neoliberal ideologies that promote 
and normalise ideas of individual entrepreneurship, markets and economic growth, along 
with Mozambique’s particular political and economic history. This investigation thereby 
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It is time for bold and catalytic action for ocean conservation. We must recognize the 
critical role Marine Protected Areas play in protecting people and wildlife. Marine 
Protected Areas are a win-win. Marine Protected Areas are our best conservation 
tool protecting habitat, improving fisheries, supporting local livelihoods and 
securing the long-term health of marine biodiversity and the oceans. We must rally 
together around solutions like Marine Protected Areas for our greatest partner 
supporting all life on Earth, our oceans (Cristián Samper, President and CEO of 
World Conservation Society 2016).1 
 
1.1. Marine	protection	in	a	changing	Mozambique	
In 2008, Steinberg argued that debates in marine environmentalism were driven by two 
factors: A sense that the ocean was being overused through greater extraction of marine 
resources, while at the same time, this issue was suffering from underexposure and therefore 
not on the radar of major governments or of general individuals. While the overuse and 
pollution of marine resources is undoubtedly intensifying, the latter part of Steinberg’s 
assessment can no longer be said to be accurate. As the citation above emphasises, there is a 
growing focus among major institutions like the International Union for the Conservation of 
Nature (IUCN), which set a global 10 per cent target for the conservation and management 
of coastal and marine areas by 2020 (Aichi Biodiversity Targets, IUCN, CoP 10 Decision 
X/2). Both the number and size of marine protected areas (MPAs) have increased rapidly in 
recent years (Edgar, Stuart-Smith, Willis, Kininmonth, Baker, Banks, Barrett, Becerro, 
Bernard, Berkhout and Buxton 2014). Alongside this protectionist trend, the oceans are 
                                                      
1 This statement was made at Our Ocean 2016 Conference, in Washington, D.C, announcing a new 
financial commitment to increasing global MPA coverage to 10 per cent, including Mozambique 




increasingly incorporated within green growth and natural capital discourses through the 
concepts of marine ecosystem services, ‘blue growth’, and marine eco-tourism. The ocean’s 
role in development is also firmly on the agenda, with the United Nation’s Development 
Program (UNDP)’s Sustainable Development Goal 13 focussed on the sustainable 
management of marine resources as the foundation of three billion people’s livelihoods in 
developing countries (UNDP 2016; WWF 2015b).  However, despite these efforts to 
emphasise the importance of marine environments, scientists warn of an “emerging mass 
extinction in the oceans” (Payne, Bush, Heim, Knope and McCauley 2016: 1), with human 
fishing and hunting of large marine fauna driving an “extinction of sufficient intensity and 
ecological selectivity to rank among the major extinctions of the [past]” (Payne et al. 2016: 
3). Marine protected areas are positioned as a key tool in arresting this apparent crisis in the 
oceans, as well as, in some cases, promoting economic growth and community development. 
This thesis is positioned at this crucial juncture: the exploitation of marine resources is 
intensifying under neoliberalism, yet answers are increasingly provided in the form of 
protectionist and neoliberal market-based solutions (Arsel and Büscher 2012). This dialectic 
whereby ecological crises provide impetus and opportunity for neoliberal solutions forms the 
central problem of this thesis.  
I focus on the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve (PPMR), a trans-boundary MPA in the 
south of Mozambique. Mozambique is no exception to the trend for protectionist and 
neoliberal solutions, often, though not always, imposed by external non-government 
organisations (NGOs), major donors and development institutions to solve crises of 
underdevelopment and marine resource depletion. These organisations, along with national 
governments are looking to the sea to fulfil ecological and development goals, and an 
increasing amount of Mozambique’s extensive coastline is coming under marine protected 
area regimes, over 18 per cent in 2014 (World Bank Datasource undated). Mozambique’s 
MPAs are seen by their supporters to provide many advantages: as a means to protect marine 
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ecoregions and migratory species, as well as protect (and regulate) local livelihoods that 
depend on marine resources, and to boost regional and national economic growth. Crucially, 
they are also providing a basis to promote idyllic visions of marine tourism, linking MPAs 
directly with this economic development.  The creation of MPAs is therefore promoted by 
major donors including the World Bank’s Global Environmental Facility (GEF), along with 
NGOs like the World Wildlife Fund (WWF) Mozambique and the Peace Parks Foundation 
(PPF).  
As a Peace Park, the ‘win-win’ discourse which surrounds the PPMR is amplified. Peace 
Parks are trans-frontier conservation areas (TFCAs) organised by the PPF, a South African 
environmental NGO. The PPF describes its TFCAs as areas which restore and promote the 
free movement of animals according to ‘natural’ bioregions; as contributing to cross border 
political co-operation and the linking of historic African communities; and, as creating 
opportunities for community development as well as regional economic growth. As 
acclaimed by the late patron of the PPF, Nelson Mandela, TFCAs are presented as a solution 
that “can be embraced by all” (Peace Parks Foundation undated f). However, there are 
several critical studies which highlight how Peace Parks are imposing drastic change on vast 
areas of southern Africa such as through authoritarian and sometimes violent interventions 
into the lives of local communities (Büscher and Ramutsindela 2016; Milgroom and 
Spierenburg 2008), the reorganisation of governance (Duffy 2006a; Lunstrum 2008), and 
through ushering in a new neoliberal conservation paradigm which prioritises the needs of 
investors and tourists (Büscher 2013; Noe 2015). My first goal is therefore to problematise 
the uncritical celebration of the PPMR as a Peace Park, and situate it within Mozambique’s 
neoliberalising political economy. I uncover dynamics of appropriation, accumulation, 
authority and territorialisation as conservation becomes a means of bringing order to a 
contested region through a spectacular, scaled-up model which aims to ‘save’ nature through 
the assertion of neoliberal, incentive-driven conservation.  
4 
 
However, I do not aim to seek out and then condemn an idealised neoliberalism as 
something I have pre-judged in advance. Rather, I am interested in the place-specific 
neoliberal experience. As Mitchell (2002) observes, there is a danger in reifying ‘big ideas’ 
like neoliberalism; the critical act of setting it apart as an object for study contributes to its 
coherence and power. The second purpose of this thesis is therefore to show how 
establishing the PPMR has been a long process which has often met with contestation as it 
has intersected with Mozambique’s national political economy, with local communities, with 
experts and scientists who ascribe to different normative visions and values of conservation, 
and with the materiality of the ocean and its non-human inhabitants. I am interested in how 
the PPMR came to be seen as the ‘right arrangement of things’, and how the continued 
presentation of its success is actively managed by governmentality based on the ‘will to 
conserve’. 
I build on these critiques by looking at market-led conservation in Mozambique in the 
context of an emerging green economy and booming extractives sector. This is the third 
objective of the thesis. Mozambique (real and imagined) is changing rapidly. In the space of 
little over fifty years (over thirty of which were spent on protracted and bloody conflict), it 
has transitioned from Portuguese colony, to socialist construction to free-market state. From 
a debt-ridden “phantom state” (Sidaway and Power 1995:1477) to donor darling, 
Mozambique is often viewed as a case study for the success of neoliberalising reforms and 
trade-based development and, most recently, as a rising African economy (Hanlon and Smart 
2008). Its growth rates averaged 7 per cent per year between 2008 and 2015, largely as a 
result of mega-projects in coal, industry and agriculture, and it has recently discovered 
globally significant amounts of natural gas in its northern waters in 2010 leading to 
celebrations of Mozambique as one of Africa’s “new investment frontiers” (Chatham House 
2013: 1; see also Blanco Armas, Gratcheva, Pevzner and Sharma 2014). However, this 
excitement has more recently been tempered by a high-profile debt crisis and continuing 
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questions about how to foster broad-based development in a context of major challenges, 
limitations and contradictions. Extractives-based accumulation is currently intensifying 
throughout the country; from United States oil and gas company Anadarko’s controversial 
gas extraction and processing project in Cabo Delgado, to coal extraction in Tete Province, 
and ProSavana, to the joint Brazilian and Japanese agricultural megaproject in the Nacala 
Corridor in the north of the country. These projects have all been the subject of opposition 
and contestation. Critical voices observe a government pursuing an extractives agenda 
regardless of social or ecological outcomes, and following entrenched patterns of neo-
patrimonialism (Centro de Integridade Publica Mocambique 2014; Hanlon 2016; Kirshner 
and Power 2015; Santos, Roffarello and Filipe 2015).  
Mozambique’s conservation sector is seeking ways to both respond to, and benefit from the 
growing extractives and industrial sectors. The green economy is the latest example of policy 
experimentation in Mozambique. Throughout my fieldwork between 2013 and 2014, 
conservation was increasingly reframed in terms of green capitalism, though this is by no 
means a uniform, or uniformly celebrated discourse. The green economy aims to radically 
reform and revitalise the sustainable development idea. It posits that the root cause of issues 
of underdevelopment and ecological degradation is the “gross misallocation of capital” 
(UNEP 2011: 14), and explicitly seeks to debunk what it sees as the myth “that there is an 
inescapable trade-off between environmental sustainability and economic progress” (UNEP 
2011: 15). It seeks to make capitalism ‘green’ by re-allocating capital through valuing 
ecologically sustainable modes of production more highly than polluting or ecologically 
degrading ones. In Mozambique, the conservation sector is becoming involved in the 
emerging green economy through both novel funding and financial mechanisms, and through 
the development and protection of a ‘stock’ of imagined pristine nature to provide mitigation 
for damage caused elsewhere. These emerging entanglements between neoliberal 
conservation, the extractives sector and the green economy provide an important lens 
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through which to understand contemporary dynamics of the relationship between capitalism 
and nature.  
This thesis, then, explores these three themes: The neoliberalisation of conservation in 
Mozambique, the ways in which the PPMR takes its form as a series of distinctive 
interventions in the material lives of people and animals, and, how these dynamics should be 
interpreted in the apparently contradictory shifts towards both a green economy in 
Mozambique and an increasingly extractive state. These themes offer a compelling 
opportunity to study the co-production of marine conservation and the extractive sector in a 
neoliberalising economy, and are why I chose Mozambique and the PPMR as the focus for 
my research. 
1.2. Why	neoliberal	conservation?		
Conservation is a much-debated term. In this thesis, I discuss Western conservation, a 
culturally, geographically and historically specific phenomenon originating in the 19th 
century which has been globalised through actors including states, NGOs and donors, and 
through particular types of environment-development governance (Adams 2013). 
Conservation is a set of material practices, imaginaries of nature, ideologies, institutions, 
forms of governance, technologies and knowledge which purports to save and protect nature 
for an imagined wider humanity. Historically rooted in colonial practices, ideas, 
accumulation strategies and methods of governance, conservation now is a recognised global 
form involving protected areas, scientific research, governance of people and animals, zoos 
and parks, community projects, international regulations, complex forms of funding, 
military-style protection, media, techniques of publicity and profile-raising, online 
innovations, technologies for making conservation economically productive, along with 
ideological and moral positions, and affective relationships. This paradigm has traditionally 
been ignorant towards alternative ways of understanding and relating to nature, despite often 
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being intertwined with concerns about community livelihoods, sustainability and 
international development (Adams 2013; Neumann 2003, 2004).  
In recent years, conservation has been central to capitalist expansion, creating new forms of 
nature and providing new opportunities for accumulation (Brockington, Duffy and Igoe 
2008; Büscher and Fletcher 2015; Igoe, Neves and Brockington 2011). Neoliberal 
conservation as a historical juncture in the capitalist project can be discerned through the 
intensification of a political ideology which reframes ‘saving’ nature into something which is 
best achieved through producing it as a commodity with a marketable value, and the 
expansion of material practices and policies which aim to bring this goal about through new 
products such as pollution credits and the commodification of interactions with charismatic 
animals. Neoliberal conservation is therefore both an ideology and a new mode of protecting 
nature through market-based interventions and processes (Büscher, Sullivan, Neves, Igoe 
and Brockington 2012).  It reflects particular ideas about development and nature, and also 
creates and reproduces uneven balances of power. It represents a novel phase of intensified 
capitalist expansion based on the appropriation of nature through novel forms of investment 
in ecosystems, and the handling of contestation through anti-political techniques (Büscher et 
al. 2012), but at the same time, it takes place alongside, and is entangled with other historic 
forms of development and socionature (Peluso 2012). Critiquing the neoliberalisation of 
conservation is therefore vitally important because it is becoming increasingly paradigmatic 
in dominant environment and development institutions that, to paraphrase McAfee (1999: 
133), to save nature, you must sell it.  
The notion of reconciling capitalist growth and conservation through market-driven means is 
featuring increasingly in Mozambican political discourse and practice, yet it is increasingly 
debated whether market-based solutions will meet their promises to solve ecological and 
development problems. After all, it has long been the case that development and 
environment projects have failed to meet up to their often-grand promises (Edwards 1989; 
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Ferguson 1990; Mosse 2005; Rist 2002). Neoliberalism must be understood as a historical 
process and as part of the unfinished project of capitalism, at the core of which is the 
ongoing, historically rooted transformation of socionature for profit (Moore 2015b; Peluso 
2012). The trends towards the commodification and financialisation of nature apparent under 
neoliberalism can be understood as part of historic capitalism’s uneven crisis-accumulation 
dialectic. As Moore (2015b: 110) puts it, “[c]apital’s dynamism turns on the exhaustion of 
the very webs of life necessary to sustain accumulation; the history of capitalism has been 
one of recurrent frontier movements to overcome that exhaustion, through the appropriation 
of nature’s free gifts hitherto beyond capital’s reach”. Intensifying and extending neoliberal 
conservation into the marine realm goes to the heart of the co-constitution of nature and 
capital in an era of entangled political, economic and ‘natural’ crises. I now discuss how the 
PPMR relates to these debates. 
 
1.3. About	the	Ponta	do	Ouro	Partial	Marine	Reserve		
The PPMR was declared in 2009. As shown in figure 1.1, it is located in the far south of 
Mozambique close to the South African border. As indicated in figure 1.2, it stretches for 
300 coastal kilometres from St Lucia in South Africa to Maputo Bay in Mozambique, and 
comprises over 650 square kilometres of ocean. below. Until 2012 with the designation of 
the Primeras and Segundas Archipelago, it was Mozambique’s largest marine protected area, 
and is still its only trans-boundary one. It is administered from new headquarters near Ponta 
do Ouro town, a popular coastal tourist resort near the South African border.  The reserve is 
located in the Mozambican administrative region of Matutuíne Province, but it also draws on 
Maputaland for some of its boundaries and its identity. Maputaland is a historical African 
region which encompasses a broad swathe of South Africa (now Kwa-Zulu Natal province) 
and surrounding regions, and along the coast, stretching into Mozambique up to Maputo.  
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The park was proposed and is managed by the Peace Parks Foundation (PPF) which 
promotes, pays for and manages TFCAs throughout southern Africa. 


















Figure 1.2: Map of the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve  
 
A central aim of the reserve is to protect loggerhead and leatherback turtles which make 
nests on the beaches of southern Mozambique and South Africa from October to January 
each year (PPMR 2009). The turtles, their nests (shown in figure 1.3) and the hatchlings are 
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protected along the coastline by the PPMR’s sister MPA, the iSimangaliso reserve, and the 
PPMR. As is the case in many other places, turtles face challenges including the destruction 
of former nesting sites through coastal construction, they have been often killed for food, 
though this is in decline in Mozambique, and they can become entangled in fishing nets and 
either killed as bycatch or drown (PPMR 2011). 
  
Figure 1.3: Leatherback turtle nest in the PPMR, October 2013 (author photograph) 
A South African turtle monitoring and protection programme has been running since 1963, 
began by what was then known as the Natal Park Board, which later merged with the 
KwaZulu Directorate of Nature Conservation to become Ezemvelo KZN (referred to as 
KZN). As will be discussed later in this thesis, KZN has been a key organisation in lobbying 
for the extension of its turtle programme to encompass the southern coast of Mozambique. 
The PPMR’s scheme replicates KZN’s model of monitoring and recording nesting 
populations (including invasive processes like tagging, alongside recording the location and 
date of nests). The monitors also protect the females while on the beach, and assist 
hatchlings to water if necessary. It is possible for tourists to take part in an organised turtle 
walk in the PPMR, but driving on the beach is currently prohibited. 
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The PPMR sits within a wider complex web of protected and managed designations. It is 
part of the Lumbombo TFCA (as seen in figure 1.4), along with four more land based parks 
and another marine protected area, the iSimangaliso in South Africa.  
Figure 1.4. Map of the Lubombo Trans-frontier Conservation Area 
 
The Lumbobo, which was agreed in 2000 by the respective heads of state of Mozambique, 
South Africa and Zambia is currently unique in connecting land and marine based 
conservancies, and has recently been recognised under the United Nations Education, 
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Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) World Heritage List as Africa's first trans-
boundary marine World Heritage Site. The Lubombo aims to link human and animal 
populations percieved as artificially separated, drawing heavily on histories and imaginaries 
of Maputaland and a ‘pristine’, historic Africa. The site is also recognised as a key 
biodiversity area under the Eastern African Marine Eco-region (EAME), a major marine and 
coastal management plan. Several species such as its nesting turtles, dugongs, whale sharks 
and great white sharks which frequent the area are listed as endangered, and consequently 
are covered under international legislation including the Convention on International Trade 
in Endangered Species of Wild Flora and Fauna (CITIES). At an international level, 
Mozambique is a signatory to the Convention on Biodiversity (CBD) guidance on MPAs as 
mentioned above.  
The PPMR’s Management Plan highlights a number of ecological threats. In particular, the 
lights from an increased number of houses in sensitive areas are said to be disturbing turtles 
nesting sites. The Plan (2009: 19) notes that “coastal developments within the area have 
increased dramatically within the past 10 years”, and large tourist enclaves in Ponta do Ouro 
and Ponta Malongane have expanded, along with ad hoc construction of hotels and second 
homes along large portions of the coast. However, local subsistence communities and 
uncontrolled tourism are often emphasised as the main problem for the site’s marine 
ecology, particularly turtle poaching and fishery degradation through artisanal fishing. In 
response, certain activities are now restricted in the park, including commercial fishing. 
However, controlled recreational fishing, tourist development, and activities such as whale 
watching and shark diving are still permitted. Although the site is ecologically diverse, the 
Plan emphasises charismatic animals, particularly turtles, dolphins, sharks and dugongs. 
Despite its challenges, there are high expectations in the donor and conservation community 
around the development and ecological potential of the PPMR, and indeed around the Peace 
Parks model in general. Studying this reserve enables me to open the ‘black boxes’ of claims 
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that are made around commodified approaches to conservation and the enrollment of  
communitues as so-called ecotourism entrepreneurs in development, and to interrogate the 
increasingly common-sense approach that you can ‘save nature through selling it’ (often 
repeated in claims that animals like turtles are ‘worth more alive than they are dead’).  
The PPMR is also caught up in Mozambique’s extractives and industrial boom in mutiple 
and contradictory ways, both directly through the on-and-off discussion about a large deep 
coal water port being constructed at Ponta Techobanine in the reserve (Club of Mozambique 
20 April 2013), and indirectly, through new governance which links conservation and 
extraction under a green development rubric. At the same time, its supporters hold it up as an 
example of sustainable and long-term development, representing a vision which is overtly 
contrasted with the governing elite’s percieved focus on extraction at all costs. The reserve 
thus provides a means of understanding the interconnections between natural resources, 
conservation and Mozambique’s politics and development post-independence. It allows me 
to explore questions relating to geopolitics and Mozambique’s development trajectory in the 
context of structuring forces like neoliberalism, along with debates about ideologies and 
discourses of nature, sustainability and biodiversity conservation. It also places these into a 
material contex, allowing me to consider particular ways of organising and governing 
socionatural (human and non-human) life within a marine reserve.  
1.4. Research	questions	and	structure	of	thesis	
This thesis seeks to answer the following questions: 
• What governance arrangements, policies, discourses and imaginaries led to the 
production of the PPMR? How do these relate to neoliberal developments in 
Mozambique and more widely? 
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• How is the reserve managed, governed, contested and held together as a coherent 
project?  
• How is conservation linked to both extraction and the green economy?  
These questions all feed into my overarching research goal: to contribute to understanding 
the historical co-production of neoliberalism and nature in and beyond Mozambique.  As 
shown in figure 1.5, these questions directly relate to my three research themes. 
Figure 1.5: Table of themes, objectives and research questions of the thesis 




To problematise the uncritical 
celebration of the PPMR as a Peace 
Park, and situate it within 
Mozambique’s neoliberalising 
political economy. 
What governance arrangements, 
policies, discourses and 
imaginaries led to the 
production of the PPMR?  How 
do these relate to neoliberal 
developments in conservation 
and development? 
The interventions 
in the material lives 
of people and 
animals. 
To understand how the PPMR 
came to be seen as the ‘right 
arrangement of things’, and how 
the presentation of success is 
maintained and contested. 
How is the reserve managed, 
governed, contested and held 
together as a coherent project? 






To understand the contradictions 
and synergies between market-led 
conservation, the green economy, 
and the extractives sector. 
How is conservation linked to 
both extraction and the green 
economy? 
 
The thesis is structured in eight chapters. Following this introductory chapter, which sets out 
the rationale for the study, provides research questions and explains the contribution of the 
thesis to current debates, I move to chapter two. Chapter two is the literature review, which 
begins by situating my research within different political ecology traditions of eco-Marxism, 
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poststructuralism and relational theories, and argues for a hybrid approach which draws on 
insights from these positions to illuminate different questions relating to the PPMR. The 
review then discusses the concept of neoliberalisation in greater detail, arguing for a process-
based conceptualisation of neoliberalism as an unfolding and incomplete yet historically 
distinct set of ideologies, policies and practices, particularly in relation to nature. I then 
analyse recent accounts of neoliberal conservation, drawing on a growing body of literature 
to provide a synthesised analytical overview which guides this thesis. However, this chapter 
also shows that, while neoliberal practices, logics and ideologies are undoubtedly intertwined 
with conservation in qualitatively new ways, existing debates often present a sweeping 
account of the neoliberalisation of conservation, and risk reinforcing its putative hegemonic 
status. I therefore suggest that the literature could be guided by a more nuanced account of 
how dissent and divergence from ideology works in practice, in other words, to take 
seriously accounts of neoliberalism as a messy and impure project, and a set of contingent 
political practices. Finally, the review situates the thesis in debates about governing 
extractive and conservation spaces, and the role of the state. I note here that the review does 
not discuss the green economy in detail. There is an extensive literature about ecological 
modernisation, sustainable development and emerging green economy models. Discussion of 
these debates is embedded directly in chapter seven for reasons of clarity.  
Chapter three sets out my study design. It begins with conceptual discussion of how I 
propose to put my hybrid approach into action. I then provide rationale for my mixed 
methodological strategy, which encompasses discourse, ideology and policy analysis, 
ethnographic fieldwork into how these ideas are mobilised, and analysing this case in a 
broader body of research about neoliberalism. There has recently been substantial critique of 
using case studies of specific, and perhaps incomparable, instances of neoliberal nature to 
provide more general or universal accounts of neoliberalism (Bakker 2010; Castree 2008a, 
2008b). With this critique in mind, I provide a defence of the case study approach. The 
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methodology then explains the methods I have used, why I have used them and the practical 
challenges and ethical dilemmas that arose, concluding with a short reflection on academic 
engagement, analysis and writing.  
Chapter four frames conservation as state-making through tracing Mozambique’s dynamic 
recent history. Mozambique’s dramatic transformations through colonialism, socialism, the 
post-war ‘failed state’ through to its current incarnation as ‘donor darling’ and exciting new 
resource frontier enable me to explore how conservation narratives have changed throughout 
these transitions. I discuss how conservation policies and programmes have provided the 
Mozambican ruling party, Frelimo (The Mozambique Liberation Front/ Frente de Libertação 
de Moçambique) with both resources and opportunities to enhance their power. At the same 
time, conservation has also provided means for donors to enhance their influence over 
Mozambique. This chapter thus situates the emergence of trans-frontier conservation firmly 
in the context of Mozambique neoliberalising political economy and its state-donor 
relationships.  
Chapter five focusses in detail on the construction and establishment of the PPMR. It builds 
on the historical analysis of chapter four to show how, through taking advantage of post-war 
instability and by promising development and conservation, the World Bank and the PPF 
(the two key architects of trans-frontier conservation in Mozambique), along with the state, 
were able to position themselves as bringing order and development to a contested region.  
This chapter explores how the PPF’s vision represents the neoliberalisation of conservation 
through creating scaled up conservation spaces which prioritise the needs of private investors 
and well-off tourists, and by reimagining development in terms of incentive-based 
inducements to local communities to act as ‘ecotourism entrepreneurs’. These ideologies are 
underpinned by a commodified view of nature, and a form of entangled state-private 
governance. This chapter thus feeds directly into my goal to understand neoliberalisation as a 
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process by which state and private actors extend and intensify market relationships at a 
variety of levels.  
Chapter six is about the unruly material politics of the PPMR. Using concepts of 
governmentality, biopower and assemblage I explore the exercise of power in the PPMR, 
and how the use of political practices of assemblage are used to make the sometimes 
contradictory and fragile TFCA vision cohere. Building on the insights of Li (2007a, 2007b) 
I examine the distinctive and often contradictory interventions in the material lives of people 
and animals, and how these are resisted and reconfigured in an ongoing process. This 
highlights the fragility of the neoliberal conservation consensus and disrupts the idea of a 
hegemonic neoliberalism. Two examples from my fieldwork help me to do so: The 
management of animal life through the turtle monitoring programme, and the management of 
human life through the controversial planned relocation of communities from the nearby 
Maputo Special Reserve. Ultimately, this chapter is an exploration of the dilemmas, 
contestations, knowledges, techniques of persuasion and the materiality that all come 
together to constitute the reserve, and consequently, messiness takes centre stage.  
Chapter seven then zooms out from this detailed perspective to focus again on nature and 
capital in Mozambique’s political economy. It builds on Tsing’s (2005) insight that 
commodities like gas and, indeed, nature-as-tourism-product rely on discursive and 
imaginative ‘conjuring’, and enters into debates regarding the future of capitalist 
accumulation through nature. Specifically, it examines the co-occurrence of conservation 
and extraction in the context of the very recent rollout of novel green economy discourses, 
policies, institutions, regulation and projects in Mozambique. I use examples from the PPMR 
and from Mozambique more widely to demonstrate the increasingly close relationship 
between extractives-led growth and biodiversity conservation and how this is further 
entrenching the neoliberalisation of nature. However, in keeping with the ethnographic lens 
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of the PhD, I am also interested in how the green economy as idealised rational plan is 
already being put to use and complicated by a range of actors pursuing different goals. 
Finally, chapter eight returns to my overall research goal of using the case of the PPMR to 
understand the neoliberalisation of nature, and explains how my three points of engagement 
with the case (historical production of the reserve, its assemblage through political practices 
and its entanglement with Mozambique’s extractives boom and its role in the green 












This chapter engages with the ideas and debates that are necessary to understand the Ponta 
do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve as a site of neoliberal conservation. This thesis is broadly 
situated in the political ecology tradition, which I understand as an interdisciplinary field of 
study which takes in geography, development studies, economics, politics and environmental 
studies. Political ecology pays particular attention to issues including power and politics in 
environmental issues, control and access to resources, questions of ecological justice, and 
issues of accumulation through the enclosure of resources and dispossession of people, 
though has recently broached into novel areas, particularly the question of non-human others 
as actors in environmental issues. I situate my study in relation to three main bodies of 
political ecology literature. First I discuss foundational ideas which explore the concepts of 
nature, power and capitalism. Second, I critique a growing set of studies focussing on the 
contemporary intensification of market-based approaches to conservation. These literatures 
often combine insights from multiple perspectives to theorise contemporary conservation as 
a political ideology and a set of material practices which aims to ‘protect nature by selling 
it’. Third, I address literatures concerned with the state (also drawing here on political 
geography and international relations literatures), especially issues of sovereignty and 
territoriality, and the uneven geographies of Mozambique’s resources boom and 
conservation. Overall, I articulate a plural approach to political ecology, which combines 
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insights from eco-Marxist, poststructuralist and relational frameworks, but which centralises 
questions of what is distinctively capitalist, and distinctively neoliberal about many current 
nature-society relations.  
2.2.	Political	ecology	foundations:	Nature,	power	and	capitalism	
Nature and its relationship to society has been a perennial subject of interest to geography.  
In this section, I discuss the foundational ideas in political ecology that inform my thesis. 
While I make the case for a hybrid framework which combines eco-Marxist, poststructural 
and relational ideas, I do not suggest that these theories can be combined or made completely 
compatible (and I do not consider this is desirable because each approach allows different 
questions to be asked). Using a plural framework enables me to conceptualise the PPMR as a 
site of material, political and discursive struggles over socionature through highlighting the 
multifaceted, uneven and contested operation of capitalist power.  
2.2.1.	Eco-Marxism	
Eco-Marxists have developed Marx’s ideas on the ways in which capitalism appropriates 
common resources – the “subjection of Nature’s forces to man” (Marx and Engels, [1888] 
2002: 224) – to conceptualise the ecological contradictions of the capitalist mode of 
production. O’Connor (1991) theorises from the first contradiction of capital, that is, its drive 
to exploit labour and undermine the conditions of its own production, abstracting the 
exchange value of nature from “real places and real live people” (O’Connor 1998:128), to 
conceptualise a second contradiction. This second contradiction, according to O’Connor 
(1991), is when the same contradictory drive to profit depletes capitalism’s ecological 
foundations (see also Foster 2002). O’Connor argues that capitalism thereby produces the 
ecological conditions of its own decline through over exploitation of its ecological resource 
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base, causing progressive ecological crises. As capitalism reaches its ecological limits, 
capitalist growth and therefore its opportunities for accumulation suffer.  
This position has inspired many political ecology critiques which prioritise political-
economic approaches, in particular those which conceptualise capitalism as a structuring and 
causal factor in determining nature-society relations. In going to the heart of what is seen as 
‘the’ capitalist system, this and similar accounts have powerfully highlighted what appear to 
be highly distinctive and important aspects of the capitalism’s tendency to produce negative 
ecological consequences, thus opening the field to a proliferation of critiques of capitalism 
from an ecological perspective (e.g. Foster, Clark and York 2011; Kovel 2007; Neves 2010). 
For example, Blaikie (1985: 7), argues that the capitalist class “obliges land users to take out 
of the soil, pastures and forests what they cannot afford to put back in" in order to profit 
from surplus resources (see also Blaikie and Brookfield 1987). However, as Castree (2002: 
124) notes, eco-Marxist accounts sometimes risk positing “capitalism as a global system that 
contradicts a nature that is ontologically different from it”, a position in which an “epic” 
(Castree 2002: 126) capitalism is accorded significant causal and structural power over 
nature. That is, it asks us to see ‘nature’ and ‘capitalism’ as distinct and fundamentally 
different entities with power located primarily within in capitalist actors, a dualism which 
has been challenged by a number of important interventions.  
Smith (2010 [1984]) developed the eco-Marxist approach to socionature and capital by 
examining more closely the claim that nature is produced through capitalist relations. For 
relational eco-Marxists like Smith (2007; also Moore 2015a, 2015b), nature and society are 
understood as inseparable and indivisible, and capitalism, through interacting with 
biophysical reality, materially produces and transforms ecological and biological systems - 
“the production of nature at the global scale, not just an increased ‘mastery’ over nature” 
(Smith 2010:62). Smith’s argument is that there is a continuous metabolic relationship 
between human and non-human, and capitalism disrupts this relationship in ways that should 
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be understood historically and materially. Under ‘first nature’, nature is transformed for use, 
and under ‘second nature’ it is transformed for exchange, and the metabolic relationship 
becomes distorted into crises by the drive to accumulation. In Uneven Development, Smith 
(2010 [1984]:78-79) states that this division is not one between ‘nature’ and ‘society’, but 
one which should be understood relationally:  
[T]he distinction is now between a first nature that is concrete and material, the 
nature of use values in general, and a second nature which is abstract, and derivative 
of the abstraction from use value that is inherent in exchange value. The same piece 
of matter exists simultaneously in both natures; as physical commodity subject to the 
laws of gravity and physics it exists in the first nature, but as exchange value subject 
to the laws of the market it exists in the second nature. Human labour produces the 
first nature, human relations produce the second nature. 
 
This passage argues that capitalist processes should be understood as arguing that the “social 
and the natural ….. are internally related as particular ‘moments’ within processes that 
dissolve ontological divides” (Castree 2002: 128). This moves eco-Marxism from adopting 
an asymmetrical binary where capital holds dominion over a static and ‘out there’ nature, to 
one where the materiality of nature is an active player in nature-capital relations (Ekers and 
Loftus 2013; Moore 2015a).  
Smith’s analysis thus forms a central theoretical framework for understanding how nature is 
transformed through capitalist relations from the basis of human life to the basis for 
accumulation under neoliberalism. While nature has always been modified, extracted and 
sold, he suggests that this has become an intensified and quantitatively distinct phenomenon 
under intensified neoliberalism. Smith’s argument is that ecosystem degradation becomes an 
opportunity for further capital expansion, creating a new scarcity of degraded but ‘saveable’ 
nature which has exchange value precisely because it is threatened by such forms of 
capitalist development. The production and appropriation of ‘scarce’ nature as a fuel for 
neoliberal expansion can be recognised in novel commodities such as wetland credits, carbon 
trading mechanisms, biodiversity credits and other ecological commodities (Smith 2007). 
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Capitalism thus manufactures scarcity, producing nature as ecological commodities 
(Apostolopoulou and Adams 2015). In short, Smith’s critique highlights both social and 
ecological consequences of nature as accumulation strategy, foregrounding how capitalism is 
predisposed to ecological disaster and social inequality due to relations of commodification 
and alienation of labour from the conditions of production (Kovel 2007).  
Geographers have further developed Marx’s critique by centralising how capitalism enables 
accumulation by dispossessing people of their access to the commons.  Harvey (2005) argues 
that the drive to accumulate capital through class differentiation and accumulation by 
dispossession is the cause of social injustice and environmental problems. Common 
resources are appropriated by the application of private property rights and the assignation of 
monetary values to natural resources, a form of primitive accumulation. Accumulation by 
dispossession takes place when access and use rights are removed from some people in order 
that they can be used as a means of accumulation by others. This has been a central critique 
for political ecologists in understanding conservation through national parks. For example, 
Benjaminsen and Bryceson (2012) argue that conservation processes have caused 
dispossession of land and resources from communities in Tanzania, supported by state 
legislation to enhance private interests and displace local people and thereby enabling capital 
accumulation by powerful actors in tourism and conservation. Such an approach has multiple 
strengths when it comes to understanding the PPMR, particularly its attention to the power 
held by the accumulative capitalist class, the social injustice of those who are dispossessed, 
and the clear theoretical connection between a conservation site and a global economic 
system. It forms the basis of many contemporary critiques of neoliberal conservation, 
discussed in section 2.3 of this chapter. However, the structural approach can be enhanced by 
attention to the importance of ideology and discourse, and the material force of nature. To 
explain, I draw on a further set of ideas: first, poststructuralist political ecologies, and 




Poststructuralist approaches have been immensely fruitful in directing political ecologists’ 
concerns to consider politics more broadly, moving beyond solely class-based accumulation 
of surplus capital, and towards a complexity of “knowledge, power and practice” (Watts 
2000: 257) in explaining environmental conflicts. Escobar (1996: 325) argued that accounts 
of exclusion and power over nature must include “a consideration of the discourses and 
practices through which nature is historically produced and known”. This constructivist 
philosophy views nature as a phenomenon constructed by discourse, rather than by 
hegemonic capitalist relations. Discourses are composites of ideas, practices and normative 
positions which are diffused through, and produced by societies. There can be a number of 
competing discourses which can be used to support the agendas of ruling groups, but these 
are not fixed, and while discourses may produce and enable certain actions, they do not 
structure them in an absolute sense. Nature as a discourse constructs meanings which then 
shape people’s action through suggesting the possible, right and socially acceptable form of 
action, and shutting down alternatives, generating a “moral authority” for interventions 
which promise to restore or protect nature (Cronon 1996: 20). The idea of nature has been 
structured in various ways by discourses of sustainable development and biodiversity 
conservation, which have material effects insofar as they guide behaviour, legitimate actions, 
and foreclose subaltern ways of engaging with natural resources.  
Some political ecologists draw on the poststructural perspective to emphasise the role of 
discourse and knowledge in producing unequal access to natural resources, while embracing 
a plurality of ways that these relationships might be structured and opposed through gender, 
race and other situated environmental knowledges (Basset and Zuéli 2000; Escobar 1999; 
Peet and Watts 2004). This approach particularly emphasises the role of discourse in 
structuring common-place understanding of ecological degradation, and hence forming and 
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legitimating institutional responses (Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, and Svarstad 2001). It 
powerfully argues that historically produced and situated knowledges about nature work to 
“disguise exploitation and oppressive associations” (Peluso 2012: 80), making knowledge a 
key part of the politics of nature. This perspective conceptualises conservation as a 
discourse, foregrounding its use as a means of social ordering for colonial governments 
(Neumann 2001b, Vandergeest and Peluso 2006), in perpetuating development ideologies 
(Hutton, Adams and Murombedzi 2005; Leach and Mearns 1996), as part of the politics of 
accumulation by dispossession (Büscher and Dietz 2005; Benjaminsen and Bryceson 2012) 
and ways in which environmental knowledge and articulation of environmental problems 
reflect and produce uneven power relations in respect to natural resources. At the centre of 
this analysis is the critique that the right to structure and disseminate knowledge imbues 
power (Li 2007b; Peet and Watts 2004). Understanding how power is constructed through 
discourses, histories and imaginaries of the ‘right way’ to order nature-society relations, such 
as sustainable development, and held unequally by power centres like development-
environment institutions provide a powerful tool to understand contemporary conservation.  
2.2.3.	The	lively	turn	
In recent years, geographers have increasingly explored nature as an actor (Bakker 2003; 
Prudham 2007). There have been several review papers including Braun (2008) and Lorimer 
(2012). While eco-Marxists like Smith (2007) recognise that nature is often resistant to 
capitalism’s structuring forces, scholars increasingly emphasise the “constitutive force of 
things in social and political life……. in ways that go well beyond merely registering the 
recalcitrance of non-human nature” (Braun 2008: 670). This research agenda has been 
developed in three ways of relevance to this thesis. First, conservation is often constructed 
and mediated through romanticised perceptions of animals, involving non-human life 
directly in promoting neoliberal ideology through the marketing of nature (Duffy 2013; 
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Lorimer 2012). This can be taken further through examining the unpaid work by animals in 
conservation assemblages, building on accounts of how interactions with animals are directly 
sold, as well as attending to the use of animals in a broader conservation political economy 
such as through marketing by conservation NGOs. Bakker (2009, 2010) draws on this 
agenda to argue that scholars of neoliberal natures “should adopt a non-anthropcentric view 
of the agency of nature, and interrogate the status of non-humans as political subjects” 
(2010:34). Further, animals have long been used as ‘free’ labour and ‘cheap’ nature in the 
expansion of capitalism (Moore 2015a), drawing attention to how they are bodily enrolled in 
marketised conservation. These accounts of the importance of animal life in neoliberal 
conservation networks provide great potential for further exploration, examining more 
explicitly how animal life asymmetrically co-produces the neoliberalisation of nature.  
Second, scholars have profitably used the notion of affect to theorise conservation. Lorimer 
(2010) explores how international conservation volunteering is heavily influenced by 
nature’s capacity to invoke emotional responses – “the emotional and affective dimensions 
of human and non-human encounters” (2010:317). “[N]on-human charisma” (Lorimer 
2010:317) works to prioritise the type of conservation activity (such as the capacity of 
rainforests and savannah to create a sense of adventure) and the type of animals (like the 
capacity of big cats and elephants to produce pleasurable encounters) that volunteers 
undertake. Analysing conservation therefore means also taking emotion into account as a 
force. This approach engages directly with Bakker’s (2009, 2010) call for an enlarged 
approach to neoliberal nature which situates affect as a causal factor, and is of great 
relevance to considering the emotional pull of charismatic marine animals in the PPMR.  
Third, Foucault’s concept of biopower is increasingly enrolled in understanding animals and 
people in conservation regimes. Foucault (1978: 142–3) defined biopower as: “Power [over] 
living beings, and the mastery it would be able to exercise over them ….. applied at the level 
of life itself”.  Biopower is focused not on the individual but on the “species body” at the 
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level of “propagation, births and mortality, the level of health, life expectancy and longevity, 
with all the conditions that can cause these to vary” (Foucault 1978: 138), and works to 
“power to foster life or disallow it to the point of death” (Foucault 1978:139). Conservation, 
in its focus on viable populations and the prevention of extinction is thus necessarily about 
the exercise of biopower (Adams 2013). Conservation uses biopower as a productive power, 
enabling particular kinds of life through the general governance of bodies (rather than as 
sovereign power over the death of individuals) and fostering the care of certain populations 
(and certain individuals insofar as they contribute to populations). Biopower thus helps us 
understand conservation biology’s attention to population numbers over other possible 
interventions, and its management of conflicting priorities through utilitarian calculations. It 
speaks to conservation’s ‘will to protect’ through certain ways of acting and being with 
animals. Biopower produces new tools for governance and management such as technical 
population databases like the Red List of animals at risk of extinction (Braverman 2014), 
new socionatures such as animals bred specifically for hunting as part of a wider 
conservation regime, and new animal geographies based on encouraging viable populations 
in certain areas through particular regimes of management (Srinivasan 2014). Conservation 
biopower can also link directly with neoliberal goals through the fostering of certain 
charismatic species populations specifically for eco-tourism regimes. A particularly 
illustrative example is the ethically complex case of captive elephants of the Okovanga Delta 
in Botswana, rescued as infants from elephant culls in other parts of Africa (culls that were 
themselves specifically brought about for the purposes of managing other population-based 
conservation concerns) and enrolled into providing commodified tourist experiences (Duffy 
2013). Conservation becomes nothing short of a technology of power over life, fostering new 
socionatures based on the well-being and thriving of certain populations. 
These recent trends in multi-natural geographies provide opportunities for this thesis to 
develop existing literature. Developing the recognition that neoliberal conservation embroils 
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animals symbolically and materially offers new perspectives on how neoliberalisation takes 
place through the use of animals in conservation (Collard and Dempsey 2013). By entering 
debates over the politics of care involved in conservation, the question of social justice for 
humans which often preoccupies scholars of neoliberal conservation must be extended to 
consider non-humans. In turn, the management of animal populations and the biopolitical 
dilemmas that arise can be used to reflect on conservation’s often contradictory attitude to 
communities of people. Attention to the central place of neoliberalism in conservation 
through the lens of animal life shifts us towards the relational reconfiguration of socionature 
with capitalist processes (Moore 2015a), or, as Büscher (2015: 6) puts it, the “co-constitution 
of life and capital”.   
2.3.	Neoliberal	nature		
Büscher et al. (2012: 4) characterise the neoliberalism of nature as a contemporary historical 
juncture in which the political ideology that “natures can only be ‘saved’ through their 
submission to capital and subsequent re-evaluation in capitalist terms” has become deepened 
and extended. This recent synthesis addresses an ongoing critique in which the concept and 
explanatory power of neoliberal nature has been significantly challenged. Castree (2003, 
2008a, 2008b) argues that the neoliberal nature literature has not made its core lessons and 
theoretical conclusions clear, and instead encompasses a variety of disconnected case studies 
describing diverse issues across a wide range of socio-ecologies, geographies and scales. 
Castree (2008a:157) contends that scholars are “using the same terms – ‘neoliberalism’ and 
‘neoliberalisation’ to refer to and judge phenomena that are not necessarily similar or 
comparable”, and have failed to establish claims that inequality and environmental 
degradation are the direct result of neoliberal policies. In response, Bakker (2009, 2010) has 
suggested that the neoliberal nature literature is particularly limited in its conception of 
nature, arguing that it has perpetuated rather than dissolved the nature-society dualism 
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through focussing its analysis primarily on socio-natural entanglements where nature is used 
as a resource. As a result, neoliberalism often appears in the literature as an “an evil essence 
or automatic unity” (Ferguson 2010:182), which denies its political ambiguity and context-
dependency, and fails to explain both why the neoliberalisation of nature is taking place, and 
why it is considered undesirable (Castree 2003). These concerns are significant, and I 
address them in the following discussion. 
2.3.1.	Neoliberalism	as	a	process	
Providing a clear definition of neoliberalism is not a straightforward task. It is a slippery and 
ill-defined notion; “a ‘rascal concept’ – promiscuously persuasive, yet inconsistently 
defined, empirically imprecise and frequently contested” (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 
2010b:182). Neoliberalism has been defined in multiple ways: As a specific form of 
capitalism which involves the remaking of the world to promote, facilitate and advance the 
spread of free market principles (Brockington et al. 2008); a particular geo-historical 
tendency towards market disciplinary restructuring (Brenner, Peck and Theodore 2010a); a 
class project which results in, and thrives on, uneven development and social polarity 
(Harvey 2005); and as an series of “interve[ntions] on society so that competitive 
mechanisms can play a regulatory role at every moment and at every point in society…….a 
general regulation of society by the market” (Foucault [1979] 2010: 145) . An extensive 
literature aims to identify, explore and explain neoliberalism in a variety of social contexts 
such as the British welfare state (Peck and Tickell 2002) and international development 
(Ferguson 2005; Gore 2000). However, Wacquant (2012) suggests that accounts can be 
polarised between structuralist theories such as Harvey’s (2005) world order view of 
neoliberalism as a hegemonic class project, and poststructural accounts of neoliberalism as a 
diffuse political rationality or “government of society” (Foucault [1979] 2010: 145). To 
analyse these claims, it is important at the outset to distinguish between neoliberalism as a 
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historical epoch and a political ideology, and neoliberalisation as a process of regulatory 
change, techniques of government and embodied practices and subjectivities.  
Neoliberalism is a distinct historical phase that began as a result of the post-1945 crisis, and 
was firmly established from the 1970s onwards, particularly in its core of the United States 
of America and the United Kingdom. It is associated with a distinct geo-political and 
institutional landscape, one which is distinct from conditions associated with earlier 
capitalist systems, but which is part of an ongoing historical process. ‘Roll-back’ 
neoliberalism in the 1980s saw the destruction of Keynsian institutions like trade unions, 
central economic planning and state utility ownership and the de-regulation of trade. It was 
succeeded by a “roll-out” neoliberalism, in which aggressive destruction morphed into 
“socially interventionist and ameliorative forms” (Peck and Tickell 2002:388) such as an 
emphasis on what was portrayed as fair growth which dominated during the so-called third 
way social democracies of Clinton’s US and Blair’s UK in the 1990’s and early 2000’s. This 
second transformation is associated with a normalisation of neoliberal economic modes and 
an extension of reform into novel social spheres. The neoliberal consensus which emerged 
from these transformations to dominate today, broadly speaking, consists of trade and market 
liberalisation, market integration, the breaking down of state boundaries, and the reduction of 
the state from ‘thick’ service provider to a narrow economic role while simultaneously 
justifying the marketization of, and incursion into, the environmental realm (McCarthy 
2012). This combination of political ideology, economic and political regulatory practice, 
and cultural dogma has combined to create what Peck and Tickell (2002:381) describe as a 
“new religion”, an accepted, naturalised wisdom and way of behaving (Larner 2000; Duffy 
2013), and a global hegemon (Peck 2010).  
The roll-out of neoliberalism into developing countries by the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) through structural adjustment policies (SAPs) imposed 
the political project of market rule on African states. SAPs were intended to grow economies 
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through deregulating markets, reducing the size of the state, privatising state industries and 
devaluing currencies (Ferguson 2006). The neoliberal restructuring of Africa brought a 
normalisation of neoliberal economic strategies and an extension of reform into social 
spheres, producing a “deep shift in the way development problems were framed and in the 
types of explanations that were justified” (Gore 2000:790). Economic growth was posited as 
‘pro-poor’, and development institutions became focussed on narrow technocratic 
measurements rather than addressing larger structural issues of global inequalities. Broadly 
speaking, the knowledge of the development expert in perpetuating professionalised and 
managerial-technical solutions over more political or emancipatory interventions became 
emphasised by powerful donor institutions (Kothari 2005). This emphasis on technocratic 
development existed alongside idealistic donor policies that were (and to a certain extent, 
remain) largely predicated on free-market economics being the dominant mode by which 
poor economies can be integrated into the world economy – the Washington Consensus 
(Carmody 2011).   
A summary of neoliberalism’s central techniques and ideology can be synthesised from the 
literature as follows (adapted from Brenner et al 2010a; Castree 2008a; McCarthy 2012): 
Figure 2.1: Table of techniques of neoliberalisation 
Privatisation 
 
A faith in self-regulating markets and an extension of market logic 
throughout the public and private sphere, particularly the 
assignment of private property rights to an increased range of 
social or environmental phenomena, including the de-
nationalisation of state services and utilities. 
Marketisation The commodification of a widening set of goods and services, 
accompanied by the assignation of prices to items that were 
previously considered un-tradeable; this phenomena is global in 
scope, entailing global ‘free trade’ regulation. 
De-regulation Inspired by a disbelief in the state’s capacity to govern, this aspect 
sees the state shedding responsibility for a number of previously 
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 state-led services, in particular leading to an emphasis on local and 
regional autonomy.  
Re-regulation  
 
State-led policies and regulations to facilitate and advance markets 
and privatisation, including policies which promote the free 
movement of capital. 
Market proxies in the 
residual public sector 
A focus on ensuring the remaining public sector is run according to 
‘competitive’ and ‘efficient’ private-sector logics. 
The construction of 
flanking mechanisms 
in civil society 
Emphasising voluntary action such as communities or charities 
(‘the third sector’) to address social or environmental problems; a 
re-concepualisation of the person from a collectively-orientated 
citizen to a rational, economically motivated, private and self-
responsible individual.  
 
Figure 2.1 emphasises both the extension and intensification of market relationships, from 
state regulation to the level of the personal, intimate and embodied. It identifies 
neoliberalism as new forms of governance and policies, in which the role of the state is 
reimagined as creator and safeguard of the market, but not as provider of social services. It 
sets out what ideologically and historically specific about neoliberalism as opposed to 
capitalism in general; that is, neoliberal governments produce an intensified form of state 
regulation across various areas of social life which aims to impose, entrench and extend the 
commodification and marketisation process of capitalism. Synthesising the characteristics in 
the table provides a definition of neoliberalism as a historically discernible phase of 
capitalism in which pro-market regulatory restructuring dominates, based on a political 
ideology which aims to centralise state-led pro-market reform.  
However, as Brenner et al. (2010a, 2010b), Peck and Theodore (2012) and Peck (2010, 
2013) have pointed out, examples of “actually existing neoliberalism” (Brenner and 
Theodore 2002:349) do not always follow this ideal type. In contrast to its ideology, 
neoliberalism is also a specific political project which rolls out unevenly across different 
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geographic and historical contexts. Neoliberalisation interacts with previously existing 
regulatory and social contexts implying a dynamic, evolving and imperfect process. 
Nevertheless, while neoliberalisation tendencies always occur in hybridised forms, certain 
modalities can be discerned as generally characteristic. This means that neoliberalisation can 
still be said to be the dominant socio-political tendency despite research which identifies 
difference, imperfections, modifications and adjustments across projects which are all 
identified as neoliberal. In this analysis, neoliberalism is persistent and multi-scalar, 
intensifying and accelerating over the past four decades with increasing incursions into 
policy arenas previously insulated from pro-market reforms. The tendency of neoliberalism 
to spread from a series of disarticulated policy experiments to global hegemony describes a 
current position where alternative political possibilities seem highly unlikely or untenable 
(Peck 2010). This account of the deepening and transformative nature of neoliberalisation 
explains its resilience and ability to exploit multiple ongoing economic and ecological crises 
(Brenner et al. 2010a, 2010b; Peck 2010). The formulation of neoliberalism as a political 
process – neoliberalisation – partly addresses the problems of causation and comparison by 
emphasising the context-specific embodiment of techniques while also theorising these as 
part of a broader and more coherent political project. 
2.3.2.	Neoliberalism	as	governmentality	
A focus on neoliberalism as a specific form of governmentality (power through which social 
worlds are governed) is also useful in addressing the question of neoliberalism’s variegation, 
drawing our attention to neoliberalism as a system of meaning which can be historically and 
empirically examined, but which is nonetheless made up of “institutions, practices and 
identities in contradictory and disjunctive ways” (Larner 2000: 12; Wacquant 2012). 
Neoliberalism can therefore also be seen as the emergence and intensification of new forms 
of governmentality which entrench neoliberal ideology (Larner 2003). This governmentality 
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analysis draws on Foucault’s critique that neoliberalism is much more than a class project 
focussed on capital accumulation; rather, it is whole series of interventions into society. 
Foucault’s govermentality framework understands power as the reorganisation of small-scale 
and personal (as well as politio-economic) spheres of life by government and other agents, 
that is, the often contradictory measures that states undertake to control, manage and 
discipline its populations, alongside the political rationalities which underlie them (Foucault 
2010 [1979]).  
Fletcher (2010) distinguishes 'disciplinary' and 'neoliberal' governmentality. The former 
seeks to incalculate social and ethical norms into society through individual and group self-
directed governance. In contrast, neoliberal governmentality aims to alter behaviour through 
establishing incentive structures on the understanding that homus econimus (humans 
understood as rational, self-interested, and motivated primarily by economic gain) will act to 
maximise their personal utility. Rather than disciplining the soul, such as through self-
surveillance techniques, neoliberal governmentality acts on the social environment. 
Neoliberalism thus reforms the individual according to diverse strategies of regulation which 
pushes state responsibilities such as welfare onto the responsibilised individual, and the 
realm of interpersonal and social relations becomes increasingly, and only, intelligible 
through economic criteria and concepts. Subjects become “entrepreneurs of themselves” 
(Lemke 2001:9) which are managed through incentives to produce socially and 
environmentally desirable ends (Fletcher 2010). The neoliberal subject “normalises the 
logics of individualism and entrepreneurialism, equating individual freedom with self-
interested choices” (Leitner et al. 2007, cited in Harrison 2008: 1200). In environmental 
disputes, this brings about a greater focus on issues of individual environmental politics as 
questions of personal and consumer choice and ignoring wider issues of regulatory failure 
and socio-economic inequality (Harrison 2008).  
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However, as Larner (2003: 511) observes, such a formulation does not explain why people 
voluntarily adopt particular positions, noting that “such analyses of neoliberalism may 
explain the creation of particular subject positions, but not that of acting subjects”. For this 
reason, neoliberal subjectivities can be worn lightly, making it fruitful to explore why and 
how people adopt apparently neoliberalised subject positions, how these contradict and work 
with other forms of power, and how such subjectivities are incalculated. As Li (2007b) 
argues, both disciplinary and neoliberal governmentalities are utopian, in that they aim to 
bring about ideal states of affairs or ideal subjects. Inevitably, these are resisted, and 
furthermore, sit alongside other forms of power and political-economic systems. 
2.3.3.	Neoliberalism	and	assemblage	
The relational turn analyses social formations as contingent assemblages made up of 
heterogeneous elements (human and non-human) which are composed through relations 
(Anderson 2012; Anderson and McFarlane 2011). The general approach has been applied to 
a diversity of geographies, including community forestry in Indonesia (Li 2007a, 2007b), a 
middle Eastern oil pipeline (Barry 2013) and the production of international development 
expertise in Egypt (Mitchell 2002), though, as will be discussed, there are several different 
interpretations of the approach. Generally speaking, assemblage theory adopts particular 
ontological, epistemological and political ideas, and emphasises relations over categories 
like society, capital or nature. Ontologically, the world is understood as “an entanglement of 
technical, natural and human elements [which]… combines different kinds of materials or 
forces, involving various combinations of human cognition, mechanical power, chance, 
stored memory, self-acting mechanisms, organic matter and more” (Mitchell 2011:239). 
Empirically, attention is paid to mobility and process, conditionality and emergence in 
analysing space. Methodologically, analysis is often focussed on contingent and fluid 
processes of assembling, in which development-environment interventions like a water aid 
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project in India (Mosse 2005) are analysed as contingent projects held together by political, 
discursive, embodied and technical practices. Spaces are approached as contingent sets of 
relations and networks, understood as “made up of material objects, living things and natural 
processes, alongside the practices, cognitive responses, and emotions that produce and are 
produced by this intersection” (Anderson 2012: 574). The contingency of an assemblage is 
foregrounded, drawing attention to multiple “discourses, institutions, architectural reforms, 
regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific statements, philosophical, 
moral and philanthropic propositions” (Foucault 1980: 194, cited in Li 2007b: 264). It 
focuses on how neoliberalism (or any other technical field of government) is constructed as a 
mode of social organisation through contingent and often internally contradictory means. It 
analyses how seemingly disparate programs and processes are made to cohere, how they are 
contested, and how this results in material changes to lives.  
‘Strong’ relational theorists refuse to seek any general explanations such as neoliberalism, 
seeking instead to subvert general theories and dualisms with attention to the empirical 
characteristics of each assemblage (Latour 1993; Mitchell 2002). Others contend that 
capitalism itself must be understood through a relational lens, accepting there is something 
called ‘capitalism’, but focussing on the way it is relationally constructed rather than viewing 
it as an a priori category (Moore 2015a). Within this, power is theorised as a set of “social 
relations which constitute agency” (Clegg 2002, cited in Haugaard 2002: 266), drawing on 
Callon’s (1986) conception of power as a process of the translation of objects and events into 
resources through the mobilisation of support, achieved through the posing of problems in 
such a way that the agent’s solution becomes the ‘natural’ solution, and through building and 
fixing coalitions of support based on agreed representations of problem and solution. 
Callon’s theorisation of power as a process of positioning agents and framing problems 
inspired accounts of development interventions as processes of translation and mobilisation 
(Mosse 2005, Li 2007b). Consequently, scholars often draw on the insights of relational 
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thinking as a methodology which powerfully draws attention to the multiplicity and 
complexity of actors, while still enabling a focus on structural concepts like class and capital, 
and provides an important theoretical tool for this thesis in chapter six.  
To sum up briefly here, I have considered three ways of conceptualising neoliberalism: As a 
historic, global yet variegated political process underpinned by a particular ideology; as a 
governmentality (and related subjectivities and subject positions); and as a set of contingent 
relations. I now turn to discuss how these ideas relate to the neoliberalisation of 
conservation.  
2.4.	Neoliberal	conservation		
A distinct and influential epistemic community within political ecology has argued that 
novel ways of protecting nature have sprung from recent alliances between neoliberal 
capitalism and conservation (Brockington et al. 2008; Brockington and Duffy 2010; Büscher 
et al. 2012; Büscher and Fletcher 2015; McAfee 1999; Roth and Dressler 2012; Sullivan 
2006).  A flurry of papers, monographs, special editions and edited collections has been 
produced over recent years by a relatively small number of scholars interested in issues and 
cases where the neoliberalisation of conservation is of central importance. This neoliberal 
conservation literature argues that a critical focus on “how nature is conserved in and 
through the expansion of capitalism” (Büscher et al. 2102: 4) is now crucial, as neoliberal 
practices, logics and ideologies are intertwined with conservation like never before. The 
body of work has grown substantially over recent years to include theoretical syntheses of 
the concept (Arsel and Büscher 2012; Büscher et al. 2012), case studies of the role of 
institutions and celebrity philanthropists (MacDonald 2011), and donors and NGOs 
(Spierenburg and Wels 2010), and empirical investigations into novel neoliberal 
conservation programs in Africa and beyond (Büscher 2013).  
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The neoliberal conservation literature holds several commitments in common. These include: 
A political ecology approach which prioritises questions of social justice (often, though not 
exclusively from a human perspective); a concept of neoliberalism as both a political 
ideology and a set of material practices which emphasise valuing and ‘saving’ nature by and 
through producing it as a commodity with a marketable value; and, a commitment to the idea 
that neoliberal conservation is something novel. The literature often draws from eco-Marxist 
approaches to foreground issues of social justice (frequently focussing on developing 
countries), the production of nature through capitalist relations and uneven development, 
and, the dialectical relationship between capitalism’s limits and novel forms of accumulation 
(Büscher and Arsel 2012). Scholars also look to poststructuralist approaches to identify the 
role of discourse and techniques of governmentality in shaping ideas about how nature 
should be governed, and for whom (Fletcher 2010).  There is also a consensus around 
process analyses of neoliberalism; neoliberal conservation processes are understood to work 
through existing social ideas and institutions, producing a generally recognisable yet 
variegated process (Roth and Dressler 2012). The critique can be understood as exploring 
three main concerns: First, the modes, logics and actors through which neoliberal 
conservation is advanced; second, the material impacts and effects; and third, theoretical 
insights into processes of commodification, financialisation, enclosure and privatisation, and 
the relationship between capital and nature. 
Brockington and Duffy (2010) argue that contemporary conservation should be understood 
as part of the same global network of inequalities and power relations as capitalism, based on 
empirically observable trends involving ideological and material changes in the way 
conservation is conducted. Their argument draws on the concept of the hegemony developed 
by Gramscian political ecologists including Mansfield (2004), Mann (2009), Ekers, Loftus 
and Mann (2009), and Ekers, Hart, Kipfer and Loftus (2012). Hegemony refers to a 
dominant ideology and set of lived social practices which enact a historically particular 
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political project, and try to establish it as dominant (Ekers et al. 2009, Mann 2009). 
Neoliberal conservation as a hegemon is seen as a “historical moment in which a 
transnational class of corporate CEOs, professionals, government officials and bureaucrats, 
NGO leaders, merchants and the media are working together to overcome [ecological] crises 
by offering easy consumption-based solutions to complex socio-ecological problems” 
(Büscher et al. 2012:18). Büscher and Arsel (2012) argue that the relationship between 
capital and nature has noticeably intensified in the past decade, observed in the proliferation 
of market-based solutions to conservation problems which argue that nature can be saved 
through making it more valuable, such as ecosystem services markets (McAfee 2012) and 
ethical consumption (Carrier 2010). Conservation is not a reaction to capitalism, as 
understood by those who see protected areas as a form of necessary protection from the 
relentless pressures of economic growth, or as a pure ideal which has succumbed to the 
pressures of capitalism.  Instead, mainstream conservation can be seen as both a way of 
thinking about nature, and a way of interacting with nature which is part of the same global 
hegemon as capitalism. While conservation may limit exploitation of nature in some 
instances, it supports global capitalism more generally by providing new ways of seeing and 
valuing nature.  
Empirically, these trends can be globally discerned, with southern Africa identified 
particularly as a region where neoliberal conservation practices have taken on something of a 
missionary zeal (Büscher 2013; Büscher and Whande 2007; Walker 2015). Case studies note 
the increasing involvement of the private sector in protected area management and 
ownership, the growth in market-style finance systems, the corporatisation of conservation 
organisations and the representation of scientific contributions through marketing 
communications (such as ‘hotspots’ designations) (Adams and Hutton 2007). New actors 
include non-government organisations, corporations, private philanthropists and celebrities 
which work alongside national states and donors. Igoe, Neves and Brockington (2011:17) 
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describe “spectacular” conservation, where conservation ideas are disseminated through 
media such as films, products like “Starbucks Conservation Coffee and McDonalds 
Endangered Species Happy Meals” (Igoe et al. 2011: 29) and through the marketing of 
conservation as a lifestyle product.  This is then taken up by NGO and state actors which are 
themselves framed as the rightful and capable providers of solutions, producing mainstream 
conservation as hegemonic. From this, new relations of exclusion and accumulation are 
enabled and produced. Spectacular conservation shows us how the discursive framing of 
nature within popular culture, and activities such as marketing and financial speculation, 
directly contributes to the production of new forms of nature, and new (and old) relations of 
exclusion and dispossession.  
In analysing these dynamics, it is important to distinguish between techniques of 
commodification and financialisation. Commodification can be simply defined as “the 
process during which a thing that previously circulated outside monetary exchange is 
brought into the nexus of a market” (Page 2005, cited in Prudham, 2009: 274). However, the 
dynamics which with many scholars are concerned go beyond the selling of nature as 
commodities such as through selling timber or coal. Rather, there is increasing focus on the 
creation of novel environmental products purely for the goal of increasing profit. This gives 
a broader definition of commodification to include the replacement of production for use 
with the production for exchange, the development of new products and services specifically 
as commodities, social life increasingly structured around exchange relationships, and the 
dominance of money as expression of value (Prudham 2009). Insofar as conservation is 
concerned, commodification describes the inclusion of conservation natures as products in 
circuits of exchange, including the selling of interactions with animals and other tourist-
based nature products. This leads to the reproduction of certain conservation socionatures 
and their incorporation in value circuits where ‘value’ is defined financially. Though 
sometimes conflated, financialisation refers to a different reconceptualisation of nature as 
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ecological products which are not the same as commodities like timber. Rather than natural 
commodities, financialising conservation aims to redirect economic forces by incentivising 
the protection of nature such as through carbon markets and payments for ecosystem services 
(Smith 2007). Sullivan (2013: 199-200) usefully describes the two key elements of the 
financialisation of conservation as:  
The turning of banks and financiers to environmental conservation parameters as a 
new frontier for speculative investment and the creation of additional “value”-
accumulating financial instruments; and the revising and rewriting of conservation 
practice and understandings of nonhuman natures in terms of banking and financial 
concepts, enabling conserved “nature” to be entrained with new circuits of 
monetised exchange and financial instruments. 
 
This definition refers to several elements: First, to the empirically observed tendencies for 
banks, governments and NGOS to increasingly describe the rationale for conservation in 
financialised terms; second, to the implementation of policies and schemes which aim to 
bring about such goals through the development of a new range of financial products and the 
markets in which to trade them; and third, implies a material change in socionature through 
its reproduction through these financialised networks. Both commodification and 
financialisation are important for my thesis, and are key concepts for understanding current 
dynamics in Mozambique.  
The ability to commodify and financialise nature through conservation depends partly on the 
appropriation of space, specifically through the privatisation of land for conservation and 
tourism purposes. It also relies on the development of new economic relations, and 
ecotourism is seen as a prime means by which economic benefits can be extracted from 
conservation. Consequently, TFCAs are lauded as drivers of regional and even national 
economic growth (Wolmer 2003, Duffy 2006a). The concept of “tourist habitat” advanced 
by Brockington et al. (2008: 133) encapsulates the ways in which the needs, expectations 
and imaginaries of wealthy visitors are prioritised in neoliberal conservation, and how this is 
a fundamentally spatial dynamic. The production of tourist habitat often requires the 
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dislocation of communities from resource-dependent livelihoods in favour of insecure 
employment in the eco-tourist industry, including emotional labour for communities 
expected to reproduce expected behaviours of ‘indigenous tribes’ (Blaikie 2006; 
Brockington et al. 2008), the prioritisation of the needs of an (eco)tourism industry over 
ecological or social concerns and the production of ecological costs at different scales (Duffy 
2006b, 2010), the wholescale relocation of communities (Brockington et al. 2008), and the 
commodification of certain forms of profitable nature through tourism (Duffy 2013; Neves 
2010). This logic is amplified under neoliberal conservation, reshaping nature according to 
customer expectations especially in the new strain of high-end lodges which offer luxury and 
wildness to rich tourists, while producing new socionatures in the form of reified and 
idealised wildernesses.  
However, while the overriding theme from the neoliberal conservation literature is that 
nature is being both commodified and financialised like never before, Dempsey and Suarez 
(2016) raise an interesting puzzle. If the financialisation of nature is theorised as a novel and 
growing means of making profits, then empirical investigation should reveal capital flooding 
to take advantage. However, as Dempsey and Suarez report, the actual global investment in 
products like biodiversity financing has been negligible. They propose that the function of 
neoliberal conservation ideas is instead in promoting and reproducing norms of 
entrepreneurialism, rather than necessarily about actual financial performance.  This notion 
of the political performativity of neoliberal conservation and the promotion of the idea of the 
neoliberal subject as a form of discipline is important, and relates to discussion in section 
2.3.2 of this chapter that neoliberalism is a form of political rationality which aims to 
reproduce particular norms. In the case of biodiversity conservation, this means “the 
continued reconstitution of conservation actors as entrepreneurial subjects that come to 
understand conservation itself as an enterprise” (Dempsey and Suarez 2016: 666). The 
normalisation of entrepreneurialism can be understood as a form of discipline (rather than 
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necessarily as a form of direct financial accumulation), and is particularly relevant to 
understanding the apparently contradictory nature of neoliberal conservation. On the one 
hand, neoliberalism is rhetorically committed to the goal of introducing free-market 
principles, while on the other (as chapter six of this thesis will show) it often takes form as 
discipline which requires extensive intervention from state and non-state actors. 
The issue of contestation is closely related to the importance of discipline. While 
conservation, and especially trans-frontier conservation brings together a geographically 
widespread set of interests under a ‘win-win’ banner and promotes economic, political and 
ecological gains, the reality is often one of contestation and uneven development (Duffy 
2006a). The appearance of resolving divergent aims often exists at a superficial level, 
characterised by “inclusive, apolitical images centred on harmony between conservation, 
development, economic growth, etc.” (Büscher 2010: 263). The inability of conservation to 
deal with complex socionatural realities means it relies on anti-political techniques such as 
political marketing which produces a series of idealised solutions and promises, creating a 
‘win-win’ vision that economic development, conservation and post-conflict resolution go 
hand-in-hand (Büscher 2013; Duffy 2010). This consensus-orientated formulation is used as 
a deliberate strategy to downplay the reality of conflict, complexity and politics in 
conservation programs. Schuetze (2015) and Walker (2015) discuss how conservation 
narratives based on crisis and spectacle, along with neoliberal discourses of market-based 
conservation through tourism are used to manage community contestation in a new private 
philanthropy-led extension of Gorongosa National Park in Mozambique. This handling of 
contradiction through anti-political techniques simultaneously gives the impression of a 
neutral technical process and a positive, ethical program, while disciplining disobedient 
voices and disguising and de-legitimising contestation.  
To briefly sum up here, neoliberal conservation can be seen as both an ideology and a new 
mode of protecting nature through market-based interventions and processes. This dialectical 
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relationship sees apparently contradictory or opposing forces form parallel processes where 
ecosystem degradation exists alongside, and interacts with processes designed to mitigate or 
save nature through increasing insertion into the market. While continuing capitalism’s 
subsumption of nature, it also represents a novel phase of intensified capitalist expansion 
based on the appropriation of nature through novel forms of investment in ecosystems, and 
the handling of contestation through anti-political techniques. Neoliberal conservation’s 
central techniques include the ‘smoothing’ of contestation and conflict through techniques of 
marketing new representations of nature and anti-politics, but, crucially, these legitimate and 
produce material and spatial effects. Both the values and the practices infusing conservation, 
according to this critique, demonstrate neoliberal conservation’s core imperative that 
‘saving’ nature must be made materially profitable in order to motivate rational, neoliberal 




Trans-frontier conservation areas cross national borders, primarily to promote 
bioregionalism, but also to meet economic development, cultural and political goals (Hanks 
and Myburgh 2015). TFCAs are defined as “any process of co-operation across boundaries 
that facilitates or improves the management of natural resources” (Alexander and McGregor 
2000, cited in Wolmer 2003: 267), including the removal of “all human barriers within [a] 
trans-frontier park so that animals can roam freely” (Peace Parks Foundation 2003, cited in 
Milgroom and Spierenburg 2008: 438, emphasis added). Despite a strongly supportive 
literature from ecology and conservation biology and from policy actors which support its 
development and economic claims (discussed in more detail in chapter four), TFCAs have 
met with sustained criticism from political ecologists on the grounds of practical failure, and 
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perpetuation of a neoliberal model of conservation. Drawing on the ideas that space is 
constructed by historical processes and practices, by discursive ideas and representations, 
and by processes of contestation and negotiation (Lefebvre 1991), scholars have considered 
the production of trans-frontier conservation space through neoliberal political economy and 
ideologies of nature, enacted through processes of territoriality and new technologies of 
governing. 
Turning first to discussions of practical failure, Duffy argues that TFCAs are presented as an 
“ideal development strategy” (2006a: 96) in which communities, as “partners in 
conservation” (Wolmer 2003: 267) both manage and benefit from poverty reduction and 
conservation. However, community impacts have been mixed, ranging from a failure to 
devolve management in any meaningful way to communities to accounts of how 
communities have been forcibly removed from land to make way for TFCAs in a 
continuation of the primitive accumulation of earlier conservation practices. For example, 
the Great Limpopo Trans-frontier Park which straddles Mozambique, South Africa and 
Zimbabwe has led to eviction of local communities (Milgroom and Spierenberg 2008, 
Lunstrum 2015). These contradictions between the high hopes for development and the 
reality experienced by many communities are seen as reflecting deeper contradictions in the 
neoliberal political economy (Büscher 2013; Duffy 2010). 
TFCAs exemplify processes of neoliberalisation in the following ways: By requiring new 
environmental governance; by privatising and enclosing often previously-occupied lands in 
private parks; by involving conservation in the economy by demanding that conservation 
contribute to regional economic growth; and, by placing an economic or exchange value on 
nature, often through eco-tourism (Büscher 2013). TFCAs thereby require the large-scale 
alteration of land from a space for subsistence livelihoods into spaces where tourist uses take 
priority and nature and communities are presented in idealised ways. TFCAs have 
consequently led to displacement, eviction and the prioritising of the needs of wealthy 
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international travellers over local people (Brockington et al. 2008; Igoe and Brockington 
2007; Schuetze 2015; Walker 2015). Powerful donors are often highlighted as powerful non-
state actors in southern African conservation, “constantly ‘supplying’ the states in every 
possible way to expedite the political process, specifically those supplies the national state 
would need in order to make policy – maps, human and financial resources and policy 
documents” (Büscher and Dietz 2005: 10; Duffy 2006a; Wolmer 2003). Notably, the state’s 
role is changed by this relationship, but not necessarily diminished (the question of the state 
is discussed further in section 2.5 of this chapter, and in chapter five). Consequently, rather 
than a state-private dichotomy, it is useful to analyse the relationship between the state, the 
private and NGO sector in producing TFCAs. 
Lunstrum (2008, 2013) argues that the post-conflict Mozambican state furthered its own 
agenda and consolidated its power through the re-spacing of the Great Limpopo National 
Park. In a counterpoint to the increasing private governance of conservation parks, 
Lunstrum’s analysis emphasises the expansion of state power through increasing 
authoritarianism, for example through the detention and criminal prosecution of park 
residents for poaching. The state accrued significant material benefits including resources 
and financing for construction, the means to relocate communities and bring in animals, 
access to military and legal technologies to patrol and regularise the space, and the means to 
market the space for tourism (Lunstrum 2006). Rather than being seen as the encroachment 
of private interest into the state sphere, Lunstrum conceptualises this as “articulated 
sovereignty” (2013: 1), where sovereignty is manifested through properties, abilities and 
powers which emerge from interactions with other actors. The Mozambican state has rebuilt 
its power along neoliberal lines through partnerships with donors, rather than having its 
sovereignty reduced. Lunstrum has shown how a simple state-private dichotomy is not useful 
in understanding neoliberalism; rather than the neoliberalisation of conservation, we see the 
neoliberalisation of the state through conservation. Conservation must be understood as the 
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entanglement of capital accumulation and neoliberal processes with visions of modernity 
embedded in ideas of Mozambican independence, strategies of national development, and 
relations of political accumulation.  
In sum, the combined factors of an ideology of market-based conservation, accumulation by 
dispossession, alteration of state authority, the strategic blurring of state-private dichotomy, 
intensification of private governance, disciplinary governmentality and anti-politics are 
embodied in TFCAs, making them useful to understand how neoliberal goals are pursued 
through conservation.  
2.4.2.	Towards	a	synthesised	approach:	Neoliberal	conservation		
As can be seen from the previous discussion, the concept of neoliberal conservation is in no 
way under-examined or taken for granted. The literature recognises that it risks deploying 
terms like ‘neoliberalism’ simply as a “means of joining the crowd” (Brockington and Duffy 
2010:11), and several papers specifically address the validity and utility of the concept (e.g. 
Brockington and Duffy 2010; Büscher et al. 2012; Büscher and Arsel 2012). The strength of 
this literature is its ability to pinpoint a central technique of capitalism, namely, to expand 
through contradiction. It highlights the way in which ecological crises themselves become 
“opportunities for capitalist expansion” (Büscher et al. 2012: 7), placing conservation firmly 
within a historic capitalist project of expansion through nature (Moore 2015a). It also 
provides an overtly political critique of neoliberal interventions like payments for ecosystem 
services and tourism based conservation, often arguing that the solution to intensifying 
ecological crises cannot be constructed around the same logics that are driving the crises in 
the first place.  
This remarkably consistent critique agrees on the power, existence and broad characteristics 
of neoliberal conservation, which is viewed as a “new and historically original penetration 
and colonisation of nature” (Jameson 1991, cited in Büscher and Arsel 2012: 67). Strikingly, 
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it generally views any form of neoliberalism whatsoever as contributing to the accelerated 
destruction of ecologies, the alienation of humans and nature, and the entrenchment of a 
capitalist project that is generally understood in the most negative of lights. While I broadly 
accept the usefulness of the view that there is a discernible ideology and set of material 
practices called neoliberal conservation which this literature does important work in defining 
and critiquing, there are opportunities for a research agenda to develop the existing literature 
to consider questions including power, agency and the construction of neoliberalism.  
Turning first to power, the literature has itself taken an active role in defining, naturalising 
and perpetuating notions of neoliberal conservation as a unified and hegemonic entity. The 
definitions and typologies of schemes that constitute ‘neoliberal conservation’ tend to be 
painted in somewhat general terms, with the contradictions and contestations that arise in 
empirical case studies themselves explained as evidence for neoliberal conservation’s ability 
to absorb and manage contestation (Büscher 2013; Büscher et al. 2012). However, other 
literatures suggest that such disruptions might equally be evidence for the continued 
presence of non-neoliberal elements at the heart of conservation ideology and practice 
(Bakker 2009; Mitchell 2002). For example, a study by Sandbrook, Fisher and Bhaskar 
(2013) revealed that conservation professionals were far more critical of markets than 
suggested by the official view of their organisation. While this is addressed in a recent 
synthesised critique of the neoliberal nature literature (Büscher et al. 2012), dissent is 
analysed as either wholly managed through discipline, or permitted as a catharsis; in other 
words, the treatment of dissent itself provides further evidence for the overall and hegemonic 
neoliberalisation of conservation. However, this can also be read as a tautologous 
conclusion, that is, that any form of divergent practice or understanding whatsoever is a 
contestation to be ‘absorbed’, in turn providing confirmation of the ever-increasing 
hegemony of capital. As an alternative, it is possible to take seriously the observation that 
actual practice diverges from ideological vision. I suggest that such difference does not 
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necessarily prove neoliberal conservation’s crisis-reassertion-crisis logic, but rather, 
indicates an inherently impure project contingent on existing social arrangements - the 
“messy reality that characterises most conservation projects" (Sandbrook et al. 2013: 239).  
There is a deeper question here. The concept of socionature, if taken seriously, sits in tension 
with the implicit and explicit normative assessments of many political ecologists writing 
about neoliberal conservation. There are several competing claims in the literature. First, 
there is undoubtedly a commitment to socionature as a produced or social nature and a 
rejection of the ‘natural’ as providing grounding for normative, political or ethical claims. At 
the same time, the neoliberal nature critique often displays a sweeping normative judgement 
in which capitalism is considered to be anti-ecological. However, created or socionatures 
have no necessary normative qualities any more than imagined pristine or original natures 
do. Moreover, as Castree (2002: 141) argues “created ecosystems….. are more and more 
essential to the reproduction of contemporary social life”, and cannot be pre-determined to 
be ‘bad’ simply because they involve capitalist processes. Socionatures like forests or marine 
reserves cannot be reduced to pre-existing ‘natural’ qualities and are rather comprised of 
assemblages of ecosystems, technologies, and social systems such as customs of inclusion 
and exclusion, which serve different purposes to different audiences. The identification of 
capitalist processes in conservation per se is not enough to provide ethical or political insight 
into what might be a just socionature (Mansfield, Biermann, McSweeney, Law, Gallemore, 
Horner and Munroe 2015). With this opportunity to develop the literature, political 
ecologists have begun to grapple with ethical dimensions, such as literature which explicitly 
discusses the implications of using animals to advance capitalism and neoliberalism along 
with scholarship which explores the ontological politics and ethics of post-nature and post-
capitalism, such as Collard, Dempsey and Sundberg (2015), Mansfield et al. (2015) and 
Tsing (2015).  
51 
 
This leads into the related question ‘what is new and different about neoliberal 
conservation?’ The neoliberal nature epistemic community generally advances the view that 
neoliberal conservation involves the novel creation of products and services, as well as 
increasing intensification of solutions which favour the market. However, a different 
perspective is offered by Peluso (2012), who observes the long history of nature’s 
entanglement with, and production through, processes of capitalism. Peluso (2012: 85) 
argues that “neoliberal policies in parks, with wildlife, or in ecosystems are no less 
contradictory, obfuscatory or afflicted with unintended consequences than were the politics 
of socio-natural relations in other eras of capitalist production”. Under this historically 
situated approach, conservation is recognised as a historically situated process, while the 
commodities it produces are contextualised and situated within gendered, racialised and 
social relations of power. As Peluso puts it, “[h]ow nature and capitalism come into being, 
join together, or become undone is ambiguous on a global scale” (2012: 99), and must be un-
entangled empirically. This contribution encourages the neoliberal nature critique to consider 
how socionatures are shaped by more than neoliberal relations, and suggests that the 
commodification of nature is not necessarily a novel phenomenon. Peluso also suggests that 
who wins and who loses may be more of an open question than the neoliberal nature critique 
might allow. Recalling my arguments for a hybrid approach to political ecology, this, I 
argue, is where such a need is most apparent. Relational and process accounts both draw 
attention to neoliberalisation as an ontologically, ethically and politically impure project. 
Drawing on these approaches foregrounds both the contingency and the active construction 
and contestation of neoliberalism as a political process.  
2.5	Conservation,	the	state	and	private	governance	
This section examines the importance of the state in understanding contemporary dynamics 
of resource extraction and conservation in Mozambique. I draw here on literature on public 
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authority, territorialisation and state-making in connection with both natural resources and 
conservation, drawing comparisons between the two phenomena. 
2.5.1	Private	and	state	authority	
It has become common in international relations and political geography to refuse the 
‘territorial trap’ and argue for a diffuse view of state power and public authority in which 
power and authority is not only connected to the national state (rather, power is seen as 
produced through states and other entities as part of a relational structure), and where the 
state itself is not seen as necessarily a coherent and static entity (Allen 2011; Allen and 
Cochrane 2010; Jessop 2008). However, recent literature brings the state back in, reaffirming 
its central role in processes of accumulation (Moore 2014b; Parenti 2015). At the same time, 
Africa’s particular history of fragmented states, privatised governance, and contested 
borders, along with the uneven development caused by partial integration into global 
capitalism requires special attention to the concept of the state (Ferguson 2006; Mamdani 
1996; Mbembé 2001). African studies scholars are not so much concerned with 
straightforward processes of territorialisation and state-making, but how these processes 
thrive in the margins and in contested spaces, and how they then interact with broader 
questions of capital movement, development and environmental governance (Engel and 
Nugent 2010). This conversation has considerable relevance for understanding 
Mozambique’s booming interest in both extractive development and conservation.  
Parenti (2015) argues that the state is, and has historically been central to the capitalist 
process through its ability to deliver the use-value of nature to capitalist actors. For Parenti, 
the state is the only entity capable of delivering commodified nature through the creation of 
physical infrastructure, private property regimes and territorial sovereignty, and the 
mobilisation of knowledge, conceptualised together as “geopower” (2015: 834). This 
argument reflects a broader trend in political geography literature which positions the 
53 
 
national state at the heart of the neoliberal capitalist project, working with but not dominated 
by the private sector. Examples include the extraction of natural resources (Bridge 2014), 
and the provision of water (Ioris 2013). This literature argues that the centrality of the 
national territory will only intensify as capitalist accumulation through extractive growth 
intensifies, producing new forms of nature. The state is literally an environment-making 
machine, appropriating biophysical reality through territorial, military, legal and scientific 
means. The “environment-making” (Parenti 2015: 829) capitalist state is one which deploys 
these powers in the service of accumulation through appropriating, extracting and 
commodifying nature; an “ecology making institution” (Parenti 2015: 843) which is the 
central metabolising entity in capitalism.  
However, it is clear that geopower is often exercised by non-state actors, and is about more 
than the production of state space. A research agenda focussing on the new political 
topographies of Africa identify hybrid state-private spaces, novel enclaves like export zones, 
infrastructure which creates new global linkages even as it divides and excludes others, and 
novel forms of state-private power (Hönke 2012, 2013; Hönke and Cuesta-Fernandez 2015). 
This literature suggests that parts of Africa are witnessing novel regimes of re-
territorialisation by public and private actors, enacted through hybridised techniques, and 
resulting in novel borders, zones and locations which overlay and depend on state 
sovereignty, but which cannot be reduced to it (Engel and Nugent 2010, Schouten 2016). 
Frontiers (both physical and capital) can be spaces where accumulative and territorial rights 
are asserted by a variety of actors (state, private and informal) using a variety of techniques 
(authoritarian, participatory and consultative) to govern (Allen 2008; Hönke 2012). This 
reflects Lunstrum’s (2013) suggestion, discussed earlier in this chapter, that state and non-
state spaces in Mozambique is not an ‘either-or’ question, and that the ability to govern is 
manifested through a hybrid of private and state governance.  
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Re-spacing is also a matter of understanding how knowledge works to re-make material 
entities. TFCAs aim to re-produce idealised and uniform patterns of governance across a 
variety of heterogeneous and unruly cultures, people, natures and spaces. This is done 
through devising knowledge and governance which works across boundaries to produce new 
trans-national technological spaces. Barry’s (2006: 239) concept of a technological zone is 
useful here: “A technological zone can be understood as a space within which differences 
between technical practices, procedures and forms have been reduced, or common standards 
have been established”. Technological zones may include zones with common forms of 
measurement such as the adoption of metric calculations in most of Europe; infrastructural 
zones associated with common standards like common railway track gauges, and “zones of 
qualification which come into being when objects and practices are assessed according to 
common standards and criteria” (Barry 2006: 239). Geographically, zones may have only an 
indirect relationship to national borders, for example, subjecting countries and businesses 
who wish to trade with zones such as the European Union to particular demands and 
“speeding up the circulation of goods, persons and information along very particular 
directions” (Barry 2006: 242). This has particular relevance to Africa; as capital ‘hops’ 
across Africa’s hinterland to integrate some areas with the global economy while 
dispossessing others (Ferguson 2006), it is assisted through technological free-trade zones 
and globally-integrated infrastructures like ports, but also the movement of people through 
international airports and tourism zones. Thinking about TFCAs as technological zones helps 
to shed light on how they aim to integrate conservation into a global capital regime through 
the creation of tourism-based economic zones. This is particularly useful for understanding 




Ferguson’s (2005, 2006) discussion of the oil enclave provides a critical account of 
contemporary resource extraction dynamics in Africa2. Ferguson posits that oil extraction 
produces self-contained spaces which are highly connected to international capital, but are 
physically, socially and economically separate from the societies in which they operate. Oil 
and capital produce “spatially differentiated forms of political order” (2005: 381) in which 
the space within an extractive zone is connected to globalised capital and governed by 
transnational companies, and the space without, conceived as a ‘hinterland’ which is 
marginalised. Practices of spatial differentiation and securitisation are central; enclaves are 
“typically tightly integrated with the head offices of multinational operations and 
metropolitan centres”, while being “frequently walled off from their own national societies 
(often literally, with bricks and razor wire)” (Ferguson 2006: 203).  This dynamic has been 
hugely influential in understanding extractives in a variety of contexts and a variety of 
commodities and it is certainly very useful as a starting point to understand contemporary 
Mozambique. For example, Kirshner and Power’s (2015: 10) study of coal mining in Tete 
Province in central Mozambique describes a “proliferation of enclaved mineral-rich patches, 
privatised regional transport corridors/networks and urban spaces of enclosure” (2015: 29). 
Mozambique can be seen as uneven, in which systems of multi-scale capital accumulation 
                                                      
2 The starting point for looking at governance of resource extraction, particularly oil, is often the 
“resource curse” (Auty 2002: 1) and the “paradox of plenty” (Carmody 2011: 2) which explores the 
paradox of poverty in resource-rich states. In brief, it is commonly argued that natural resources, 
particularly oil, can curse economies through economic distortions, encouraging an unbalanced 
economy and by producing corruption, rent-seeking and weak democratic institutions. Accounts posit 
an economic curse in which resources are allocated disproportionately towards the primary 
commodities sector at the expense of other sectors (Collier 2008), or emphasise the role of poor 
democracy and weak, unaccountable institutions in producing poor outcomes in resource-rich states 
(Collier and Hoeffler 2005, Williams 2011), or prioritise context-led and political explanations of 
extractive states (Basedau 2005, Power 2001). This literature is indirectly relevant to this thesis, and is 
certainly on the radar of donors who wish to avoid Mozambique becoming “another Angola” due to 
its gas deposits (interview with USAID official 2, 2 May 2014, also Vines 2013); however, as I do not 
deal directly with the political economy of oil extraction I do not discuss it in detail.  
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produce the dispossession of some areas and the selective inclusion of others into regimes of 
export-driven capital accumulation. 
The re-spacing process seen in the development of extractive enclaves can be usefully 
compared to national parks, sharing features such as the commodification of nature, 
accumulation by dispossession and enclosure, while being experienced by indigenous 
communities in similar ways (Büscher and Davidov 2013; Lunstrum 2011). Conservation 
spaces may be similarly analysed as hybrid spaces in which private and state actors both 
govern and can benefit from capital accumulation from the goods the territory can yield. 
Conservation spaces also may be governed by the same hybrid of authoritarian and 
participatory techniques witnessed in extractive spaces. They might also usefully be seen as 
enclaves, in which a ‘profitable’ space is ring-fenced and prioritised for use by global elites, 
although, the development aims of TFCAs and their extensive interaction with communities, 
often not present in extractive enclaves, must also be taken into account here. The re-spacing 
debate has important bearing on this thesis, as I come to analyse the complexity of public 
and private sovereignty in the PPMR, and uneven geographies of Mozambique’s resources 
boom as it intersects with a similarly uneven geography of tourist habitat. 
I suggest that bringing international relations and African studies literature into conversation 
with Parenti’s ‘environment-making state’ calls for more attention to the question of 
environment-making through fractured and hybridised public and private authority. Building 
on research which shows how the state can develop its power and sovereignty through 
public-private conservation regimes, research is now required to how the state is currently 
negotiating conflicting imperatives of extractives-led growth against social and ecological 
concerns. These issues are taken up directly in this thesis, especially chapter seven. More 
broadly, if we see neoliberalism, and capitalism more generally as fundamentally an 
ecological project, the extraction and the conservation of Mozambique’s nature must be 




This chapter has discussed the debates I use to frame my empirical research. Rather than 
adopt a singular theoretical position, I have sought to find constructive engagement between 
different approaches to understanding conservation in the neoliberal era. The first section 
therefore addressed multiple perspectives to understanding nature and capitalism in political 
ecology, focussing on eco-Marxism, poststructuralism and relational theories. I suggested 
that conservation is too complex to reduce to pre-determined theoretical positions, and that a 
hybrid political ecology approach is useful which moves away from a conception of nature 
as a resource that can be accumulated or depleted, towards the relational reconfiguration of 
nature with capitalist processes, ideologies, symbolic and political narratives (Khan 2013). 
I reviewed literature concerning neoliberalism and conservation. I suggested that while 
neoliberalism is variegated, multi-faceted and contradictory, it can usefully be defined as a 
historically specific, ongoing and unfinished process characterised by patterns of 
privatisation, marketisation, de- and re-regulation, and the re-shaping of public sector and 
civil society. Having discussed some important challenges to the neoliberal nature literature, 
I put forward a historically situated account of contemporary conservation as simultaneously 
an ideology that prioritises ‘selling nature to save it’, alongside distinct forms of neoliberal 
governmentality and discipline and subjective, embodied and material practices (Büscher et 
al. 2012).  
I have highlighted ways in which this literature can be taken further by considering emerging 
areas political ecology taken up in this thesis. The first has been the need for greater attention 
to different forms of life besides human in understanding neoliberal power in conservation 
regimes. I have also brought conservation literatures into conversation with debates on the 
re-spacing of Africa, contemporary hybridised modes of governing extractive and 
conversation spaces, and how to understand both the central role of the state as both ecology-
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making machine, and as a contingent, fragmented and disjointed assemblage. The 
intensification of both extraction and conservation, if theorised as part of the same ongoing 
capitalist process, sheds new light on the ongoing project of neoliberalisation in 
Mozambique. This thesis takes these future directions up by theorising them both as new 
capital frontiers, showing how neoliberalism is being reworked through both extractive and 
conservation-oriented plans, and how multiple forms of socionature continue to be central to 
the capitalist project. Before doing this, I now turn to discuss the methodological approach to 








The half-way station and the community-run campsite are in a beautiful and remote 
spot about a 45 minute drive straight up the beach from Ponta town. Along the way, 
the rangers check for turtle nests and we see the first one of the season. It is 
measured and its location recorded. Just inland from the PPMR ranger’s hut, 
officially in the MSR, there is a small village of raffia huts on stilts in groups of 
between five and ten. The rangers explain the lack of public authority (which 
apparently places local women at risk of attacks), the lack of services, water and 
schools, all of which they try to address. They also do small things like take rice to 
them, and try to sort out community disputes. However, in the words of a local hotel 
manager, the community ‘feel they live there at the sufferance of the reserve, which 
they don’t like’. I interviewed a young man who works as a turtle monitor and at the 
campsite. The interview was conducted in Portuguese, Ronga and occasionally 
English, translated by a reserve guard and overseen by other reserve authority 
figures. My Portuguese was enough to work out that the rangers were occasionally 
making suggestions as to what answers the monitor should provide. I asked if the 
community wanted to leave the reserve or not. A ranger stepped in and responded 
directly with a phrase I had heard several times before: ‘some don’t, but they know 
they will have a better life’. Another guard reminded him to let the interviewee 
speak! This was clearly not a text-book way to conduct an interview. Yet, this short 
encounter demonstrates the control that the PPMR team has over the debate. They 
absolutely believe they act in the best interests of the community and of wildlife, but 
I also feel that today I have been told some of the worst aspects about conditions in 
the village (attacks, lack of medical care) in order to support the position that 
relocation is best for everyone. (Extract from fieldwork diary, 12 October 2013) 
 
3.1.	Introduction	
This passage from my fieldwork diary describes my first visit to the Maputo Special Reserve 
to interview a member of the community who lived near the ranger station at Millebangolale 
and observe a ranger beach drive en route. The episode highlights many of the challenges 
and issues I faced when researching in the PPMR. It reveals the ways in which the ability to 
travel around the PPMR is structured by the reserve’s authority (to protect turtle nests, only 
reserve vehicles are permitted to make the beach drive and everyone else must drive inland 
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or walk), and how the space is constructed through practices and performances of regulation, 
and embodied and material inequalities. It highlights the tensions in conceptualising what 
counts as ‘the field’, and how this became constructed and reconstructed throughout 
fieldwork by the choices I made in fieldwork. It vividly illustrates my positionality; for all 
the literature which warns against an imperialist approach to development research, here I 
was arriving at the MSR village in a luxury four-by-four and in the company of reserve 
authority figures. Yet, while on one level the event provides an illustration of the 
paternalistic agenda of trans-frontier conservation often emphasised in the literature, for me 
it also highlighted the difficulty in making straightforward assessments of the moral 
dilemmas at play. My research methods were entangled with these conceptual, political and 
ethical questions. 
In common with many political ecologists, I used qualitative and ethnographic methods to 
“explore the meaning of people’s worlds” (Brockington and Sullivan 2003: 57). Political 
ecology can be seen as a “community of practice” (Robbins 2011: 11) with shared 
methodological approaches. It is applied and empirical, that is, concerned with embedded 
research in messy, complex and tangible, ‘real world’ contexts. It is also political, that is, 
engaged in questions of power, politics and ethics, along with particular attention to 
processes of change and conflict. It is critical, that is, seeks to understand and critique 
fundamental underlying assumptions, and to deeply understand and provide theoretical 
accounts of the co-construction of nature-society relations within a global political economy. 
This attention to the particular and specific along with broader structures and processes 
conceptualise political ecology as “predicated on the assumption that any tug on the strands 
of global human-environment linkages reverberates throughout the system as a whole” 
(Robbins 2011: 13).  My overall research strategy, as this chapter will discuss, is to use in-
depth methods like participant observation, interviews, life histories and group discussion to 
understand the case of the PPMR, and combine this with cross-case theorising regarding 
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structural power and wider capitalist logics and processes, allowing me to understand both 
the ‘tugs’ and the wider relations (Harvey 2005, Peck and Theodore 2012).  
The case study approach has been contested and critiqued, and I wish to acknowledge and 
discuss questions while still offering an explanation of why I have conducted my research in 
the way that I did. The stance of this chapter is reflexive and self-critical, and it is not 
intended to offer a retrospective defence of an imagined coherent methodology that never 
really existed in the first place (the extract from my fieldwork diary above provides just one 
example of how things quickly deviated from text-book methods). Acknowledging, with 
Law (2004: 4), that “much of the world is vague, diffuse, or unspecific, slippery, emotional, 
ephemeral, elusive or indistinct, changes likes a kaleidoscope, or doesn't really have much of 
a pattern at all” means that I have, to some extent, introduced coherence and narrative to the 
research through methods. The chapter begins by setting out my epistemological approach, 
before focussing on the issue of case studies. I then go on to discuss in detail how I 
conceptualise the field, the methods I have used and why I used them, and some practical 
challenges. I then reflect on the many ethical and political aspects of my research, and how I 
have imposed coherence through analysis, writing, teaching and academic engagement. 
3.2.	Theoretical	and	methodological	framework	
The case study approach entails focussing on a specific example of ‘actually existing’ 
neoliberalism in its historical and geographical context. However, as I mentioned in chapter 
two, this approach suffers from problems, including generalisation (i.e. how to generate 
general conclusions on the basis of individual case studies), causation (i.e. how to attribute 
inequality or ecological degradation to neoliberal policies), and comparison (i.e. how to 
compare neoliberal processes that occur at different scales, times and across diverse 
socionatures) (Castree 2003, 2008a, 2008b). There is undoubtedly a tension between 
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theorising ‘neoliberalism’ or ‘neoliberalisation’ as an abstract concept and researching it by 
examining its instantiations, and I now discuss how I respond to this. 
First, I draw on dialectical thinking, which offers an explanation of how case studies can 
provide a window onto more general phenomena. Harvey (2005: 26) conceptualises that 
each case is “an internalisation of fundamental underlying guiding forces” which, if properly 
examined can enable identification and understanding of wider processes. As Harvey 
(2005:85) explains, “I stand, in short, to learn far more about the urban processes under 
capitalism by detailed reconstruction of how a particular city has evolved than I would from 
collection of empirical data sets from a sample of one hundred cities”.  Methodologically, 
this allowed for the reconstruction of processes of neoliberalisation which can then be 
compared to similar developments elsewhere, either directly through a comparative study, 
or, as I have done here, in drawing on literature which synthesises neoliberal nature 
(Brockington et al. 2008; Büscher et al. 2012; Igoe et al. 2011) and which discusses 
comparable cases in different contexts (e.g. Büscher 2013; Ramutsindela 2007). This is a 
similar claim to Peck and Theodore (2012: 180), who argue that “the fact that 
neoliberalisation always amounts to more than the sum of its local parts necessitates constant 
recourse to cross-case and cross-conjunctural modes of analysis, as opposed to 
extrapolations from one site or another”.  Crucially, Peck and Theodore differentiate 
between direct extrapolation of general claims from one case study, which would indeed be 
conceptually shaky, but rather, accept case studies as fundamental to a broader comparative 
research agenda. Theorising through this cross-case comparison allows both a detailed 
understanding of the contradictory and crisis-ridden operation of neoliberal processes in one 
area and a more general picture of the historic development of neoliberalism. This thesis 
therefore follows an iterative approach whereby detailed empirical work is interpreted in 
light of a wider body of similar cases of transfrontier and neoliberal conservation (Arsel and 
Büscher 2012; Büscher 2013).  
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A second useful strategy is to consider specific techniques of neoliberalisation in relation to 
particular types of socionature, looking beyond nature-as-resource to the many complex 
entanglements between human and non-human life (Bakker 2010). As Cavanagh (2014: 227) 
argues “[t]here is……a vital, living dimension to the politics of environmental change”. The 
question of community evictions in the PPMR pits turtle lives against the well-being and 
land claims of a marginal population, balanced in turn against broader questions of the kinds 
of human and animal life that should be maximised (and, conversely, which should be 
marginalised) through the promotion of conservation areas (Biermann and Mansfield 2014). 
As these and similar entanglements become increasingly complex (for example through 
climate change) there is a need to engage methodologies and conceptual frameworks which 
do away with nature (as understood as a separate and exterior entity) and seek to investigate 
the multi-dimensional assemblages of human and non-human life, technologies, emotional 
and affective relationships, and economic and political relations alongside eco-Marxism’s 
focus on capitalism (Lorimer 2012; Srinivasan 2014). Methodologically speaking, this 
requires attention to the more-than-human though foregrounding the interactions between 
animal and human bodies and how these interactions are governed through conservation 
interventions (including attention to forms of biopower). It also involves attention to the 
specific processes of the neoliberalisation of nature (commodification, financialisation, 
marketisation) and how they relate to particular socionatures. For example, privatisation may 
be more likely to be a successful strategy of neoliberalising water provision, while primitive 
accumulation through privatisation permits the capitalisation of nature necessary in the 
extractives sector (Bakker 2009). This is particularly important given the multiple natures 
subjects to neoliberal governance in Mozambique (especially the conservation and extraction 
sectors).  
Third, I also used research methods which pay attention to how neoliberal ideas are made to 
cohere through political processes. Instead of helping piece together wider processes and 
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structural forces, Law (2004: 143) proposes that method “helps to produce realities” through 
crafting “conventionally acceptable statements, representations or depictions of the realities 
for which they stand”. This performative account of method foregrounds the process of 
assembling; “to arrange, to dispose, to fit up, to combine, to order” (Law 2004: 41). For 
Law, coherent stories about an ‘out there’ world are achieved or accomplished through the 
work of construction of one narrative at the expense of alternative, messy and contradictory 
realities.  Similarly, Mitchell (2002) argues that capitalism is constructed through a process 
of reproducing a dualism which marks the ‘capitalist’ from the ‘non-capitalist’, imbuing the 
project with logic and coherence and reproducing the ontological category of ‘capitalism’. 
As discussed in chapter two and again in chapter six, assemblage insists on de-centred 
theories of agency and power in which ‘actors’ can be human, more-than-human, object or 
technology (and more). The word ‘actor’ therefore goes beyond a conscious awareness and 
intentional desire to influence political regimes (though it does include this), and the notion 
of ‘acting’ has been theorised several ways. In geography it often describes an unruly or 
unmanageable nature such as Bakker’s (2005) uncooperative water, while in philosophy it 
denotes a form of agency which is tied to the capacities and qualities of the actor, rather than 
a psychological intentionality (Dennet 1989). In social theory, actors are viewed simply as 
"entities that do things" (Latour, 1992: 241), making an actor a human, object or non-human 
animal which “acts or shifts action” (Akrich and Latour 1992: 259).  
While many proponents of relational thinking intend it to provide a direct critique of 
dialectics, I am clear that I employ this approach in a particular way. I acknowledge that 
strong relational thinkers would dispute the possibility that focussing on a particular case 
could do anything other than tell you about that particular assemblage and the actors in it 
(Law 2004). However, with Castree (2002), I argue that this account fails to achieve the 
goals of differentiating between historical, cultural or geographically different areas of 
reality, and has a “flattening” (Laurier and Philo 1999:1016, cited in Castree 2002:134) 
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rather than explanatory power. In addition, while the material world does seem to co-produce 
outcomes with the human world, it is also clear that, as Castree (2002) argues, capitalist 
power does seem to accumulate in particular actors and institutions, and an account of these 
uneven power relations is required. In light of this critique, I prefer to use assemblage 
methodology to draw attention to political practice including both the performative processes 
through which development and environment schemes are given coherence, and the 
performative outcomes that result from such processes, such as the creation and adoption of 
subject positions. Methodologically, this can mean neoliberalism’s appearance of 
consistency and agency and asking how this is crafted and reproduced through assemblage. I 
do this by examining the presentation of discourses and ideologies in interviews and 
organisational texts, the day-to-day performances of managing dissenting views such as the 
PPMR’s consultation program, and forums in which political issues are debated such as a 
Conservation Policy Workshop that I attended in Maputo. 
Such an approach had two advantages, the first of which is that it enabled me to focus on the 
processes by which the PPMR achieves an appearance of coherence, especially those which 
translate political issues such as ecological degradation, resource politics and land claims 
into those which can be managed in techno-managerial ways (Mitchell 2002; Mosse 2005).  
This provides insights into the de-politicisation which surrounds development schemes, and 
brings important political issues to light. A second advantage is that it enables greater clarity 
around the central importance of tension and contradiction to neoliberal schemes. As Li 
(2007b) observes, the ideas of improvement that underpin development schemes sometimes 
sit awkwardly alongside capitalist goals of accumulation and growth. However, rather than 
challenging either the goals of the development scheme or the principles of capitalism, these 
fundamentally irrevocable tensions produce escalations in techniques of meaning-making, 
persuasion and anti-politics. By focussing on the shifting discourses and performances of 
neoliberal conservation, I was able to elucidating the uneven and multifaceted operation of 
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neoliberalism as active rationality. This still permits the kind of attention to multiple and de-
centred agency encouraged by strong relational thinking, but also places capitalist and 
neoliberal processes central to the kinds of transformations at play in Mozambique.  
My overall goal was therefore to try to move between approaches concerned with 
reconstructing patterns and regularities, especially in relation to techniques of 
neoliberalisation and specific socionatures, and one which focusses on the messy and the 
specific through examining day-to-day practices of assemblage. As Li (2007b: 28) contends, 
a multifaceted research strategy like this is useful to ask different questions and draw 
attention to different “fragments of reality”.  Engaging this range of methodological 
approaches enabled me to use a deep understanding of the co-production of ‘actually 
existing’ neoliberalism with Mozambican history and geography, while also considering how 
these processes form part of a wider political project.  
3.3.	Research	design	and	methods	
I use qualitative and ethnographic methods including interviews, particularly open and in-
depth conversations rather than structured, a fieldwork diary, observation (sometimes as a 
participant through attendance at workshops and events in the conservation world), 
accompanied with policy and textual analysis. This section discusses my research design, 
methods and practical challenges in more detail.  
3.3.1.	The	field	and	fieldwork	
I decided to research Mozambique and the PPMR for several reasons. My interest in marine 
conservation is longstanding. As a dive master in Thailand, I was often confronted with the 
gap between the discourse of the conservation goals of nature-based tourism and the reality, 
though I lacked the theoretical knowledge and reflexive awareness to decipher it at the time. 
I became interested in the multiple political and geographical issues raised by trans-frontier 
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conservation when I was a Masters student. When I was considering potential research topics 
in 2011-12, the PPMR was Africa’s only trans-frontier marine protected area, and it was a 
major flagship project, making it an exciting and current case study to combine my interest 
in marine conservation with attention to the politics of trans-frontier conservation areas. In 
addition, I was growing increasingly interested in the complexities of resource politics in 
southern Africa, and Mozambique was on the radar as one of Africa’s supposedly rising 
economies thanks to its resources boom. The country’s recent transitions are both fascinating 
in their own right and relevant to the wider debates in which my interest was growing. There 
was also comparatively little literature on Mozambique compared to the east African 
countries I had focussed on in previous studies, highlighting Mozambique as a research 
opportunity. It may be that I am also guilty of the being drawn to the romantic imaginaries 
that surround Mozambique. I have been immersed in globalised scuba diving culture which 
has long celebrated the country as the next exotic diving frontier. These imaginaries, 
combined with Mozambique’s dynamic post-war transitions and the intensification of both 
extractives-led growth and the TFCA agenda made the PPMR a compelling research project. 
However, once I had established the case for researching the PPMR, I then was faced with 
the choice of how and where to travel in the large reserve, who to speak to, and whether to 
extend my research to South Africa and Zambia, the other participating countries in the 
Lubombo TFCA. Many of these choices were made as the research evolved, particularly in 
light of practical considerations discussed below. I therefore do not wish here to 
retrospectively impose coherence on what was often a research process driven by being in 
the field rather than planned meticulously in advance. That said, my initial research choices 
were driven by my desire to focus in-depth on the practices and ideologies which drive 
conservation, which meant I had to focus on elites. I had also encountered literature 
regarding controversies between communities and the PPF, and consequently I knew that I 
would have an eye for those issues in this study.  
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I did not conceive the PPMR as a bounded area for research terms, and I focussed instead on 
what Li (2007b: 5) calls a “field of power”, which consists of those actors, ideologies and 
practices directed at the “will to improve” (ibid), or in the case of the PPMR, the ‘will to 
conserve’. I draw on several scholars in describing this research design, including 
Brockington and Duffy (2010:27) who argue that the field can be conceived of as “networks 
of conservation, commerce and the state” which work as a “development-conservation 
nexus” (Büscher and Dietz 2005:1), or, as one respondent in my study pithily put it, as a 
“conservation bubble”. Doing fieldwork with this networked community means researching 
a group of people connected by virtue of their professional involvement in conservation. 
Travlou’s (2014: 245) conceptualisation of “rhizomatic ethnography”, that is, ethnographic 
research as a process of following lines and connections which emerge as relevant 
throughout the study was also helpful here. The lines to begin following can be planned in 
advance, but developments can be influenced by happenstance and luck. However, that is not 
to say that they emerged entirely by chance, and in line with my conceptualisation of the 
need to capture wider power relations and political-economic processes, I also informed my 
ongoing research by using a deeper understanding of the community and issues of interest. I 
began in the PPMR head office, tracing a relatively small and highly interconnected 
community of people out from this initial encounter across diverse locations (for example, to 
the ranger station in the MSR illustrated in figure 3.1), guided by the concept of a 
development-conservation nexus.  
I designed my research around a first trip of seven weeks in October and November 2013 to 
Ponta do Ouro town where the office of the PPMR is located. This gave me the chance to 
build a relationship with key informants in the reserve, and observe at close hand the day-to-
day operation of power. A second trip from March to June 2014 took me to Maputo, 
Mozambique’s capital city, and to Inhambane, a small town on the south-central coast, as 




Figure 3.1: Ranger station, PPMR, October 2013 (author photograph) 
Overall, I was in Mozambique for a total of five and a half months. My time in Maputo of 
approximately three weeks was spent talking to policy makers and donors, elites who play an 
influential role in the development conservation nexus, visiting academics and conducting 
one formal interview at the geography department at Universidade Eduardo Mondlane 
(UEM), as well as attend the Conservation Policy in Mozambique workshop which provided 
access to many significant actors. Attending this event was an excellent opportunity to 
witness the complex ways in which policy is both created and contested, and to see the 
interactions between conservation officials, NGOs, researchers, donors and Mozambican 
government officials at first hand. The conservation community was small and well-
networked, and I often found that I would meet participants based in one location again in 
another; for example, a marine conservation NGO head happened to be staying in the same 
hotel as me in Maputo, facilitating an informal interview. The purpose of the visit to 
Inhambane was to interview several members of an active and high-profile marine 
conservation community including Bitonga Divers/ Ocean Revolution. This organisation is 
home to many prominent Mozambican marine conservation activists. At that stage in my 
research, Ocean Revolution was due to begin work in the PPMR training local Mozambicans 
to become dive masters and instructors, a major commitment of the PPMR’s community 
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development strategy and part of Ocean Revolution’s goal of de-colonising scuba diving. As 
it turned out, this work is now being provided by a different organisation, but my time in 
Inhambane enabled me to get a deeper understanding of some of the activists who are 
attempting to shape marine conservation, to see the development of marine biology 
knowledge first-hand, and see how conservation is communicated to traditional 
communities. As noted by other scholars of trans-frontier conservation, this contrast between 
ethnographic complexities against a critical engagement with the structural power of 
development makes for rich research (Büscher 2013). 
3.3.2.	Challenges	and	limitations		
This section discusses the logistical, financial and time pressures which shaped the research. 
An immediate practical consideration, and one which proved to be a continuing challenge 
throughout research, was travel and logistics. With the exception of Maputo and other major 
cities where there are regular buses and affordable taxis, Mozambique is often difficult to 
travel around unless you have private transport, ideally a large four-by-four land cruiser. The 
transport system in Mozambique reflects its uneven economy. Especially outside of Maputo, 
rich Mozambicans, well-off expats, NGO and donor employees and tourists could hop from 
place to place by plane or travel in private transport, whereas many ordinary citizens took 
chapas (a local van) or walked. There is little regularised public transport and many places, 
including Ponta do Ouro are not currently served by a tarmacked road. Travelling the 120 
km to the PPMR from Maputo involved a six-hour journey by private four-by-four taxi, 
which cost over £120 one way, a journey I made several times. This was the only way to 
reach the town as the unseasonably wet weather meant the public chapas were either not 
running or were getting stuck in the sand dunes and not reaching Ponta do Ouro. I also chose 
to walk a lot, around Ponta do Ouro and around Maputo. I was considered somewhat unusual 
in this habit; as a white person, it was often expected that I drive. 
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The second and related obstacle was cost. Mozambique is an expensive destination, 
especially when conducting research on Maputo elites and in areas where much of the 
(limited) infrastructure is geared towards the needs of well-off tourists. As noted above, 
public transport was limited and expensive, and I faced similar issues when it came to 
accommodation, especially in Maputo where hostel and hotel rooms are notoriously costly 
and limited in availability. As an established tourist area, Ponta do Ouro is similar. Over my 
total time in Mozambique, these costs added up significantly.  
Conducting an extended study over several locations meant I had to be strategic in where to 
go and who to follow. While I retained flexibility to be able to take advantage of unplanned 
opportunities, I could not move too often and therefore decided to plan my trips in chunks, 
focussing most of my time and resources on extended stays in the PPMR and Maputo.  
Though I planned at the outset to also research the PPMR’s partner marine protected area in 
South Africa, the iSimangaliso, I decided to remain within Mozambique for several reasons, 
partly due to the prohibitive cost of travelling in and out of the PPMR and partly due to the 
time I was spending focussing on the day-to-day processes of assemblage in the reserve. 
Most importantly, from the early stages of my research it became increasingly clear that 
Mozambique’s resources boom was a significant issue for many of my respondents. 
Consequently, my research quickly became less focussed on the possible frictions between 
multiple countries in a TFCA, but on what, following Büscher and Davidov (2013), I began 
to conceptualise as the co-production of extraction and conservation. Overall, choosing to 
remain only in Mozambique was a decision driven by the research as it unfolded.  
A third challenge was gaining official permission. While getting a multi-entry visa as a PhD 
student was straightforward, all research in Mozambique’s protected areas must be approved 
by the Ministry of Tourism. I had to provide the PPMR Reserve Manager with an 
explanation of my research and wait for official approval before I could start researching. 
This permission was granted on my arrival in dialogue with the reserve manager. A fee of 
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24,000 meticais (about £300) was waived, with an explanation that social research was to be 
encouraged in the PPMR to help it to run better. As my goal in this research was to see 
development and conservation in action, this was certainly facilitated by a good relationship 
with this management team but, as will be discussed in the ethics section, this immediately 




My primary method was interviews, which enabled me to “collect and rigorously examine 
narrative accounts of social worlds” (Miller and Glassner 2011:144). I sought a rich 
understanding of how interviewees understood their involvement in the development-
environment nexus, and I conceptualised participants as describing their own positions and 
framings of these issues. In this sense, I do not view interviews as providing a ‘real’ insight 
either into out-there knowledge or into a stable, authentic inner world. Rather, they provided 
an opportunity to explore interviewees’ own interpretations of their lived experience in the 
context of the interview. I interpreted the knowledge as a “joint accomplishment” (Miller 
and Glassner 2011: 141) between myself and the interviewee. Interviews were nearly always 
audio recorded and then transcribed, which negated the need for notes and meant I could 
engage fully in the conversation. Informed consent was sought and recorded in a consent 
form and I gave my respondents a note to take away which explained the research and gave 
my contact details. Interviews were generally conducted in English; despite my attempts to 
learn some Portuguese before leaving, and hopes that this language skill would improve 
throughout fieldwork, all of the Mozambican conservation actors spoke excellent English (a 
combined result of their need to communicate with the global development political 
economy, their status as well educated, often in overseas institutions, and, for those in the 
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PPMR, the need to deal directly with their very proximate South African neighbour and 
regular international visitors). As one PPF official joked, I was more likely to pick up 
Afrikaans than Portuguese in the reserve.  
My interview participants were varied, reflecting the multiple actors in conservation, 
including tourists, officials, NGOs and other agencies, communities, businesses and 
residents. I conducted a total of 40 interviews (some with groups or couples), and conducted 
informal discussion with several more NGOs, conservation officials, donors and 
Mozambican Government officials at conservation events and conferences. Some of these 
interviews were with key informants that were interviewed multiple times over several 
hours. A full list of participants is found in appendix A. I chose my participants on several 
grounds, ranging from their involvement and importance in the governance and management 
of the PPMR, their responsibilities as donors and policy makers, their prominence as 
activists, and their day-to-day involvement in life in the PPMR. This included speaking with 
community members affected by the reserve, including those people due to be relocated and 
those who benefitted through employment with the reserve (sometimes these were the same 
individuals), along with private businesses, tourists, and Mozambican academics and 
activists. It was not always clear from the outset who would be likely to be important; my 
fieldwork often meant contacting people who emerged as relevant throughout the process, 
piecing things together as I went. I did not use a pre-determined set of questions, and topics 
for discussion depended on the interviewee. For example, when I interviewed participants in 
ocean safaris, I asked them about their experiences. When interviewing Frelimo officials, I 
focussed conversations around the institution that they worked for, key policies and 
achievements, but often centred on processes of change and topical conservation issues (such 
as poaching) to try to encourage a more conceptual discussion. As discussed in the ethics 
section below, many of my respondents were very aware of contemporary and controversial 
debates in conservation (such as trade-offs between attracting tourists and protecting 
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vulnerable ecosystems, and ideas about sustainable development), and discussions often 
developed along lines which emerged in the interview.  
As the literature emphasises, reflexivity is vital in conducting interviews in developing 
contexts, and I had to pay attention to how my gender, race and perceived social positioning 
affected the research. However, this was not always a simple relationship of uneven power 
relations with me as a white, Western researcher perceived as dominant. On the contrary, 
interviewing elites raises a number of methodological debates (Desmond 2004). As Smith 
(2006) discusses, power relations in interviews are complex, and it not as simple as assigning 
power to individuals based on their position in a system of structural power. Feminist writers 
such as Rose (1993) particularly critique the assumption that power is automatically ascribed 
to elites based on their assumed social superiority, as this uncritical stance reinforces 
gendered (and racialised) assumptions. Allen (2011) argues for a more fluid and 
performative account of power, turning away from the view that power is something held or 
retained by elites or by organisations, and rather proposing a diffuse, relational and context-
driven account of power, understood as stemming from social relationships. For Allen, 
“power is an effect which is produced through the actions of groups and 
individuals……..mobilised on what is often a loose and tenuous basis” (2011:38). These 
debates challenge the notion that elites can be said to hold power by virtue of their place in a 
social structure, and that this power is automatically transferred into the interview space 
(Smith 2006). Applying the critical debates discussed above to the field of development 
studies disrupts the notion that elites can be neatly assumed to be more knowledgeable and 
superior to other members of their society. 
Nevertheless, members of organisations like the PPF or the World Bank do hold a high 
degree of power in development and should be researched on this basis (Scheyvens et al. 
2003a). In conservation and tourism, they play key roles in decisions about where reserves 
should be located and how they should be operated (Darbi and Hall 2014). Furthermore, the 
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way that historical structures of colonialism inscribed racial, social and economic divisions 
in Mozambique cannot be minimised, bringing the idea of structural power back in. I 
therefore cannot ignore the fact that uneven power relations structured by the ideas and 
practices of development present clear issues in some interviews, such as in the encounter 
described in the opening of this chapter. The interviews I did undertake with people who 
could be described as marginalised raised specific ethical issues regarding possible outcomes 
of the research, discussed further in the ethics section below. I adopt the position that, while 
power is not seen as ‘held’ in a straightforward or automatic way, it is undeniably something 
that is wielded unevenly in the development sphere, in which different positions enable 
people to shape the world in different ways. This, I argue, forges a closer connection 
between my methodological approach and the conceptual debates discussed in chapter two 
and again in chapter six, by drawing attention to power as something which is situated in the 
practices of development and conservation.  
‘Following the power’ meant interviewing those decision-makers to understand how global, 
regional and national policies related to trans-frontier conservation are articulated and 
understood by those responsible for designing and implementing them. I include both 
influential Mozambicans and those foreign nationals (nearly always South African, North 
American, European or Brazilian) who also hold influence in the development-conservation 
nexus as elites3. I successfully gained access to several senior Peace Parks Foundation and 
PPMR officials, along with officials in relevant departments such as ANAC, Biofund and 
MITUR in Maputo, donors and conservation NGOs, and several conservation researchers 
                                                      
3 I recognise, as Scheyvens et al. (2003a) point out, that ‘elite’ can be seen as a Western construct and 
should also include categories such as influential members of local communities and people holding 
high rank in customary power structures. However, for the purposes of researching global and national 
neoliberal processes, elite here refers to categories of donors, conservation management, conservation 
researchers and government officials.   
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and scientists4. Access to these elites was often surprisingly easy, and I found that other 
members of the relatively small Mozambican conservation community were often happy to 
facilitate introductions. I also employed proactive tactics such as speculatively visiting 
departments and offices, emailing and text messaging, which sounds far more impolite than 
it actually was, it being fairly common practice in many African countries including 
Mozambique to seek interviews in this way. Many interviews also snowballed from the 
conservation science workshop, and similarly, the management team in the PPMR was 
extremely welcoming and willing to facilitate meetings with other PPF officials. As with 
many aspects of my fieldwork, serendipity played a role in being in the right place at the 
right time to be introduced to people of significance in the development-conservation nexus. 
It also required, as I have already mentioned, being prepared to change location to ‘follow 
the power’. As a consequence, my interviews took place in several locations across Maputo, 
Ponta do Ouro and Inhambane, often in NGO, donor and government offices, in the PPMR 
headquarters in Ponta do Ouro but also in beach cafes and city bars. I also conducted pre- 
and post- fieldwork conversations by Skype, telephone call and email. While I interviewed 
some key informants multiple times over several hours, which meant that I was able to think 
about and refine questions in time for our next meeting, at other times I had just 30 minutes 
as a one-off with a person. This meant I had to be quick and adaptable and did not permit 
pilot interviews; often I had one chance at trying to understand a particular participant’s 
position.  
                                                      
4 There were some important organisations that I was not able to secure time with. These include 
WWF Mozambique; although I was in an email exchange with the key contact responsible for MPAs 
and visited the office in person to research policy documents and brochures, the individual in question 
advised me that she was unfortunately too busy to be interviewed. I was also unable to interview 
anyone from the Mozambican Maritime Department (INAMAR/ Instituto Nacional da Marinha), 
although I did visit the offices several times. I was requested not to try to interview the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications (responsible for the then-proposed deep water port in the PPMR), as 




As well as those I interviewed, I also understand my research participants to include those 
with whom I had informal discussion and those whose lives I observed through day-to-day 
living in Ponta and other sites. McCall (2006:4) suggests that participant observation should 
be understood broadly to encompass “not just a single method but a necessarily multi-
method, mixed-method mode of social research”. This should include extended living in the 
context, actively participating in all aspects of everyday life, from informally “hanging out” 
(ibid), to getting to grips with in-depth tacit and explicit cultural knowledge. While I do not 
contend that my research is aimed at understanding life and culture within the PPMR in this 
holistic and anthropological way, I consider that my extended stay enabled observation of 
how the idealised plans and schemes of the PPF sat in tension with the lived realities of the 
reserve (Li 2007b). It also drew my attention to how the scheme is relationally produced 
through encountering the area’s particular history and geography. By observation, I include 
walking in and around the PPMR, particularly Ponta do Ouro town, and taking part in every-
day life such as shopping in the market and observing the regulation activities which took 
place at the main boat launch point in town. This was not always easy observation, as 
observed in my fieldwork diary on 29 September 2013:  
I was sitting quietly in the beach bar listening to the increasingly enthusiastic and 
cheerful conversations among the staff. As soon as they saw me, they instantly shut 
up and the gardener apologised (“I have been told to make no noise”), and both 
resumed their tasks – silently mopping the outside bar and cleaning the pool. Their 
silence contrasted with a loud table of white South Africans who arrive shortly after 
this encounter. They smoke, talk, watch rugby and drink beer. One boy, no more 
than 17, clicks his fingers for the black waiter to come over to his table. All the 
businesses I have encountered so far are owned by white South Africans or white 
Mozambicans, with manual and service jobs performed by black Mozambicans. 
 
While this was by no means uniform across the reserve, this was one of many examples of 
the unequal access to the benefits of tourism that I recorded, and would not be the last 
instance of what I perceived as disrespectful behaviour by white guests to black staff in 
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hotels and resorts. This encounter shows how observation as a method can reveal how space 
is inscribed with race (Rose 1993), and how these inequalities are intertwined with the 
political and the economic in trans-frontier tourism in Africa (Büscher 2013). This provided 
a picture of how inequalities pervasive throughout the reserve are present in day-to-day 
encounters. 
I have tentatively used the term ‘participant observation’ to describe some of my 
observational work, noting the slippery position between insider and outsider I occupied 
throughout my fieldwork (Miller and Glassner 2011). Being perceived as an ‘insider’, such 
as with Western and Mozambican conservation activists, I found I was taken as having a 
similar outlook on life, similar position and similar values. This often facilitated open 
conversation and led to further lines to follow in the nexus. Sharing a “positional space” 
(Scheyvens et al. 2003b:186) was also useful with other elites such as conservation 
management, government officials and donors, made even easier by a shared language, and 
facilitated some frank discussions. However, I did try to maintain an ‘outsiderness’, partly 
for reasons of tactics (to enable me to ask questions which might sound ignorant from a 
‘real’ insider), but mainly to negotiate the question of how I represented myself. It was 
important for me to ensure that my research participants understood I was not necessarily 
aligned with particular political positions, a stance discussed further in the ethics section 
below. This is in line with Barry (2013: 26-27) who approached his fieldwork on a 
controversial oil pipeline as “rather than being embedded in one organisation or aligned with 
one position, I moved back and forth across the lines, attempting not to be partisan, tracing 
the course of disputes from as many directions as possible”. However, the nature of 
encounters meant I sometimes gained insights from an insider perspective, becoming 
perceived as a member of the very nexus I was trying to research. While my goal in this 
research was to remain unaffiliated and to try to understand a multiplicity of opinions rather 
than advance a particular agenda, this was not always easy. 
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I took part several times as a paying participant in marine tourist activities like scuba diving 
and dolphin safaris. I consider myself as an embedded participant in this world, able to 
understand tacit and explicit sub-cultural knowledges. However, while it would have been 
easy to slip back into a familiar pattern of talk and behaviour which reproduces values of 
ecotourism (that ‘animals are worth more alive than dead’, for example), and which 
marvelled uncritically at the presentation of a ‘pristine’ underwater world, these encounters 
provided the opportunity to take a critical stance and explore the complexity of the 
embodied, material, and more-than-human encounters present in such activities, such as 
observing the interactions between marine scientists, technology, and the animals they 
researched. I was also invited along to several events, including a village talk (where Bitonga 
Divers go to a remote village for an evening of music, marine conservation presentation, 
competitions and dancing), a conservation policy workshop, to take part in a beach patrol 
drive with the reserve team, an educational day for local children and beach clean-ups in the 
PPMR, and a night time turtle watch and dinner with visiting Dutch donors. Rather than 
filming these events or taking extensive photographs, which may have been intrusive or 
distracting, I would record these events in my fieldwork diary, which became an invaluable 
way to document reflections throughout the fieldwork.  
3.3.4.3.	Documents	and	texts	
Documents provided an important means of tracing the conservation-development nexus 
when used as part of a broader ethnographic project. As Brenner et al. (2010a, 2010b) 
explain, processes of neoliberalisation occur through the constant interplay between 
experimental regulatory reform expressed through official policy documents and other grey 
literature, and existing political and institutional circumstances. This implies a dynamic, 
fluid and evolving process, characterised by Harvey (2005: 88) as a “moving map”. In order 
to understand the multi-scale, multi-actor framework that characterises the development-
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conservation nexus, research must seek connections between regulatory innovation at a 
variety of scales and between different state and non-state institutions. To achieve this, 
Brenner et al. (2010) suggest treating policies as ‘living’ entities, tracing the history and 
development of particular regulatory change and seeking family resemblances between ideas 
at multiple sites. Scrutinising texts like policies, organisational websites, laws, brochures, 
annual reports, press statements and other written material was therefore a major part of 
analysing how major institutions like the Peace Parks Foundation, the World Bank, WWF 
and the Government of Mozambique aim to introduce and influence trans-frontier 
conservation projects. The analogy of a moving map is also relevant to the fluidity of the 
announcements circulating about Techobanine Port and the potential relocations of the MSR 
communities. Much of my fieldwork dealt in rumour and speculation, rather than concrete 
plans. While this was revealing in that I could consider how ideas were constructed and 
mobilised by different actors, it also meant being attuned to uncertainty, for example, by 
treating government announcements and policies as just one aspect of a shifting situation, 
rather than as definitive.  
I chose documents on the basis of how relevant they were to the theories that emerged from 
fieldwork, and the extent to which they helped me understand the development of 
Mozambique’s TFCA policy and its wider conservation policy landscape (especially PPMR 
2009, 2011; World Bank 1996, 2005a, 2012, 2014, 2015; AfDB 2011). Like my fieldwork, 
this list of sources grew throughout my research, informed by my growing knowledge of the 
debates and actors. While I prepared myself as far as possible in advance of fieldwork by 
reading key policies that are easily available like World Bank publications, it was often 
difficult to search for Mozambican laws and policies online. In addition, some key 
documents were provided directly to me by research participants, such as the PPMR 
Management Plan. I read these documents with an eye to critical literature which focussed 
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directly on my area of study, for example McKeown’s (2015) history of turtle conservation 
in South Africa and Mozambique which I could use as background for current policy.  
3.4.	Ethics	and	politics	
Research in developing countries is highlighted by the University of Edinburgh and the 
Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC Framework for Research Ethics, September 
2012) as presenting special concerns, specifically, safety of researcher and researched, 
attention to unequal power relationships, and political sensitivities. I conducted my research 
in accordance with these institutions’ requirements, including ensuring informed consent and 
autonomy of participants; confidentiality of research material; avoidance of harm to 
researcher and researched; and, transparency and integrity during and after research. I 
ensured the informed consent of participants by making sure they understood my research 
aims and position, by providing a consent form and through seeking verbal consent 
following a clear explanation. I explained that they were free to cease working with me at 
any point to ensure their free participation during and after the research process. During the 
fieldwork, I tried to pay attention to ways in which my research might be disruptive in the 
community, and now that the research is completed, I have tried to represent the individuals 
and groups who have taken part in my analysis fairly. The identity of research participants is 
kept confidential, and they are referred to in oblique terms. While the avoidance of direct 
harm is addressed in these points relating to safety, confidentiality and consent, the wider 
issue of avoiding harm in research is complex. I now move to discuss some thorny issues 
which arose in greater detail. 
Gaining what turned out to be a reasonable degree of access within a well-networked group 
raised particular ethical and political dilemmas. Some participants were surprisingly candid 
in interview, in particular when it came to critiquing the Frelimo government and its 
approach to conservation, or discussing the approach of their own or another organisation. In 
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some interviews, I was asked to stop recording while a controversial opinion was articulated, 
and in others, interviewees would make critical comments, then try to backtrack or appear 
uncomfortable and as if they regretted being so open. More than one interviewee stated that 
it could be dangerous to openly criticise Frelimo. Stories of violence in conservation 
threatened or perpetrated against some of my interviewees by organised poaching groups or 
disgruntled individuals was a recurrent theme. I therefore needed to be very careful with the 
many ways information could place participants at risk through, for example, revealing some 
participants’ critique of their own organisation which could be, at very least, damaging to 
their careers, while also presenting a critical and in-depth analysis of contemporary 
dynamics. This line is not an easy one to tread. In addition, I had to interpret the knowledge 
produced by these interviews carefully. While in some cases personal opinion and frankness 
was offered, in others, it was strongly apparent that I was being given an official line, 
particularly when I was interviewing more than one person from an organisation together 
(where, for example, the senior member might emhasise the official interpretation to a 
greater degree than if he or she was interviewed alone). There was sometimes significant 
slippage between personal opinion and articulation of official position, while other 
participants demonstrated a great deal of commitment to official policy position, aligning 
their own agendas with that of their organisation. Still others presented personal opinion only 
and were keen to avoid being seen as speaking on behalf of their employer in an official 
capacity. I have taken steps to address these issues in interviewing through assigning 
pseudonyms. In some cases I have paraphrased responses or reported events through the lens 
of my fieldwork diary to add greater confidentiality. To an extent, I have given participants 
some power over their own interviews by sending copies of transcripts for comments or 
revision where possible. In all cases, I retain responsibility for my interpretation of the data.  
The tension I describe above is related to the issue of research integrity. I found that a useful 
distinction was the difference between using participants as mere instruments for my own 
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research and career goals against the possibility of forming longer relationships. I have 
endeavoured to remain in contact with key informants, by keeping the reserve management 
up-to-date on the progress of my research through emails and telephone calls and sending 
interim documents like interview transcripts and a copy of a paper which emerged from 
dialogue with Centro Terra Viva, a civil society organisation, regarding gas extraction and 
community activism (Symons 2016), and examples of how I was using my research in 
teaching at the University of Edinburgh. Another way of fostering long-term relationships 
will include disseminating my research through a shorter report. I am required to share my 
thesis with the reserve authorities as a condition of my research permit. The reserve manager 
will therefore see a copy of this thesis, and I intend to be guided by him as to what form of 
shorter report, if any, might be useful. Research integrity also implies fairly representing 
multiple realities in my research and analysis process, which hopefully is apparent in the 
discussion that follows in the coming chapters.  
A second and related dilemma was presented by my initial process of gaining permission to 
work in the PPMR. The fact that the £300 fee was waived placed me in a relationship with 
the reserve management in which I felt a sense of obligation. This was certainly not the first 
time that a social scientist was permitted to work in the PPMR without paying such a fee. 
The reserve manager explained that he recognised that lone researchers like PhD students are 
not in a position to pay the fee, and that the permit process is targeted more at large research 
projects, especially those which take samples. Through this attitude he hoped that social 
science research in the reserve would be encouraged, although, the management team 
complained to me that researchers in the past had often failed to report back their findings. 
The relationship I developed with the reserve team was in many ways very useful, as it 
facilitated access to various actors in the PPMR, and more importantly, helped me develop a 
deep understanding of the operation of the reserve. But on the other hand, I also felt a subtle 
expectation that my research would both not be critical, and would provide some tangible 
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results, for example, some insight which would assist in the management of the reserve. This 
raised conflicts of interest; as Mosse (2005: 13) reports, “[d]evelopment organisations are in 
the habit of dealing with criticism and the questioning of their claims and actions….. 
However, they are less tolerant of research that fall outside design frameworks, that does not 
appear to be of practical relevance, is wasteful of time and adds complexity or makes the 
management task harder”. This reflects Scheyvens et al.’s (2003b) argument that 
ethnographic research with elites can involve negotiating complex power relationships of 
loyalty and conflicts of interest between the researched and the researcher.  
In terms of strategies to deal with this tension, this has in many ways been one of the most 
difficult aspects of the research. Another researcher might have approached this issue 
completely differently, for example by deciding to pay the fee to gain some distance from 
the reserve, and using this greater appearance of independence to agitate politically on behalf 
of certain groups such as those communities who may be relocated from the MSR. While, as 
I discuss in my conclusion, Mozambican civil society is becoming increasingly empowered 
to contest major land use changes, aligning with this perspective before going on fieldwork 
would not have been in line with my goal of an in-depth engagement with the development-
conservation nexus. Rather, prejudging the politics would have prevented an appreciation of 
the many-layered complexity of conservation interventions. In fact, I found that discussing 
such issues as relocations and the changes required to balance tourism, livelihoods and 
conservation openly with respondents led to many interesting discussions regarding the 
tensions and contradictions inherent in the TFCA strategy. My respondents were certainly 
not blind to these debates, and were willing to discuss them in nuanced and reflexive ways. 
Nevertheless, while I made my position as researcher, I hope, clear, it was hard to escape 
both the assumption of many of my respondents that I would unquestionably share their 
commitment to marine conservation, just as it was hard to escape my own pervasive cultural 
conditioning that conservation as it is currently practiced is both an urgent matter and 
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unquestionably ‘a good thing’. These conflicts are most apparent in chapter six, where I 
delve into the compromises and contestations in the day-to-day running of the PPMR. 
More broadly, this process of researching a group of closely networked individuals who 
were in many cases extremely hospitable and are working honourably in difficult 
circumstances gave rise to some discomfort on my part. As a political ecologist I have 
sought out points of conflict, change and contradiction as part of my methodology. However, 
in taking this critical stance I am also in danger of failing to do justice to the commitment 
that many of my participants had to seeking positive conservation and development 
outcomes. The politics of the researcher is one which has been extensively debated, 
particularly in the contexts of controversial land use changes in developing countries, 
whether for agriculture, extractives or conservation (Baird 2014; Bebbington, Hinojosa, 
Bebbington, Burneo and Warnaars 2008; Horowitz 2011; Neumann 2008). Ferguson (1990), 
in his seminal critique of large-scale agricultural interventions by the World Bank in 
Lesotho, claims that the role of critical researchers is to understand and analyse the broader 
power structures and discourses which frame questions and interventions – the ‘development 
machine’ - rather than try to solve development problems as they are framed by dominant 
institutions (also Li 2007b). However, other academics more explicitly link their research 
with activism such as Kirsch (2002), who argues that such detachment was not an option in 
his research regarding copper and gold mining in Papua New Guinea. Still others trace a 
difficult path between policy relevance and criticality, for example Blaikie (2008) argues that 
influencing development policy should be viewed as a responsibility despite entering into 
complex and politically compromised territory. Throughout my research I developed a 
nuanced approach to these debates based on many examples of watching people navigate 
their roles as actors in the ‘development machine’ alongside their personal commitments, 
beliefs, life stories and roles as members of families and society. I also saw how different 
and complex positions often contradicted each other, and I saw how neoliberal ideology is 
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debated and sometimes rejected by conservationists who nevertheless work in organisations 
which espouse the paradigm. Methodologically, this means conceptualising everyone as a 
situated actor; Frelimo officials, community members, reserve authority figures, consultants, 
experts, scientists and conservation consumers and accepting the mundane actualities (as 
well as the ideologies and grand ideas for improvement) which go into constructing 
conservation and development schemes (Li 2007b). This nuanced and situated approach to 
researching power helped me understand neoliberal processes in action.  
3.5.	Bringing	coherence:	Analysis,	writing,	teaching	and	
academic	engagement	
I returned from the field with a jumble of interview recordings, transcriptions, field notes, 
consent forms, photographs, policy documents, brochures, flyers, business cards and 
impressions. Deciding what is relevant is as much a process of construction, driven by the 
story I want to tell, as it is a process of discovering themes through the rather clinical process 
of coding documents and interview transcripts. I adopted a flexible approach to transcription, 
typing out myself most of the conversations in full and coding along the way by marking 
themes and highlighting significant quotations. While I experimented with using an online 
coding tool, I found I preferred to code by hand, using coloured highlighters to mark 
sections. In this process, I was interested in what issues were linked with other ones and 
what these links meant. I was particularly interested in the repetition of themes about ideas 
of nature, conservation and development, paying close attention to the context and why I 
thought such claims had been made. I was also interested in linkages between ideas, for 
example, where marine conservation was linked to ideas about nature preservation in 
contrast to where marine conservation was linked to tourism, which provided very different 
insights into the associated normative values. I paid attention to the wider ideological 
context, by which I mean whether the person was repeating or contradicting wider narratives. 
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These observations were cross-referenced with other methods, for example, reading how 
ideas about conservation were made to cohere in group discussions (such as the conservation 
conference), and how they were expressed in interview. During the course of writing, I often 
returned to the interview recordings to try to place myself back in the conversation, and I 
sometimes found that this dynamic approach presented me with new insights that would 
have been covered if I had simply relied on the transcript as ‘the’ record of the interview.  
This reflects my understanding of the interview itself as a process of constructing meaning, 
rather than a definitive report of the world.   
I worked with grey literature in a similarly active way, as texts which construct rather than 
report on reality (Atkinson and Coffey 2011). I analysed the texts using critical discourse 
analysis, paying attention to how “realities are (re)produced through text[s]” (Atkinson and 
Coffey 2011:5). I interpreted texts as containing multiple claims beyond records of concrete 
changes which the organisation has or will introduce, such as interpretations of how the 
organisation wishes to appear to its audiences, and how the organisation interprets its own 
successes (Mosse 2005; Corson 2010). They often contained overt statements of policy 
which enable me to see clearly how conservation regulation has or would be introduced, 
along with subtle (and not-so-subtle) expressions of ideology and discourse which tried to 
establish neoliberal conservation as the dominant narrative. These statements could then be 
contrasted to other sites and discourses where neoliberal conservation is contested and 
destabilised. In chapters five and seven, this multi-site, historical and contextual approach to 
texts is put to work, as I trace the evolution of TFCA policy in Mozambique and its links to 
changes in regulation governing the extractive sector and novel green economy policies.  
I also found that teaching and academic engagement helped me to refine my arguments and 
position my work within contemporary debates. Delivering papers at conferences provided 
opportunities to shape and critically discuss my ideas with other researchers.  I also found 
that exploring my research with interdisciplinary students, including those from policy-
88 
 
oriented and physical science backgrounds useful for deciding what is important about this 
research, and why it matters beyond debates in political ecology and geography. Those 
students who perhaps have taken for granted such apparently common-sense notions of 
natural capital and ecosystem services provided me with a challenge to clearly articulate, to 
paraphrase Castree (2009), what is different about neoliberal conservation and why it may be 
objectionable. This is, I found, one of the productive strengths of a geography department 
which combines environmental and physical sciences with policy and critical research, as 
Edinburgh does.  
Ultimately thesis is my attempt to impose coherence and tell a story on the basis of my 
research. As Law (2004) observes, social science writing often irons out complexity and 
removes contradiction in the interests of a clean theory. I have chosen to exclude writing 
about particular encounters or events for a variety of reasons; sometimes to protect 
individuals’ and organisations confidentiality, but sometimes because they did not directly 
relate to the story I wished to tell. However, I see contradiction as analytically significant, 
attesting to the contradictory workings of neoliberalism, but also to the lurching, contingent 
and messy processes by which particular conservation interventions and policies are made to 
cohere. In that sense, I have written about contradiction, rather than omitted it from my 
account.  
3.6.	Conclusion	
This chapter has discussed my analytic approach, my research strategy and the methods I 
have used, along with ethical and practical challenges. I used three metaphors to describe my 
field of research: A ‘conservation-development nexus’ comprised of state, donor, academic 
and NGO elites which make up a field of power; a series of lines and connections which are 
connected in a rhizomatic way across locations; and, a series of encounters characterised by 
friction between globalised ideas and practices of conservation as they intersect with 
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particular social worlds. This allows me to uncover the effects of the PPMR as it intersects 
with the historic, geographic and political terrain of Mozambique, and how particular ideas 
about conservation and development are mobilised and contested. My research strategy is to 
combine this ethnographic detail and complexity with analysis of broader processes of the 
neoliberalisation of nature. I do this through treating the PPMR as a case study through 
which broader conclusions about neoliberalisation can be drawn. I argued that moving 
between different conceptual schools and approaches has provided me with a flexible 
methodology and research strategy which provides insights into the ideologies, the practices 
and the contradictions of neoliberal conservation. In the next chapter, I put this research 
strategy to work by exploring the historical context for contemporary conservation and 
development frameworks in Mozambique. The subsequent chapters then deal directly with 










Our development had been too quick, too unbalanced; it has not been a harmonious 
development (interview with former Frelimo minister, Maputo, 9 May 2014).   
 
4.1.	Introduction		
Contemporary critical and policy literature and some media commentators highlight 
Mozambique’s uneven and unequal economy, extreme levels of public and government debt, 
increasing political violence related to its extractives boom, and high levels of dependence 
on foreign direct investment and donor aid. Mozambique’s status as example of the success 
of the Washington consensus looks increasingly fragile. At the same time, Mozambique’s 
economy is also considered to have good long-term prospects based on its natural resources, 
and many actors are currently aligning to include using conservation for development 
through tourism within economic growth plans. A relatively small marine reserve in the far 
south of Mozambique may seem far removed from these issues, but as this chapter will 
discuss, it provides an opportunity to consider Mozambique’s recent transitions from colony, 
to socialist state and to neoliberal ‘donor darling’, to consider the role of natural resources 
and conservation in Mozambique’s current political economy, and to consider the historic 
production of Mozambique’s ‘actually existing’ neoliberalism. Sidaway and Power (1995: 
1484) state that “few countries [as Mozambique] have witnessed the end of colonialism, 
revolution and counterrevolution in such a compressed period of time and with such violent 
consequences”. As also described in the quotation with which I opened this chapter, 
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Mozambique’s development has often been uneven, contested, and involved rapid change. 
The particularly intense processes of de-colonisation, conflict and the adoption of capitalism 
in Mozambique are compelling in their own right, and also shed light on how these dynamics 
play out elsewhere. 
The chapter begins by providing background information to the PPMR, before tracing 
Mozambique’s rapid and sometimes chaotic transitions. I particularly wish to highlight the 
the linkages between colonial and contemporary processes of economic growth and uneven 
development through use of, and ideas about natural resources. I then focus on 
Mozambique’s current political economy, characterised by a commitment to extraction at all 
costs and the centralisation of state control over resources, high levels of public debt, 
dependence on foreign direct investment and the massing of state-party interests around 
foreign FDI. All this is producing an uneven spatiality, characterised on one hand by hyper-
modernity and connectivity to the global economy for some, and on the other, increasing 
disconnection and exclusion for others. In this mix is also an increasing interest in 
Mozambique’s biodiversity from transnational environmental and development agencies, 
who are also re-spacing Mozambique through the construction of major national and trans-
national conservation areas.  
I also wish to consider Mozambique’s transitions in relation to current debates on neo-
patrimonialism, moving away from dichotomous discourses which present Mozambican, and 
African politics more generally as pathologised, corrupt and patrimonial, and donor politics 
as underpinned by Western and thereby apparently ‘legitimate’ rationale. Neo-
patrimonialism is defined by Médard (2014: 83-84) as a distinct state form resulting from 
Africa’s particular political history, in which an already-existing tendency to blend the 
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‘personal’ and the ‘public’ was intensified by the colonial and post-colonial5 imposition of 
modern bureaucratic state forms. A neo-patrimonial state is therefore a “hybrid of 
patrimonialism and bureaucracy” in which “the formal structure of the state is bureaucratic, a 
written law exists, the civil servants are recruited through examinations, but there is no real 
state of law and the functioning of the state is largely patrimonialised” and “much depends 
on the personal norms and personality of the leader”. Dynamics such as “nepotism”, 
“friendship ties” and “ethno-regionalism” (Médard 2014: 81) dominate political decision-
making, and elites often unfairly appropriate national assets, such as in the amassing of 
personal wealth from oil by elite families in Angola (Soares de Oliveira 2007, 2015).  
This tendency is certainly present in Mozambique, and is thrown into sharp relief by 
Mozambique’s resources boom and its recent debt crisis, discussed further in this and later 
chapters. It is therefore a useful concept. However, the association of the ‘personal’, the 
‘ethnic’ and the ‘tribal’ with Africa, and the implicit contrast with the so-called ‘Western’, 
‘rational’ and ‘fair’ is problematic, requiring attention to the role of Western agents and ideas 
in producing neo-patrimonialism (particularly the participation of major Western and 
transnational companies and institutions in the resources boom and financial lending) along 
with scrutiny of Mozambique’s elites. Writing about Angola, Soares de Oliveira (2015: 2) 
argues that “elites, far from being weak or in need of capacity building, have a strong degree 
of agency in defining the shape of institutions and the direction of their societies”. While 
Mozambique’s trajectory has been different to Angola in several respects, not least the extent 
to which oil has shaped Angola’s post-war economy, the observation that African elites have 
                                                      
5 I see this thesis as concerned with “the geographical outcomes of colonial and postcolonial 
processes” (Sharp 2009:7) and recognise that recognises that colonialism was more than a political-
economic project and involved cultural and epistemological issues as integral aspects. When I 




skilfully taken advantage of conditions to their advantage could equally well apply to 
Mozambique. As this chapter will demonstrate, neoliberalism has taken root in Mozambique 
through the interconnected, sometimes contradictory, sometimes synergistic actions of 
revolutionaries-turned-politicians, international agencies and states, the private sector, and 
major donors like the World Bank. This dissolves the “commonly used metaphor of the air-
conditioned room and the verandah” (Harrison 2010: 3) which reproduces the idea of a 
fundamental difference between ‘African’ and ‘Western’ political goals and practices, and 
emphasises the complex agency of different Mozambican and international political actors. 
In this sense, the concept of neo-patrimonialism must be used carefully, alongside an 
understanding of the important role that Western corporations, donors and banks have played 
in shaping Mozambique’s political economy.  
I begin by discussing Mozambique’s dynamic transformations through colony, socialist 
construction, donor darling and capitalist economy, and its recent extractives boom. I then 
analyse the changing narratives of conservation in a Mozambican context. This chapter aims 
to theorise from the south in two ways. First, I show that the trajectory of Mozambique, as a 
key area of neoliberal policy experimentation, reveals much about the unfolding of processes 
of neoliberalisation more generally (as opposed to the view that neoliberalisation is rolled 
out from the ‘centre’ to the ‘periphery’). Second, I take care to draw directly on ideas from 
revolutionary and contemporary Mozambican intellectuals, although I obviously accept that 
my analysis comes from the perspective of a northern scholar. 
4.2.	From	colony	to	socialist	construction	
4.2.1.	Territory	and	resources:	Portuguese	rule		
The coast of east Africa which became Mozambique represented an Eldorado for the 
Portuguese due to its gold resources, yet it was an area which often eluded straightforward 
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territorialisation. Portuguese involvement with the region dates from Vasco de Gama's 1498 
Indian Ocean mission to secure Indian spice routes and to engage in the gold and ivory trade 
with the African Muenemutapa Empire. Though economically significant, this trade only 
enabled Portugal to establish trading outposts including Maputo Bay, and did not enable 
greater expansion, with Portuguese attempts to move much further inland being met with 
successful resistance from powerful African empires. Portugal maintained a tenuous yet 
persistent presence in the coastal areas through large private landholdings, failing to control 
the entire territory politically until the Berlin conference in 1884 which, from a European 
perspective at least, formalised Portugal's claims on the coastal regions of Mozambique.  
Despite this tenuous and contested hold, Mozambique was important ideologically and 
politically, feeding Portugal's imaginaries as a great colonial power, enabling it to project 
national ideas of grandeur and global influence as well as to build its economy and strategic 
global connectivity (Newitt 1995).  
Europe’s authorities profoundly re-ordered space in Africa, re-drawing existing territories 
according to European imaginaries, politics and economic ambitions (Pakenham 1991), and 
controlling Mozambican territory and exploiting its resources required new techniques of 
domination and government. The colonial system in Mozambique thus centralised new 
relationships between people and land, between people and traditional governance, and 
between colonists and colonised. The Portuguese colonial system in Mozambique had four 
pillars: Private land ownership of land which had previously been governed by traditional 
customs, a system of indirect rule through re-establishment of aspects of traditional authority 
rather than racialised segregation, a company system (backed by state force) to exploit the 
human and natural resources through a system of forced labour in mines and plantations, and 
the church and additional ideological techniques of control (Mondlane 1969; Sidaway and 
Power 1995). This was a capitalist system which encouraged agriculture (such as sheep and 
horse breeding along with cultivation of sugar and spices) and established mining 
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companies, as part of a ‘civilising mission’ which aimed to re-make African Mozambican 
culture and social life (Mondlane 1969; Newitt 1995).  
Allina’s (2012) account of company rule illustrates how these principles worked together to 
cement Portugal's claim on Mozambican resources and territory. The Mozambique Company 
(one of three companies with charters to exploit Mozambique’s natural resources) assumed 
control of central Mozambique under a 50 year charter in 1888, providing 7.5 per cent of its 
net profits and 10 per cent of company shares to the Portuguese state. This fusion of state 
power and private capital was granted near autonomy in its practices and was backed up by 
colonial force. It had brutal practices, especially the forced labour system in which black 
Mozambicans (with the exception of a few assimilados, that is, those who were judged 
sufficiently proficient at performing Portuguese characteristics of ‘civilisation’ such as 
eating with a knife and fork) were effectively forced to work in company or privately owned 
(through company sub-concessions) gold mines and agriculture. Despite declaring in 1869 
that men could freely seek work rather than being slaves, and subsequently in 1899 that men 
were compelled to provide for themselves by working, the Portuguese labour system 
amounted to slavery in all but name (Allina 2012).  
This system of the exploitation of people and natural resources, plus control over territory by 
the company system set the conditions for Mozambique’s continued rural poverty, and 
opposition to it formed the core of anti-colonialist and revolutionary ideas. Mozambique’s 
revolutionary leader, Eduardo Mondlane (1969: 33) describes how: 
[T]he African found himself dispossessed not only of his political power and his 
land, but also of the most rudimentary rights to control his own life. He could be 
treated virtually like a slave: forced to leave his home and family to work almost 
anywhere, for excessively long hours and for merely nominal pay. 
 
The forced labour system facilitated uneven exchange between Portugal and its colonies, 
supporting accumulation in Portugal and consequently provides a stark example of uneven 
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development. Economic life in Mozambique and other Portuguese African territories was 
“geared towards serving the interests of a metropolitan Portugal” (Mondlane 1969: 82) by 
providing gold, cotton and other tropical goods, while providing a market for Portugal’s 
exports. The labour system was characterised by its opponents as designed to produce profit 
for companies or for the colonial government, rather than for the labourer, and produced 
extreme concentration of rural and urban land and property ownership in few hands and 
dispossession of the majority. The years of systematic social and economic marginalisation 
means that rural Mozambicans remain largely excluded from the country's current rapid 
economic growth. This colonial political geographic map of displaced people, exploited rural 
regions, forced labourers and segregated cities fuelled the anger of revolutionaries, who 
aimed for nothing short of total political, economic and social transformation. 
4.2.3.	Revolution	and	independence:	De-colonising	Mozambique	
Despite taking precautions to protect its African Empire by dispatching the Portuguese state 
security police (PIDE) to harass and intimidate potential revolutionaries, including killing 
500 people at a peaceful protest in Mueda in 1960 (Mondlane 1969), the Portuguese were 
unable to prevent nationalist groups meeting in Dar es Salaam in Tanzania to form the 
Frente de Libertação de Moçambique (The Mozambican Liberation Front, Frelimo) in 1964. 
Frelimo’s leader at its outset was Dr Eduardo Mondlane, who led the party until his 
assassination by letter bomb in Dar es Salaam in 1969 and was responsible for much of its 
founding Marxist-Leninist philosophy. Mondlane was replaced by Samora Machel, who was 
also at Frelimo’s formative meetings. Machel was a trained nurse and revolutionary 
commander throughout the conflict who became the first President of Mozambique, well-
known as a skilled diplomat and rousing speaker (Finnegan 1992) and remembered by 
several of my respondents as a visionary and beloved leader. Other significant members, 
who would all become powerful, complex and sometimes divisive members of 
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Mozambique’s Frelimo elite included General Jacinto Veloso (now a controversial 
businessman involved in the extractives sector, to be discussed in chapter seven), Joachim 
Chissano (Second President of Mozambique from November 1986 to February 2005 and 
current member of the board of the Peace Parks Foundation), Armando Guebuza (Third 
President of Mozambique from February 2005 to 15 January 2015 and now one of 
Mozambique’s wealthiest people) and Bernardo Luis Honwana (former culture minister, 
seminal author and current head of Biofund, Mozambique’s new biodiversity funding body 
which is also discussed in chapter seven). Frelimo’s founding group was dominated by 
highly educated and often expatriate elites, for example, Mondlane returned from a 
successful career as an assistant professor of anthropology at Syracuse University in the 
United States to fight for independence. This, according to an interview with Honwana 
published in Finnegan (1992) was partly responsible for its later difficulties in connecting 
with traditional Mozambican authority and culture, and the perception that it represented the 
interests of the Maputo-centric elite. 
Frelimo launched its military campaign, which totalled only 250 armed combatants, in 
September 1964, with an attack on a Portuguese base in the town of Chai, northern 
Mozambique (Mondlane 1969). The independence war would last, at varying degrees of 
intensity, for the next ten years before negotiations between Portugal and Frelimo opened in 
1974, and peace was temporarily achieved in 1975. The war was extremely brutal, with 
routine massacres committed by the Portuguese authorities against ordinary Mozambicans 
which were condemned as genocidal in evidence presented to the United Nations on 
Portuguese atrocities (United Nations September 1973). Frelimo, too, also committed acts 
which were considered as murder and cruelty (International Aid and Defence Fund 1973). 
The handover of power to Frelimo under the Lusaka Accord in 1974 was “almost 
unconditional” (Newitt 1995: 541), and Portugal effectively washed its hands of its former 
colony not only by breaking all political and economic ties, but also by repatriating skilled 
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people, useful items like cars, and capital. Frelimo was left to build its nation with very few 
skilled citizens in a worsening economic recession, growing dependence on Scandinavian, 
Chinese and Russian donors, with South Africa becoming an increasingly hostile and 
aggressive neighbour (Andersson and Nilsson 1995; Newitt 1995). For all these reasons, 
Frelimo would face multiple challenges when it came to “building a state out of a colony” 
(interview with former Frelimo minister, Maputo, 9 May 2014).  
Frelimo’s leaders faced an uphill battle to produce any kind of popular support for 
nationalism, as poor literacy, poor infrastructure, disparate cultures, geographical separation 
and Portuguese aggression had produced fragmented and frightened groups of people who 
happened to share a border rather than any form of national identity (Finnegan 1992). To 
forge a national idea of a state of Mozambique, Frelimo created an ideology and strategy 
around education and literacy, self-determination and ownership of resources and labour, 
diplomacy and external relationships, and also launched an armed struggle for independence 
in the face of intensifying Portuguese violence. Frelimo’s aim was two-fold: The destruction 
of colonial rule which was perceived to service the exploitation of African labour and 
resources for Western capitalist gain, and the establishment of a new social order based on 
equity and national self-determination (Mondlane 1969; Machel 1981a). 
Following independence on June 25, 1975, it was assumed that Frelimo would become the 
party of government, and its then leader, Samora Machel, automatically assumed the 
presidency. Although this was unchallenged by many ordinary Mozambicans and by 
international actors, contestation was brewing in the form of Renamo, the Mozambican 
National Resistance/ Resistência Nacional Moçambicana. Frelimo has continued in power in 
Mozambique since this date, consistently challenged electorally and sometimes violently by 
Renamo. After achieving independence, Frelimo’s leaders embarked on a state-building 
programme, driven by its conviction that the colonial regime was primarily one of class 
rather than racial exploitation. Frelimo declared itself as a Marxist-Leninist party at its Third 
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Party Congress in 1977, a declaration which was fundamental to its ideologies and practices 
thereafter. The party became driven by ideologies of socialising the means of production 
through building state-owned companies, providing universal health and social care, wealth 
redistribution through nationalisation of assets and land, and through promoting race, gender 
and class equality. It positioned itself explicitly as not a racialised movement, and aimed for 
racial equality rather than black dominance (Mondlane 1969). 
Frelimo’s vision of modernity drew heavily on Leninist ideas that “superior knowledge, 
authoritarian instruction, and social design could transform society” (Scott 1998: 148). 
Frelimo tried to make society legible through the administrative ordering of people, 
especially rural populations. Ordering rural people spatially into idealised communal villages 
was intended to lead to transformations in wider economic and political life, and represents 
an attempt to transform the peasantry through highly authoritarian means. The party 
displayed a confidence in science and intellectual progress, particularly the idea that the right 
ordering of nature and people would lead to greater productivity. The influence of Soviet 
development ideas was evident throughout Mozambique’s development ideology and 
programme, with similar trends also present in Angola’s independence movements and 
development trajectory. A strong Socialist state was considered to be the “decisive link in the 
national economy and the material base for the achievement of revolutionary political and 
economic transformations” (Young 1998: 70), and this emphasised a centrally planned 
economy along with co-operative ownership structures introduced for enterprises, and 
political, economic and trade links with other like-minded nations. Frelimo conceptualised 
agriculture as the stable basis for development which would then support a dynamic 
industrial sector, although peasant-style agriculture was considered too basic and the goal 
was a planned mechanised sector. These ideologies formed the central planks of the planned 
socialist economy. Although, it should be noted that, while the commitments to Marxist 
politics were undoubtedly deeply felt by leaders such as Mondlane, Young (1998) suggests 
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that these ideas were also adopted for pragmatic purposes including seeking political and 
financial support from the Soviet Union (Andersson and Nilsson 1995), and soft support 
such as the placement of foreign teachers from sympathetic nations in Mozambican schools. 
For example, one of my interviewees recalled being taught by Vietnamese and Cuban 
teachers. 
Frelimo’s flagship policy was to move six million people into government villages where 
schooling, clean water and healthcare could be provided and where the Marxist-Leninist 
vision could be easily communicated. These communal villages would form the basis of the 
hoped-for modern mechanised and communal agriculture, thereby providing Mozambique 
with an educated, working population and with politically conscious cadres of citizens 
(Mondlane 1969). However, Frelimo’s vision was often met with resentment from rural 
Mozambicans who had their own cultural and social preferences for organisation, and who 
were reminded of colonial forced labour policies. This deeply undermined the claims to 
‘people power’ and national development espoused by Frelimo (Young 1998). Additionally, 
the reality of a rural economic system which had previously been supported by cash flows 
from mining in South Africa was overlooked in Frelimo’s vision of the ‘ideal peasantry’, and 
self-sufficiency based on agriculture proved to be unattainable in much of the country 
(Newitt 1995). The communal villages became synonymous with Frelimo, and consequently 
the failures of the communal system were seen as failures of Frelimo’s Marxist vision. Rural 
discontent which could be partly attributed to the communal village policy in central regions 
such as Sofala, Tete and Manica Provinces began to fuel the rise of Renamo (Newitt 1995). 
Frelimo’s dismissal of traditional culture and its over-simplification of rural economics were 
equalled by its enthusiasm for the creation of modern infrastructure throughout the country, 
and its desire to produce development through the large-scale exploitation of natural 
resources. These grand projects played an important role in establishing the strong party, 
strong state, modernist ideology of Frelimo, and prefigure Mozambique’s later emphasis on 
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mega-projects. Mondlane (1969: 29) framed nature in terms of extractable resources that 
were being unfairly appropriated by the Portuguese: 
The Portuguese government proceeded to distribute the natural resources of the 
country to the various economic interests which were vying to explore and exploit 
them. Such natural resources included agricultural land, the natural harbours of 
Beira, Lourenço Marques [now Maputo] and Nampula; the five largest rivers of east 
Africa, all of which have their estuaries in Mozambique, all kinds of hardwood, 
rubber plants, palm trees, wild animals for hides and skins, fisheries, and above all, a 
large labour force. 
 
The Cahora Bassa scheme, a mega-dam to supply cheap electrical energy primarily to South 
Africa and a project dating from the finals stages of Portuguese colonisation became 
symbolic of the appropriation of what was considered to be rightfully Mozambican resources 
(Machel 1981:6), and Frelimo perceived Mozambique’s use of its own natural resources as a 
means and an ends. Exploiting the rivers, mines and forests were seen as central to achieving 
economic independence, while the right to use resources, and for Mozambicans to profit 
from them, became central to Frelimo’s ideology and its vision for an independent 
Mozambique.  
Alongside this promotion of Soviet development models, the Frelimo government became 
increasingly authoritarian and intolerant of those who did not willingly partake in its vision. 
Machel, in a move which complicates his image as benevolent leader and international 
statesman, established detention centres dedicated to the violent and brutal disciplining of 
Portuguese secret police agents and “deserters, murderers, criminals, robbers, delinquents, 
drug addicts, corrupt people, vagrants and the antisocial” (Machel 1981b). Despite this 
growing emphasis on authoritarian methods, the Leninist high modernism which Frelimo 
tried to impose on Mozambique was facing both internal resentment and growing external 
forces aligned to free market capitalism.  Peaceful independence in Mozambique was 




Frelimo’s massive transformation ambitions were quickly and seriously derailed by South 
Africa’s policy of destabilisation. Hostility towards its newly-independent regional 
neighbours began with economic measures, such as ending the employment of Mozambican 
migrant workers who worked in South Africa’s mines and other industries in 1974 thereby 
ending important financial in-flows, but quickly hardened into a deeply aggressive stance 
(Newitt 1995). There are both geopolitical and racial factors behind South Africa’s deliberate 
and violent destabilisation of its neighbours. Mozambique was a “frontline state” in the cold 
war, supported by Russia and China, which placed it in direct conflict with South Africa’s 
commitment to Western values, and growing hostility towards what it saw as the rise of 
communist Africa (Harvey 2005: 118; Finnegan 1992). Newitt (1995) foregrounds how 
South Africa’s internal racial politics led to what it referred to as the ‘total strategy’, 
particularly as Frelimo was supportive of South Africa’s national liberation movement, the 
Africa National Congress. Similarly, Finnegan (1992) contends that successful, independent, 
socialist, black-ruled states on South Africa’s borders were simply too ideologically 
threatening to the apartheid government. 
South Africa launched multiple attacks north of its border, including the invasion and 
permanent occupation of Angolan territory in 1975, which was experiencing a similar 
trajectory of national independence based on a commitment to Marxist-Leninist values 
(Soares de Oliveira 2015). The Rhodesian Central Intelligence Organisation, supported by 
South Africa, created Renamo, which became responsible for “some of the darkest moments 
in African history” (Newitt 1995: 569). Renamo began directly attacking Mozambique in 
1976. The destruction of roads, bridges, communal villages, clinics and schools, along with 
the terrorisation of Frelimo supporters instigated by Renamo had symbolic as well as tactical 
importance: “to destroy the presence of the party and the state” (Frelimo’s European 
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spokesperson Evo Fernandes, quoted in The Independent February 24th 1988, cited in 
Finnegan 1992: 283). Renamo’s tactics included the abduction of children to act as soldiers, 
and severe human rights abuses of citizens in a conflict from which ordinary Mozambicans 
could not escape (Vines 1996). However, the rural guerrilla nature of the conflict meant it 
became unwinnable, and the Nkomati Peace Accord was reluctantly by Frelimo and Renamo 
leaders in 1984. The Accord agreed to a cessation of funding of Renamo by South Africa in 
exchange for the withdrawal of Mozambican protection from African National Congress 
members.  
The political geographic map of Mozambique was shaped by the conflict, and by the 
ideological battle between Frelimo and Renamo. By treating the country as a blank slate, 
Frelimo aimed to demonstrate state power through nothing short of the complete 
reorganisation of space and social relations. However, this created divisions, which could 
then be exploited by Renamo, including between urban and rural, traditional and modern, 
and north and south. Renamo’s response was also spatial – it aimed to wipe out Frelimo by 
negating its use of space; in some areas, “…. government presence was effectively 
eliminated from large areas of the country” (Newitt 1995: 571). Mozambique remains 
spatially divided as a consequence of Frelimo’s policies, but also the ways in which these 
overlaid and exacerbated colonial divisions. Frelimo intensified discord between central 
urban elites who share many of the assumptions and aims of international institutions, and 
rural areas which are often characterised as mistrustful of central government, actively 
community-focussed and respectful towards traditional leadership (Anstey 2001; Anstey and 
De Sousa 2001; Virtanen 2005). Broadly speaking, support for Frelimo remains concentrated 
in the south and far north of the country, especially around the capital city Maputo, while 
central regions support a resurgent Renamo agitating for a share of gains from coal and gas 






The conflict was devastating, resulting in the near-total destruction of civil, transport, urban 
and social welfare infrastructure, significant disruption of the economy and of food 
production (the latter exacerbated by severe droughts between 1978 and 1982). More 
fundamentally, it precipitated social breakdown and the collapse of social norms, with 
families becoming separated as people fled from the countryside to the cities to avoid 
conflict and search for income (Abrahamsson and Nilsson 1995). Frelimo successfully 
sought assistance from the West which was provided in the form of humanitarian aid and 
debt relief (by 1984, Mozambique’s total debt was $2.4 billion). However, this assistance 
ultimately came with a price, as the United States determined that it should take the form of 
short-term aid conditional on state reorganisation, austerity, and the introduction of a market 
economy approved by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). With the civil conflict 
nominally ongoing but a temporary ceasefire agreed, Mozambique joined the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund in 1984 and was subjected to IMF-imposed economic 
restructuring in 1987 with the introduction of the economic rehabilitation program. While 
there were clear continuities between the colonial-capitalist regime, especially the 
exploitation of natural resources achieved through the control of territory, this transition 
marked a political moment for Mozambique in that it adopted a capitalist economy based on 
a “resoundingly liberal” (Finnegan 1992: 131) constitution in 1990. The Frelimo government 
publicly abandoned Marxist-Leninism and endorsed the free market, private property 
ownership, privatisation of state assets, liberalisation and stimulation of foreign trade 
through devaluation of Mozambican currency and multiparty elections (Finnegan 1992). 
This paved the way for the final official end of the conflict with the signing of the Rome 
General Peace Accord in 1992.  
105 
 
Harvey (2005) argues that Mozambique’s swift transition to capitalism and the use of the 
peace process to prompt the adoption of capitalism exemplifies the opportunistic nature of 
capital in exploiting crises, as well as the importance of local circumstances in advancing 
capitalism in its neoliberal version. Undoubtedly, there was a causal relationship between the 
social and economic crisis caused by the conflict and the subsequent abandonment of 
Frelimo’s vision for Mozambique in favour of the vision of the World Bank and the IMF. 
Like states experiencing parallel trajectories of post-colonial independence such as Angola 
(Soares de Oliveira 2015), and several Latin American countries (Cupples 2013), 
Mozambique’s reforms of the late 1980s and early 1990’s were driven by the Washington 
consensus. This included the promotion of policies which were labelled pro-poor and pro-
growth, such as education and small loans to the poorest (rather than direct intervention in 
the form of subsidies), and economic reforms including trade liberalisation and low 
borrowing, low tax and low spend in government, the protection of private property, the 
liberalisation of trade, and the privatisation of national assets. Post-conflict Mozambique 
now officially shared the colonial-capitalist vision of private property and exploitation of 
resources, along with an emphasis on personal and media freedoms and democracy in line 
with the Washington consensus. This process was sponsored by the very same Frelimo 
individuals who won independence based on a Marxist-Leninist vision.  
However, Mozambique remained an aid-dependent state throughout much of the 1980s and 
1990s, “completely dependent on the donor’s goals and ambitions” (Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson 1995: 132). Sidaway and Power refer to Mozambique during this period as a 
“phantom state” (Thrift and Leyshon 1994, cited in Sidaway and Power 1995: 1484); heavily 
indebted, reliant on external assistance, and unable to provide social services to its citizens. 
Governance in Mozambique often took place by pushing external institutions’ agendas 
through Mozambican government departments using the leverage provided by debt and aid 
conditionality. As a consequence, Mozambique’s sovereignty over its territory and ability to 
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govern its economic, political and social affairs dissolved. Mozambique remained highly 
donor-dependent throughout the 1990s and early 2000’s, receiving around USD $1bn per 
year in aid money on condition that it follow donor prescriptions of development shaped by 
private sector economic growth, elimination of extreme poverty, facilitation of greater 
international trade and a focus on democracy, good governance and stability (Hanlon and 
Smart 2008). 
4.3.2.	Open	for	business:	contemporary	Mozambique	
Increasingly, Mozambique is presented as open for business, a slogan often repeated in 
ubiquitous signage such as the huge billboard on one of Maputo’s main roads, Avenida 24 de 
Julho which states, in English, that Mozambique is an “ideal destination for the businessman 
or traveller”. Development has been fully oriented for much of the last fifteen years towards 
economic liberalisation and reforms geared to achieve greater foreign investment under the 
‘trade not aid’ rubric (World Bank 2008, 2011, 2013). Mozambique is seen by the 
international business and donor community as embodying the success of this Washington 
consensus formula - a ‘donor darling’ - and example of what foreign aid and neoliberal 
economics can achieve for development (Hanlon and Smart 2008). Mozambique’s poverty 
reduction action plans have emphasised governance and security issues, along with 
redistribution (via social intervention like education and health care) and promoting diverse 
economic growth through the private sector. The dominant aim has been the targeted 
reduction of absolute poverty (defined as below the national poverty line of USD $2 per day) 
by headcount, in order to produce inclusive growth. For example, the most recent poverty 
reduction strategy paper (IMF 2011) aimed to “reduce the poverty headcount from 54.7 per 
cent in 2009 to 42 per cent in 2014; close the country’s infrastructure gap and promote 
human and economic well-being through rapid and inclusive growth” (IMF 2011: 4). 
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However, the ‘inclusive growth’ and ‘trade not aid’ maxims have been criticised for failing 
to deliver equitable development or to actually reduce poverty. 
Poverty remains entrenched in Mozambique, despite rising gross domestic product (GDP). 
Mozambican economist Castel-Branco (2014: 26) has characterised Mozambique’s economy 
as “social losses and private gains” due to the concentration of the political elite around huge 
foreign direct investment inflows, its lack of democratic accountability and an exploited 
domestic labour force. Interviewed in the national newspaper O País on April 20 2016, 
Mozambican economist Carlos Nuno Castel-Branco argued that “as long as we depend on 
external dynamics and interests, our economy will be structured around what is fundamental 
for the global capitalist economy – and this may conflict with the interests and the basic 
needs of the population”. While GDP has grown at an average 7 per cent per year (World 
Bank 2013), poverty headcount has stubbornly remained at over 50 per cent of population 
since a high of nearly 70 per cent in 1996 (OIES 2014). As a consequence, Mozambique still 
ranks extremely low on the Human Development Index (currently ranking 178 of 187 on the 
HDI index), leading commentators to critique the inclusive growth paradigm, and with it, 
Mozambique’s apparent validation of the neoliberal model of development (Castel-Branco 
2014; Vines 2016).  
Critics also observe a tendency towards partial rather than complete reform in Mozambique. 
The good governance paradigm, which is intended to promote development by ensuring a 
more even spread of resources, promoting the confidence of investors and reducing 
corruption, has failed to actually produce the intended outcomes. Söderbaum and Taylor 
(2010) argue that there is a close relationship between Western donor-driven liberalising 
goals and the politics of patronage in Mozambique. This relationship is simultaneously 
contradictory, in that Western donors claim to be introducing measures to improve 
governance, and synergistic, in that neo-patrimonialism helps to move neoliberal policies 
forward. This tendency was particularly pronounced under the Guebuza presidency (which 
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lasted between February 2005 and January 2015), though not limited to this period. 
Mozambican state elites ostensibly followed donor’s free market and ‘good governance’ 
prescriptions in order to secure funds, however, in practice this provided the financial means 
and motivation for state elites to further entrench their own positions. This was described by 
one of my respondents as a “dog and pony show to fulfil conditionality” (interview with 
donor 2, 2 May 2014). Consequently, contemporary Mozambican state elites are viewed as 
predominantly concerned with maintaining private relationships of patronage and rent-
seeking, producing a “fundamental difference between the interests of the ruling political 
regime and the broader so-called ‘national interest’” (Söderbaum and Taylor 2010: 53). In 
particular, Mozambique is considered to be very proactive at making new legislation which 
responds to donor priorities, but often very bad at following it, with elites bypassing the law 
when it suits their private purpose. Through manipulating the good governance agenda, 
Mozambican elites have successfully created an impression of democracy without genuine 
political accountability (Virtanen 2015). Systematically, then, the interests and goals of the 
ruling elite diverge from the interests of ordinary Mozambicans, simultaneously challenged 
and enabled by donor actors. This reinforces the assessment of Mozambique as a neo-
patrimonial state, but also emphasises the synergistic relationship between donors and 
Frelimo elites. 
4.3.3.	Mozambique	as	neoliberal	frontier:	The	resources	boom		
The reshaping of Mozambique’s trade and development relationships from donor input 
towards foreign direct investment (FDI) is nowhere more pronounced than in the extractives 
and industrial sector. Over 50 per cent of FDI into Mozambique between 2000 and 2011 was 
into mega-projects in coal, oil and agriculture (AfDB 2011), in particular in energy and 
industrial megaprojects such as the Mozal Aluminium Smelter in Maputo province, the Sasol 
gas plant in Inhambane, Moma Titanium and heavy sands mining in Nampula, and large coal 
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mining projects in Tete province (AfDB 2011; Santos et al. 2015). Mozambique has recently 
made major discoveries of natural gas, which are expected to transform the country’s 
economy still further. The gas boom represents a potential transformation for Mozambique’s 
economy (World Bank 2014). The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies (2014) estimated that 
exports from gas could be 50 per cent of Mozambique’s total by 2023, vastly outweighing 
other exports, and being the main driver of growth in the economy. It is important to note the 
central role played by the international private sector here, who work closely with the state to 
ensure mutual benefit from the resources boom. Under President Filipe Nyusi (elected in 
2015), Mozambique is said to be entering a new era of political maturity characterised by 
sustainable long-term economic prospects, the production of stable business norms, and a 
break with the neo-patrimonial politics of the recent past (Vines et al. 2016). In light of this 
anticipated transition from aid-dependency to global gas exporter, Mozambique has told 
donors that it will no longer require foreign aid in order to balance its economy after 2025 
(Country Strategy for Development Cooperation with Mozambique, 2014–2017, Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs of Finland). Although this claim has been disputed, particularly in light of 
the recent debt crisis (Vines et al. 2016; Hanlon 2016), recent developments represent a 
potentially transformative moment in Mozambique’s economy (or at least, that is the rhetoric 
adopted by donors and Frelimo).  
The resources boom is also bringing new south-south development dynamics which threaten 
the Washington agenda. The first is the relationship between China and Mozambique, who 
have maintained a close relationship throughout the conflict (with China providing support 
and funding to Frelimo). This relationship has strengthened in recent years with Chinese 
firms donating major buildings like the US$75 million expansion to Maputo International 
Airport in 2010 along with a cancellation of over US$90 million of Mozambican debt since 
2001 in exchange for agriculture, mining and major forestry projects in several provinces 
(Jansson and Kiala 2009). China is now Mozambique’s second-largest source of foreign 
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direct investment (Gu, Zhang, Vaz and Mukwereza 2016), while Mozambique is also 
extending and intensifying other south-south connections including with Brazil and India in 
its energy sector (Power, Newell, Baker, Bulkeley, Kirshner and Smith 2016). While these 
complex and heterogeneous new configurations present opportunities to do things 
differently, hopes that these relationships will represent a new development paradigm more 
suited to Mozambican needs is checked by the analysis that many of the state and private 
sector actors involved share the same neoliberal assumptions about development as Western 
donors (Amanor and Chichava 2016; Power et al. 2016).  So although they are presented 
under the rhetoric of a different approach, current analyses suggest that south-south co-
operation in Mozambique may be more likely to continue dominant logics and modes of elite 
appropriation. 
The extractives boom is thus throwing the complicated relationship between development 
actors and Frelimo’s authoritarian state-party into sharp relief. Some donors such as USAID 
have publicly critiqued the Mozambican state, pointing to a “get rich quick” mentality 
among some Frelimo politicians at national, regional and local level (Coughlin et al. 2013: 
8). Similar ideas were echoed by one of my research informants: 
The predominant impression you get is of a resource scramble amongst the 
elite…It’s perceived as an opportunity for economic expansion… A lot of the 
wheeling and dealing is between those who want to come in and invest, the foreign 
investors, and the local elite that control business and politics. It’s a pretty tight 
nexus (interview with donor 2, 2 May 2014). 
 
Note from this comment the synergistic relationship between investors and the elite, 
exposing the way in which the trade-not-aid agenda is exacerbating neo-patrimonial 
behaviours. Donors are also critical of boom-time Mozambique’s economic unevenness, 
viewing it as too dependent on just one sector (World Bank 2014; AfDB 2011; Santos et al. 
2015), and concerns relating to governance (Coughlin et al. 2013). There are also growing 
concerns related to security and conflict as Renamo has for several years engaged in a 
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violent armed campaign related to resource discoveries and perceived lack of political 
representation, concerns which have recently intensified. Schubert (2016) reports how 
“civilians are being killed or are disappearing at the hands of security forces and thousands 
have been forced to flee their villages” (see also Vines 2013; Vines et al. 2016).  
Civil society organisations also draw attention to large land grabs, evictions and 
resettlements, negative ecological consequences, uneven development and community-level 
conflict as a direct result of the extractive’s boom. Manuel and César (2014), analysts from 
Centro Terra Viva, a civil society organisation which has been active in land rights issues 
report 53 areas where indigenous land rights conflict with potential or actual extractive and 
industrial uses. This is resulting in material impacts to livelihoods such as disruption of food 
production, and in some cases, relocation of communities is planned or being undertaken. 
Reflecting wider debates about land grabbing in Africa, the legitimacy and fairness the 
contracts under which these transfers took place is questionable (Cotula 2011). Examples 
include the Cif - Moz Company cement plant near Maputo, an area home to around 400 
families, licences mining concessions in Manica Province which take up over 50 per cent of 
the land in four districts, affecting nearly 60,000 people’s access to land, and in Cabo 
Delgado Province, there is a strong demand for land for mining and hydrocarbons with 
controversial relocations planned in the Afungi peninsula. An informant from civil society 
described “a big mafia way of operating and governing the country” (interview with 
Mozambican NGO director, Maputo, 26 April 2014) in which land deals are repeatedly 
approved without proper oversight, to the detriment of communities.   
Such contestation is likely to reach new levels, as Mozambique has levels of unreported debt 
that had previously been kept secret by the outgoing Guebuza presidency. In July 2016, the 
Mozambican government announced that its public debt was US$14 billion, approximately 
US$2 billion more than had been reported. The debts take the form of loans to international 
banks including Credit Suisse, and were spent on a loan for a large fishing fleet for 
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Mozambican tuna company Ematum, and infrastructure and equipment such as speedboats 
for Mozambican state company Pro-Indicus to provide security and logistics to the marine 
gas sector (Hanlon 2016). The loans were given on the basis of Mozambique quickly 
becoming a major gas exporter, but Anadarko’s reticence to commit to investment decisions 
(partly due to difficulties in operating in Mozambique) and a global fall in commodity prices 
were not predicted when these loans were taken out. This indicates both neo-patrimonial 
practices on behalf of the Guebuza presidency, but also complicity of the lenders. The debt 
crisis has undermined donor and lender confidence, renewed political tensions, and made 
development promises from the resources boom even more fragile. Expected government 
revenues from the Cabo Delgado discoveries must now be diverted from planned public 
spending to service capital expenditure on the gas project, meaning that “most Mozambicans 
will never benefit from the gas” (Hanlon 2016, no page). 
Critical geographers suggest that Mozambique’s extractives boom is entrenching neoliberal 
development as a project of accumulation by dispossession (Kirscher and Power 2015).  
Power and Mohan (2010: 470) describe extractives-led development in Mozambique as 
“reinstating or cementing class privileges” driven by processes of dispossessing people of 
land and access to resources, continuing the incomplete and historic processes of colonial 
and capital development. The resource boom has continued and entrenched the trends of elite 
capture of resource revenues, dependence on foreign investment and lack of structural 
transformation seen under Mozambique’s period of aid-dependency. This played out most 
intensely in the Guezeba presidency from 2005 – 2015, which was able to entirely 
monopolise financial benefits from mega-projects and use these gains to support political 
goals and private enrichment of his particular Frelimo supporters (Burr 2014; Castel-Branco 
2014). Guezeba’s presidency was “first time in the history of the Frelimo political 
organisation that party, state and economic power have been concentrated in one faction” 
(Burr 2014: 20). Burr distinguishes between state institutions and bodies (which have been 
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set up and sometimes successfully administered with high levels of assistance from 
international development agencies) and the Frelimo elite. Literature post-Guebuza is less 
extensive, but Vines al. (2016) suggest that the politics of patronage is likely to continue, 
with President Nyusi directly involved in controversies over gains from gas in his home 
constituency of Cabo Delgado (Symons 2016). In short, the Mozambican state is often 
indistinguishable from the Frelimo elite, who have been extremely skilled at working with 
private entities and donors to capture the benefits from incoming resources, whether that be 
donor aid, foreign direct investment in resource extraction, or, as will be explored in chapters 
five and seven, through conservation financing. 
4.3.4.	Re-spacing	Mozambique	
Engel and Nugent (2010: 6) describe a new phase of spatial ordering in Africa, characterised 
by “re-ordered states, trans-national and sub-national entities, new localities and trans-border 
formulations”. The re-spacing of Mozambique takes numerous forms, not all of which are 
discussed here (for example, I omit discussion of informal migration or border practices). I 
discuss three significant spatial changes in contemporary Mozambique: First, as discussed 
above, recent mega-projects are bringing differential connection to globalised capital and 
uneven development. I now discuss two further dynamics: How state and donors are 
pursuing development corridors and other regional spatial strategies, themselves often 
aligned with extractive and industrial projects; and, how Mozambique is reorganising its 
conservation estate, especially in the area of trans-frontier conservation areas.  
Mozambique is involved in regional development arrangements which are embedding 
neoliberalisation processes. The border in particular is becoming a site of re-spacing 
according to neoliberal norms. The African Union Border Programme focusses on “re-
spacing for peace, security and sustainable development” (Asiwaju 2010: 90), aiming to re-
orientate Africa’s borders to facilitate greater trade, productive migrant flows and economic 
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co-operation between neighbouring states. The project is enormously significant in its 
ideological scope and ambition, and over the last 30 years, the border between Mozambique 
and South Africa, has become reimagined from a conflict line to a site of formal economic 
integration. Similarly, the Maputo Development Corridor (MDC), one of many Spatial 
Development Initiatives (SDI) aims to increase economic growth through promoting visions 
of seamless interconnectivity between Mozambique and its neighbours. The goal is greater 
regional integration and economic growth through linking strategic transport routes and 
economic areas through “identify[ing] strategic investment and other ancillary opportunities, 
and "packag[ing]" them for private sector investors” (Maputo Corridor Logistics Initiative, 
undated). Crucially, the PPMR comes into direct contact with surrounding regional 
development and transport transformations both physically (as it is directly adjoining the 
MDC), and conceptually, as both areas represent a way of organising space based on rational 
land-use planning. 
The emergence of trans-frontier conservation should be seen in the context of this re-
spacing. TFCAs are expected to directly feed into wider economic regeneration through a 
process described by one informant as “better zones, better plans and easier attainment of 
your target……….Landscape level planning” (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 
2013).  As discussed in chapter two, TFCAs involve cross-boundary co-operation in the 
management of natural resources, along with the promotion of free animal movement 
through the removal of barriers. Mozambique’s established TFCAs, the Great Limpopo 






Figure 4.1: Map of Peace Parks in southern Africa 
  
 
These are significant areas involving the large-scale reorganisation of space, while also 
encompassing a variety of goals, strategies and imaginaries. This includes linking 
biodiversity protection to large-scale tourism routes, while aiming to restore ‘natural’ areas 
of human or animal space which are often in conflict with colonial boundaries, as well as re-
spacing for economic growth, particularly pursuing greater integration across Africa, both 
internally and with external markets and consumers of an idealised African nature. 
Compatibility and zoning practices are central here, with contemporary Mozambique being 
reorganised to reflect the idea that, if properly and rationally planned, activities which might 
otherwise appear contradictory like extraction, industrial development, tourism and 
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conservation can take place side-by-side. Mozambique is thus increasingly embodying the 
re-spacing of Africa, in which borders are selectively dissolved, and novel zones and spaces 
created for a variety of commercial and political rationale. However, as will be revisited 
throughout this thesis, such utopian re-spacing is producing relationships of dispossession 
along with inclusion. 
4.4.	Changing	conservation	narratives	in	Mozambique	
Moving away from the resources boom, I now discuss conservation in Mozambique’s 
development. This discussion describes the changing narratives in conservation over the 19th, 
20th and 21st centuries, which saw a shift from colonial fortress conservation to community-
based models and then to trans-frontier conservation areas. As these changing positions have 
been extensively discussed in the literature (Adams 2013; Adams and Hutton 2007; Büscher 
and Whande 2007; Hulme and Murpree 2001; Hutton et al. 2005), rather that repeat these 
debates I aim to position Mozambique within this history, drawing out what some have 
called a characteristic “Mozambican way” (Anstey 2001: 85). This section is therefore not a 
simplistic teleology of conservation (and in any case, conservation is often a matter of ‘old’ 
narratives intertwined with new ideologies rather than a straightforward timeline). Rather, I 
wish to show how Mozambique’s particular history has produced a configuration which is at 
once unique, and at the same time, deeply reflective of wider conservation priorities. It is 
both local and global (Tsing 2005).  
4.4.1.	Colonial,	post-colonial	and	developmental	era	approaches	
Historical accounts of conservation in Africa highlight how material practices of exclusion, 
spatial forms of national parks, regulations centring on specific animals, conservation 
institutions with global ambitions, and ideas of nature needing sanctuary from humans to 
avoid extinction, imaginaries of African wilderness, and even conservation’s characteristic 
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sense of righteous zeal all are rooted in colonial hunting histories (Adams 2013). In brief, 
early imperial practices of trophy hunting and priorities of game preservation gave way to 
late colonial ideas about protection and management of certain species through the 
establishment of more permanent reserves. Throughout colonial eastern and southern Africa, 
what are now well-known national parks were established as a result of extensive work by 
groups like the Society Preservation of the Wild Fauna of the Empire in the early part of the 
20th century. However, national parks were dismissive of indigenous claims to the land, 
often removing populations or requiring them to follow stringent rules about hunting 
(Neumann 2004).  
Protected areas were supported by several conservation myths about nature. The first is the 
idea of untouched and pristine nature, in which nature is seen as a universal and pre-existing 
essence outside of social and cultural contexts, something which denotes the correct way that 
things should be, and romanticised through national parks’ concepts of wilderness. 
Conservation claims a moral imperative to restore natural balance through appeal to this 
independent and normative set of values (Cronon 1996). This idea often sat alongside the 
reservation of other areas for natural resource exploitation, creating a dualism between 
nature as romanticised aesthetic landscape and nature as resource (Neumann 2003). The 
second myth is the conception of national parks as the only model for conservation. The 
national park myth fails to recognise unofficial resource conservation and management 
systems which have shaped the landscape (Ostrom [1990] 2015), instead characterising 
parks as fragile ecosystems in need of saving from destructive locals (Neumann 2001b, 
2003, 2004). The third and related myth is the idea that national parks must be secured by 
enclosure and restriction of access to the commons resulting in huge loss of land for 
indigenous people (Brockington and Igoe 2006).  These myths were put to use in state’s 
projects of control and territoriality. Colonial enclosures formed part of a broader plan by the 
colonial state to “civilise”, “rationalise”, “develop” and “render observable” (Neumann 
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2004: 200) populations.  Colonial conservation areas were artefacts of this civilising mission 
– wildernesses that had to be created before they could be protected (Neumann 2002).  
Even from the outset, imaginaries of state building and economic growth were important 
rationale for conservation (Adams 2013; Neumann 2004). Portuguese colonists created 
protected areas including forest and game reserves which covered around 10 per cent of 
Mozambique (Virtanen 2005: 3). In line with colonial attitudes reflected in other African 
territories, local populations were seen by colonial authorities as over-consuming game and 
other natural resources. Colonial authorities governed nature through granting authority to 
commercial colonial companies, which were entitled to enclose land to protect valuable 
natural resources such as forests for timber and the habitats of elephants and rhinos for ivory 
and tusks. Protecting these assets for colonial wealth accumulation inevitably meant the 
exclusion of people, something which Frelimo later seized upon in support of their 
independence claims. However, company interest often lay in mountainous forest reserves 
(in contrast to British and other European colonies in which large-scale sport hunting 
reserves often dominated), so colonial conservation activity was often confined to the 
mountains, leaving much of the rural country ungoverned by conservation regimes and left 
to evolve independently from colonial ideologies about conservation use (Abrahamsson and 
Nilsson 1995; Anstey 2001; Anstey and De Sousa 2001). At the same time, colonial control 
of resources was deemed to be “very weak” (Soto 2009: 88); Soto6 considers that the 
colonial authorities’ failure to prevent huge numbers of rhino and elephant horns being 
illegally taken for export to Asia to be a serious mismanagement. The perceived injustices 
                                                      
6 Dr Bartolomeu Soto is a senior figure in conservation in Mozambique. He is the current Director-
General of the National Administration for Conservation Areas, and has also been head of the Trans-
frontier Conservation Unit in the Ministry for Tourism. Consequently, his work provides direct insight 
into changing Frelimo narratives on conservation. 
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and mismanagements of the colonial era provided fuel for Frelimo’s later treatment of 
conservation. 
Following the demise of the formal colonial state, conservation continued to play a role in 
state-making, forming a means for post-colonial African states to establish and extend 
authority over space, people and resources. Conservation narratives that emerged as 
countries secured independence associated wildlife conservation with “a new and utilitarian 
concern with wildlife as a resource” (Adams 2013: 52). Conservation increasingly became 
about national development, in which preserving habitat was an important concern of 
politicians to ensure that newly-independent countries could benefit from its animals and 
plants, with a direct focus on financial gain. The first president of Tanganyika, Julius 
Nyerere, declared in the Arusha Declaration of Conservation in 1961, a conference 
sponsored by international organisations like the IUCN and UNESCO that “wild creatures 
amid the wild places they inhabit …… are an integral part of our natural resources and our 
future livelihood and well-being” (Nyere 1961, cited in Adams 2013: 53). Conservation from 
its outset was taken up by African states as a means of directly benefitting development, a 
framing which was sponsored and encouraged by international institutions. Such external 
involvement was certainly present in Mozambique, with rangers such as Ken Tinley, a South 
African turtle specialist employed by the Portuguese colonial authority in the 1960s and later 
a central figure in pressing for cross-border conservation in the region, adopted a 
campaigning approach to Mozambique’s wildlife, for example by suggesting that people be 
removed from Gorongosa National Park into a buffer zone to ensure their access to resources 
(McKeown 2015).  
However, this emerging international conservation narrative met with Frelimo’s own ideas 
on conservation, which they were able to enact following independence, nearly fifteen years 
after the Arusha Declaration. As I have already highlighted, Frelimo independence narratives 
centred on Mozambique’s right to manage its own natural resources for its own development 
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rather than feed Portuguese capital accumulation (Mondlane 1969). Biodiversity 
conservation narratives directly reflected these priorities, and emphasised the role of the state 
in managing protected areas. Forest resources and economically valuable animals like game 
were particularly targeted for greater control, and the elimination of what was framed as 
poaching by local populations seen as the key aim (Soto 2009). All land in Mozambique, 
including national parks, was nationalised, and a new department was created, the Direcção 
Nacional de Florestas e Fauna Bravia (National Directorate for Forestry and Wildlife, 
DNFFB). The government revised colonial conservation legislation to enable communities to 
participate in hunting provided they were organised into government-approved co-
operatives, reflecting Frelimo’s pre-occupation with state control over agricultural and rural 
matters (Soto 2009). At the same time, there were early hints that conservation was to 
become involved in economic regeneration, with Soto (2009) reporting that the Machel 
government began to consider policies for conservation-based tourism, partly based on 
research conducted by conservationists in the 1960s and 1970s (McKeown 2015).  
Mozambique’s immediate post-independence conservation policies and narratives thus 
closely reflected the emerging globalised conservation narratives put forward by the Arusha 
declaration, while also continuing the colonial utilitarian focus on nature as resource, and 
adapting this discourse for Frelimo’s purposes. However, conservation soon became a very 
low priority during the civil war between 1980 and 1992, which “virtually eliminated the 
government’s capacity to manage wildlife” (Soto 2009: 89), leaving wildlife populations 
severely depleted and national park infrastructure destroyed. Wildlife poaching offered a 
means of survival in a decimated economy, and wildlife was used for food by soldiers in 
Renamo strongholds such as Gorongosa National Park. Eco-tourism, research and restoration 
were temporarily off the table. 
Post-war reconstruction included a drive to restore and expand colonial conservation areas 
and to rebuild wildlife populations, with attention focussing on restoring colonial reserves 
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like the Great Limpopo, the Maputo Special Reserve and the Gorongosa National Park 
(Virtanen 2005). The DNFFB drew up new conservation and wildlife legislation in 1996 
which secured the role of donors and the private sector in managing conservation. This key 
juncture is discussed in more detail in chapter five as it set in motion a process which led 
directly to the designation of the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve. The new legislation 
was positioned by ministers and donors as necessary in recognition of Frelimo’s “prior 
inability to successfully manage the protected area network and the difficulty it had in 
finding sufficient funding for the maintenance and development of protected areas” (Soto 
2009: 90). Such an overwhelming acceptance of donor financing and administration of 
conservation ushered in the period of community-based natural resource conservation 
(CBNRM) in Mozambique. International ideas about conservation, tourism and community 
development were about to gain significant traction in post-conflict Mozambique as part of 
this drive to both restore natural resources, and also to put them to work for development. 
4.4.2.	Community-based	natural	resource	management	
CBNRM is defined as “those principles and practices that argue that conservation goals 
should be pursued by strategies that emphasise the role of local residents in decision-making 
about natural resources” (Adams and Hulme 2001: 13). It emphasises the moral argument 
that communities should benefit from conservation, along with pragmatic claims that 
conservation must secure the backing of the community to ensure success. It can be directly 
traced through narratives throughout the 1970s and 1980s that conservation should benefit 
poor people rather than restrict their access to resources (IUCN, WWF 1980), along with 
sustainable development discourses that conservation needed to pay its way through the 
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exploitation of natural resources (Hulme and Murphree 2001)7. CBNRM thus offers an 
apparently ‘win-win’ solution to community and conservation development by claiming that 
resources can be conserved while communities can use them in a sustainable way.  
During the 1990s and 2000s, CBNRM became the dominant conservation discourse in 
Mozambique (Virtanen 2005). Mozambique’s CBNRM agenda can be seen as reflecting the 
agendas of international conservation NGOs, especially the ICUN, along with donors 
including the World Bank and USAID (Virtanen 2005: 13). The first project, Tchuma Tchato 
in Tete Province in 1994 essentially replicated the flagship Zimabwean CAMPFIRE project 
in its large managed area for wildlife, no fences, and community involvement on the grounds 
of promoting development and ecological sustainability. Between 1994 and 2005 a further 
41 CBNRM projects were established. The CBNMR model adopted by Mozambique has 
been inherently economic in character, often emphasising economic incentives to secure 
community buy-in. However, projects have not generally involved the full devolution of 
legal status as tenured land managers to communities, with devolution of power over local 
resources often stopping at local government (Virtanen 2005). In this way, CBNRM in 
Mozambique has often reflected the priorities of international and national elites rather than 
the rights and needs of local communities. 
Nevertheless, CBNRM rhetoric directly links conservation with community development. 
While this can be through direct resource use to support livelihoods, CBNRM also 
                                                      
7 Despite its practical, emotive and conceptual appeal, CBNRM has had sustained criticism which is 
well-covered in the literature, so they are only mentioned briefly here. Critiques problematise its 
simplistic account of the ‘the community’ and disregard of the messy reality of power relations that 
exist at the local level (Virtanen 2005). It is often viewed as a privileged, apolitical and pre-packaged 
solution which responds to the needs of the policy community rather than the needs of communities, 
“underpinned by theoretically justified benefits which serve to reproduce and market it” (Blaikie 
2006:1942), rather than any consistent record of success. Literature has also explored communities’ 
direct experiences of CBNRM, and how it can lead to rather than solve divisions (Büscher 2013). So 
although CBNRM promotes the idea that conservation must be economically viable, literature shows 
that it has often facilitated rather than prevented dispossession. 
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encourages communities to partake in the “safari, tourist, handicraft and trophy hunting 
industry” (Blaikie 2006: 1954). This relationship between tourism and conservation in 
Mozambique was a direct result of CBNRM’s adoption as its policy paradigm. The link was 
cemented in the Ministry of Tourism’s tourism policy and implementation strategy in 2003. 
This policy directly linked the protection of biodiversity with tourism, and prioritised the 
strengthening of existing protected areas and the designation of new ones, including trans-
frontier conservation areas (Soto 2009). However, as support for CBNRM was consolidating 
in Mozambique’s ministries, it was also being challenged in some conservation circles by a 
resurgent ‘back-to-the-barriers’ narrative, encompassing enclosure of space and the 
displacement of people driven by an idealised view of nature, a privileging of conservation 
science and technological mapping, a conception of humanity as a destructive force and the 
perceived failure of CBNRM (Adams and Hutton 2007). 
Before turning to discuss TFCAs in more detail, I emphasise how the shifting priorities in 
Mozambique’s conservation policy reflect its particular colonial history and subsequent 
revolution as well as international narratives. Frelimo’s continued focus on nationalising 
resources reflects its independence politics, while at the same time it has been obliged as a 
result of its post-conflict aid dependence to embrace the agendas of international donors. I do 
not, however, wish to present this as a simplistic case of ‘global’ ideas imposed on a ‘local’ 
context. As the following chapter will discus, both the conflicts and the synergies between 
Mozambique’s national institutional dynamics and power, the politics of personal 
enrichment which characterises contemporary Frelimo, and the priorities of international 
NGOs, donors and private entities are played out through conservation. For now, I turn to 




Mozambique’s position as darling of international donors throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
required it to embrace international market-driven conservation ideologies and policy 
regimes. The emergence of trans-frontier conservation is seen as a significant shift in policy 
and practice in southern Africa (Duffy 2006a), and is said to have many advantages. TFCAs 
invoke ideas of natural harmony and uniting pristine ‘pre-human’ ocean and land 
wildernesses, while also promising development and livelihoods aspects like improved 
fishing catches and eco-tourism. They are considered to be especially useful to marine 
ecology, because marine ecosystems are seldom within national boundaries, and marine 
problems such as overfishing and pollution do not tend to emanate from a single source. 
More generally, TFCAs are seen by supporters as a vehicle for enhancing political 
cooperation across Africa, and as an antidote to the artificial division of Africa under 
colonialism (Nikiwane 2001, cited in Wolmer 2003). The model is said to promote economic 
growth; Zimbabwe’s Deputy Minister of Environment and Tourism described Peace Parks as 
“an engine to propel economic development”, justified under various regional and 
international policy initiatives (Wolmer 2003: 267). There is often a requirement that TFCAs 
provide direct community benefits through finances raised through eco-tourist revenues 
(Duffy 2006b), which has obvious parallels with CBNRM goals. Moreover, TFCAs are 
linked with wider spatial regeneration plans to attract tourists into the southern African 
region (Büscher 2013).  
The adoption of the TFCA approach has a very specific history, rooted in the post-apartheid, 
post-cold war and pro-capitalist political economy. The distinctive Peace Parks philosophy 
was prominently articulated by Peace Parks Foundation founder Anton Rupert, a highly 
successful South African businessman and prominent anti-apartheid figure, philanthropist 
and conservationist, whose vision for African nature centred on the coupling of conservation 
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and capitalism8. The PPF’s message was targeted to appeal to the post-apartheid majority 
government in South Africa and to post-independence governments in the region by 
promoting “sentiments of a real or unspoiled South Africa before colonisation and apartheid” 
(Büscher 2013: 43), combining this with an emphasis on community involvement (a legacy 
of the prior CBNRM conservation discourse), and, perhaps most appealingly for post-
conflict governments, the economic arguments that increased tourism and private sector 
investment generated by large conservation areas would promote economic reconstruction 
through growth.  
The PPF promotes a triple-win formula of economic growth, cross-border reconciliation and 
environmental protection, summed up in a grandiose vision: 
The concept of the region’s peace parks is as glorious as it is audacious: vast 
conservation areas that straddle national borders, of sufficient extent to incorporate 
entire biomes; of sufficient integrity to restore the ancient patterns of diverse 
ecological communities, and of sufficient vision to reconnect the shared cultures of 
tribal peoples, dislocated when colonial rulers arbitrarily imposed Africa’s 
borders……..These parks are as astounding in their extent as in their natural 
magnificence, the immense richness of their biodiversity and the importance of their 
cultural heritage (Peace Parks Foundation undated a).  
 
The promise of Peace Parks, we are told, is to restore both human and ecological 
communities, while also promoting tourism as the only “economic engine that would create 
the jobs ….. so urgently needed on the subcontinent” (Peace Parks Foundation undated e). 
Undoubtedly, it presents an inspiring vision, and the Peace Parks garners significant political 
support. Its late supporter, Nelson Mandela, is quoted on the PPF website as follows: 
I know of no political movement, no philosophy, no ideology, which does not agree 
with the peace parks concept as we see it going into fruition today. It is a concept 
that can be embraced by all. In a world beset by conflicts and division, peace is one 
                                                      
8 For a full account of the founding of the PPF in 1997 and its predecessor organisation, the Southern 
African Nature Foundation see Büscher 2013 and Ramutsindela 2007. 
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of the cornerstones of the future. Peace parks are a building block in this process, not 
only in our region, but potentially in the entire world (Peace Parks Foundation 
undated f).  
 
This triple-win vision has been sufficiently powerful to gain PPF backing from heads of state 
across South Africa, Mozambique and six other southern African countries, which, as will be 
seen in chapter five, has been fundamental to ensuring the roll out of TFCAs across the 
region. It also has support from international donors including the Dutch and Swedish 
Postcode Lotteries, the World Bank, and private individuals, international royalty and 
corporate supporters including Richard Branson, Vodafone and Deutsche Bank under its 
Club 21 scheme (which bestows celebrated supporter status on donators of $US 1 million). 
In addition, as will be discussed in chapter five, the World Bank, through grants from the 
International Development Association (IDA) and GEF has provided significant funds and 
support to advance the TFCA agenda in Mozambique.  
TFCAs re-shape the relationships between conservation areas and their human and animal 
inhabitants in multiple ways. The agenda and vision as expressed in the passages quoted 
above provides an opportunity to analyse the neoliberal political economy, spatial 
organisation, particular actors, techniques and technologies on governance, and the 
relationship between knowledge and material nature. These are discussed in turn below. 
Regionalism. The TFCA agenda can be linked to several shifts in conservation and political 
thinking towards a regionalist approach. TFCAs are bound up with a wider shift towards 
national and transnational spaces which are integrated across southern Africa and the African 
continent. At the same time, scientific literature has become increasingly vocal in its support 
of bioregionalist systems in conservation (Büscher and Whande 2007). Regionalist thinking 
began to dominate international conservation governance in the 2000’s, with the UNEP 
promoting trans-boundary conservation and use of biodiversity for sustainable development 
as one of its four guiding principles. The agenda is increasingly supported by a scientific 
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literature which argues that networks of protected sites are required to support ecological 
integrity, facilitate species movements and create system resilience, a view reflected in 
international conservation trends. As a state party to the Convention on Biodiversity, 
Mozambique has developed a national legal framework for biodiversity conservation which 
specifically addresses cross-border issues, particularly poaching in TFCAs, and expanded its 
protected areas system, which at 26 per cent of national territory exceeds the CBD’s updated 
target of 17 per cent (Government of Mozambique 2014). However, as evidenced above, the 
regional vision is much more than an economic one; TFCAs aim to restore pre-colonial 
Africa by reducing or removing national boundaries. The TFCA model thus embodies a 
conservation discourse which combines this bio and political regionalism with wider 
development ideas and processes (Ramutsindela 2007). 
Neo-protectionism. However, at the same time as they aim for freer movements, TFCAs can 
also be seen as drawing on conservation ecology’s strong protectionism (Büscher and 
Dressler 2007). This approach, such as that expressed in Terborgh (1999) and Terborgh, Van 
Shaik, Davenport and Rao (2002) invokes ideas of widespread environmental degradation 
and calls for the enclosure of nature and the displacement of people, partly in response to the 
perceived failure of more ameliorative community-based approaches. The discourse ascribes 
a strong role to authoritarian institutions (state or private), and views humanity as a 
destructive force which must be kept from pristine ‘wilderness’. This view considers the 
threat to certain species and areas so extreme that emergency measures become necessary 
and urgent. The neo-protectionist approach is frequently aligned with militarised practices 
(Büscher and Ramutsindela 2016; Lunstrum 2014). Community-based and back to the 
barriers conservation are blended in TFCAs, with programs exhibiting some tendencies from 
each discourse (Büscher 2013). 
Spatial re-organisation. TFCAs involve the designation of hundreds of square miles as 
linked conservation zones. While many of these areas were already some kind of nature 
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reserve, the TFCAs reorganising space according to new logics. Management of TFCAs is 
predicated on the idea of free movement within the park, including the removal of fences 
which separate one park from another (an iconic example being the removal of the fence 
between Kruger National Park in South Africa and the Great Limpopo in Mozambique), 
coupled with strong protection of external borders and securitisation of the space inside. In 
addition, TFCAs are specifically established as spaces for investment by private companies 
(Noe 2015). However, there are multiple contradictions between this idea of greater freedom 
of movement for animals, people and investments and the reality, with TFCAs linked with 
the removal of communities, constraints on community movements and access to resources, 
diplomatic difficulties caused by different capacities and attitudes to conservation across 
borders, and security challenges (Büscher 2013; Büscher and Ramutsindela 2016; Milgroom 
and Spirenburg 2008). So despite the free movement rhetoric, the utopia promised by TFCAs 
is far more complex in reality.  
Reconfiguration of governance. TFCAs embody ideas about the governance of people, space 
and nature in a novel combination. The modern state is characterised by the requirement for 
a clear territorial area, enclosed by boundaries and protected by force, which it is the state’s 
right to use and cultivate. In liberal thinking, land can be said to be occupied and governed 
by state permission. However, in the TFCA discourse, this territoriality is reconfigured to 
create areas of multi-state and private governance. Duffy (2006a) observes that TFCAs in 
Africa involve a reconfiguration of governance in which including international 
environmental organisations, donors and private charities such as PPF govern TFCAs using a 
range of governance techniques. The changing set of actors in TFCA governance is also 
indicative of the re-framing of conservation as a financial opportunity, as some actors 
involved represent private sector interests and are guided by neoliberal ideas. This new 
nexus of actors produces apparently contradictory techniques of governance, using 
authoritarian tactics, such as verbal bullying of communities (Milgroom and Spirenburg 
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2008) alongside participatory approaches, such as political marketing and public consultation 
(Büscher 2013).  
Continuity and change. The driving ideology behind trans-frontier conservation combines 
the idea that conservation should be profitable with historical ideas that the interactions 
between communities and nature needed careful management. TFCAs combine this neo-
protectionism with CBNRM logics which emphasises making conservation responsible for 
development and poverty reduction. In that sense, the TFCA ideology combines what it 
views as the best of community-focussed conservation – the profit-making capacities of 
conservation - with the best of ‘fences and fines’ – the return to protectionism of nature. 
However, it also contains a novel emphasis on economic growth. This imperative is clearly 
expressed in the various policies accompanying the World Bank’s TFCA project. The overall 
goal of this project is to “contribute to economic growth and rural development…. [through] 
….. [n]ature-based tourism, sustainable forest and fisheries, wildlife management, and 
payment for ecosystem services [which] can generate income for rural communities and 
contribute to the national economy” (World Bank 2015: 4). The drive to profitability has 
been in turn amplified by global neoliberal ideologies regarding the dominance of 
commodification dictated by the market (Büscher 2013; Büscher and Whande 2007).  
To sum up here, trans-frontier conservation emerged from a regional political economy in 
which many southern African nations were experiencing the aftermath of conflict and the 
transition to neoliberal capitalism, and NGO conservation actors were regrouping around a 
‘back-to-the barriers’ narrative after the perceived failures of community-based approaches. 
In this context, the ‘win-win’ promises of trans-frontier conservation gained significant 
traction. The TFCA discourse has been actively promoted in southern Africa by a handful of 
very powerful NGOs, especially the Peace Parks Foundation, which exhibits a missionary 
zeal and makes enormous promises on behalf of TFCAs to solve many complex political, 
economic and environmental problems. It is firmly anchored in the neoliberal environmental 
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position that conservation can and should be a source of economic growth through novel 
products like ecotourism and payments for ecosystem services, and through providing a 
vehicle for private sector investment and involvement. As I will explore more fully in 
chapter five, the Mozambican state has historically had many operational, institutional and 
delivery gaps that can easily be filled by NGOs such as the World Bank and the Peace Parks 
Foundation, who have been highly successful in taking the TFCA agenda to the heart of 
Mozambique’s conservation policy.  
4.5.	Conclusions	
The chapter has emphasised the speed and dynamism through which Mozambique has 
transitioned through colonialism, socialist independence and then through neoliberal 
discipline and the thorough embrace of the market. These often violent shifts in social and 
political life involved the complex interplay of global and regional forces, local practices and 
a multiplicity of state and non-state actors. However, Frelimo has been at the centre of the 
construction of Mozambique as socialist and now capitalist state. The state-party has been 
highly successful at maintaining political dominance and the country has secured significant, 
if uneven economic growth. Mozambique has seen a long official period of national peace 
(albeit marked by violent incidents), but its stability has often been achieved through an 
illiberal approach and lack of genuine democracy. Despite the celebratory proclamations 
from donors invested in Mozambique as ‘donor darling’ and case study for the Washington 
Consensus, Mozambique’s particular development trajectory, characterised by extreme 
reliance on foreign aid, and, increasingly, on private sector loans and investment without 
political conditionality, its patrimonial political system and its emphasis on the extraction of 
natural resources regardless of social and ecological costs have all had serious implications 
for development. However, my aim in this chapter has not been to reproduce concerns of 
donors, policy experts and civil society, though they are numerous and significant. Instead, it 
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has been to show how Mozambique’s current development trajectory has been actively 
produced by Frelimo along with international state and donor actors. Mozambique’s 
particular form of neoliberalism has not arisen from inherent structural forces as if by magic, 
but rather has been brought about through the complex interplay of human agency, economic 
and political forces, and changing development ideologies.  
The history of the emergence of TFCAs in Mozambique is one of the interplay between 
colonial legacies, the shifting concerns and paradigms of international donors, Frelimo 
imaginaries and concerns, and its unique social, cultural, political and ecological landscape, 
producing a characteristic ‘Mozambican way’. TFCAs are the latest in a long line of 
conservation prescriptions; however, TFCAs represent both continuity and change. They 
continue concerns with community development and the wise use of resources, and they are 
undoubtedly a product of the post-apartheid, post-cold war and pro-capitalist political 
economy. They are also a novel departure in several important ways, particularly in the 
explicit linking of biodiversity conservation with economic growth, and in the hybrid 
governance of space according to both private and public authority. TFCAs are profoundly 
spatial organisations, re-claiming large tracts of land to be managed according to principles 
of economic growth, bioregionality and cross-border co-operation. Trans-frontier discourse 
draws on neoliberal ideas that conservation should be a tool for economic growth, and 
emerged in southern Africa as neoliberal changes were becoming deeply embedded. The 
emergence of TFCAs in Mozambique is therefore no accident, and the establishment of the 








Whoever draws the map behaves as if they were culturally, historically, legally and 
politically in the right. (Sloterdijk 2013: 103) 
 
5.1.	Introduction	
The Peace Parks Foundation describes the creation of the PPMR on the 14 July 2009 as 
follows:  
The government declared a 678 km² marine protected area, stretching from Ponta do 
Ouro in the south to the Maputo River Mouth in Maputo Bay in the north. The Ponta 
do Ouro Partial Marine Reserve stretches three nautical miles into the Indian Ocean 
and includes the waters around Inhaca Island and Portuguese Island. The marine 
reserve is part of the first marine trans-frontier conservation area in Africa, the Ponta 
do Ouro- Kosi Bay TFCA, where Mozambique's Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine 
Reserve turtle monitoring programme links up with the one across the border in 
South Africa's iSimangaliso Wetland Park, a World Heritage Site, where turtles have 
been monitored since 1963 (Peace Parks Foundation undated c). 
 
The PPMR was indeed created as a particular kind of space in July 2009. It was deemed to 
be bounded and mapped, and a new regime of public authority and governance was 
introduced. It was portrayed by its creators as a space where the primary concern is the 
management of nesting turtles, and where the ostensible logic is that of connecting 
Mozambique’s underdeveloped turtle monitoring project with the more established South 
African programme across the border. The statement emphasises the natural qualities of the 
PPMR, both in the sense of an external nature in need of protection, and also as the 
unproblematic extension of the environmental governance that is taking place in South 
Africa. Under this framing, it seems logical that Mozambique’s turtle programme should be 
partnered with South Africa’s, and the PPMR begins to appear as just a natural extension of 
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governance that is having good results just across the border. The passage makes it appear as 
if the PPMR is the ‘correct’ and ‘natural’ way to manage nature, people and space – as noted 
in the quotation which opened this chapter. However, the PPMR’s origin story is silent on its 
existing inhabitants and their social relations and fails to recognise pre-existing community, 
private and state claims to govern the area. The reserve is imagined as an external and 
standalone object which stands apart from previous social relations. 
In this chapter, I am interested in how the PPMR came to be produced and legitimised as a 
space for neoliberal conservation, geared towards the interests of conservation science and 
well-off tourists. I discuss how the space of the PPMR is produced through official 
knowledge, policy and legislation, through networks of state and non-state institutions, along 
with wider legitimating discourses and imaginaries about development and conservation. I 
analyse how the reserve is governed, and discuss whether it is best understood as a ‘state 
space’, or a space in which private and donor interests dominate. I also explore how the 
reserve is connected to global capitalism through the idea of using TFCAs as spaces for 
accumulation by private actors. The purpose of the chapter is thus to explore continuities 
with colonial and development era narratives and practices of conservation, while also 
drawing out what is novel under the neoliberal conservation trans-frontier narrative. By 
highlighting processes of continuity and change, I suggest that the PPMR in its current form 
represents both a continuation of the long history of capitalist development through the 
appropriation of nature, while also representing novel ways of conceiving and governing 
conservation according to neoliberal ideology.   
The chapter begins with describing how the idea of the PPMR as TFCA emerged from the 
needs of the state and donors to regularise and govern a contested space. I then demonstrate 
how this idea was supported and legitimated by potent ideas about biodiversity loss and 
development, before discussing the institutionalisation of TFCAs through uneven 
relationships between donor and Mozambican state actors. This enabled the construction of a 
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network of scaled-up conservation spaces geared towards the needs of investors and tourists, 
underpinned by neoliberal incentive and market-based interventions. I analyse the power 
involved in the production of this regime of accumulation, including sovereign power, which 
brings about neoliberalisation through the top-down appropriation of conservation space. 
This works alongside a neoliberal governmentality, enacted through the creation of 
incentives to bring about environmentally desirable behaviour. I then discuss state and public 
authority in the reserve. This chapter sets the scene for discussions in chapter six about how 
this conservation regime intersects with the complex and material lives of people and 
animals in the reserve. 
5.2.	Bringing	order	through	conservation	
In May 2013, about six months prior to my first research trip, 98 zebra and 117 blue 
wildebeest were transferred to the Maputo Special Reserve (MSR) immediately adjacent to 
the PPMR. The official press release celebrated this event as restoring a pre-existing natural 
balance, with tourists once again able to see animals “that were historically found in the 
area” (Peace Parks Foundation 13 May 2012). According to this statement, reintroducing 
these creatures was primarily about making the Lubombo TFCA more appealing to tourists 
by providing them with a quintessential African safari experience. The ongoing restocking 
programme forms a central element of the TFCA agenda and the introduction of large game 
was a key step towards bringing lions back to the Lubombo. The reintroduction of large 
predators would have potentially drastic consequences for the area’s current human 
inhabitants, but is widely welcomed for its tourism potential. The programme was celebrated 
by several of my informants, who claimed that one of the unique and special things about 
visiting the Lubombo TFCA was the ability to take part in marine and terrestrial safaris in 
one linked reserve. One former ranger wanted the Lubombo’s tourists to “look one way and 
see elephants, and look the other way and see the humpbacks”, a phenomenon only available 
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“one or two other places in the world” (interview with former MSR ranger, 9 November 
2013). In this conceptualisation of conservation, the land-marine pairing provides a unique 
tourism experience, amplifying the value of the constituent elements. This production of 
nature into spectacular moments for tourist consumption is at the heart of the PPF’s creation 
of the PPMR.  
The PPMR and its linked reserves have, of course, not always been designated conservation 
areas. The game re-stock was the culmination of decades of discursive construction of the 
Matutuíne Province as an area for tourism, wildlife protection and use of natural resources 
for development. Historically, however, the area has often been the site of profound 
contestation over resources and land, with colonial and Mozambican state, private, 
conservation and informal community uses all making claims at various points in history. 
Before becoming a separate reserve, the coastal region from the South African border to 
Maputo Bay was part of the Maputo Special Reserve (MSR), an area created by the 
Portuguese colonial authorities in order to protect elephant populations south of Maputo and 
to permit hunting of game. In line with colonial authorities elsewhere in Africa (and in line 
with some contemporary thought and practice), the Portuguese viewed hunting and 
conservation as complimentary rather than contradictory activities (Adams 2013). Hunting 
was permitted until 1969, when the MSR was designated a special reserve. This attracted the 
interest of international biologists who began to flag the reserve as a site of interest for its 
extensive biodiversity, and who marvelled at the huge elephant populations, hundreds of bird 
species and large populations of nesting turtles (Tinley, Rosinha, Tello and Dutton 1976).  
In the mid-1970s, with Mozambique newly independent, the MSR became understood in 
terms of emerging discourses of sustainable development. Figures such as José Lobão Tello, 
a former Maputo Special Reserve and Gorongosa National Park ranger, and George Hughes, 
a South African turtle researcher began to argue that the Mozambican coastal region should 
be targeted for greater conservation and also tourist expansion thanks to its endemic and 
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varied bird, marine and terrestrial fauna and its proximity to Maputo (Tello 1973, cited in 
Langa 2000; McKeown 2015). However, the outbreak of conflict after independence meant 
that tourism and conservation quickly became low priorities, and the country was largely 
inaccessible to foreign scientists until peace in 1992. The area around the South African 
border in particular was the site of fighting, and in some areas remains a land mine risk with 
tourists advised against taking unguided walks in the bush. Renamo affiliates claimed 
hunting rights in the area and reduced game in the MSR almost to nothing throughout the 
conflict, resulting in today’s uncharacteristically nervous and aggressive elephant population, 
and, it is argued by the PPF, necessitating today’s re-stocking program.  
Although generally speaking, conservation activity ceased in the region for the duration of 
the conflict, McKeown (2015) discusses how some individuals were still actively promoting 
the region as a linked conservation zone with South Africa (reflecting the Maputaland 
imaginaries introduced in chapter four). In 1978, a workshop was held in South Africa on the 
future of the Maputaland region, and the proceedings published two years later as Studies on 
the Ecology of Maputaland. The workshop made the case for linking conservation and 
economic concerns. Fish biology expert M. N. Bruton (1980: 526, cited in McKeown 2015: 
88) argued that:  
The preservation of a wilderness atmosphere for its own sake is clearly not an 
economic proposition, but it should be borne in mind that the present and potential 
natural productivity and diversity of Maputaland would be the main working capital 
on which a natural resource-based economy and tourist industry would be 
established. There is no doubt that this working capital will be competitive on the 
international market.  
 
This extract is striking for its use of the idea of ‘working capital’, a formulation which 
encompassed the commodification of nature to support a tourist economy, but also the idea 
of a natural resource-based economy. The combination of these two ideas under a ‘wise use’ 
thesis will be repeated again, much later, by other conservation actors, especially WWF 
Mozambique. The same report contained a draft development plan written by Ken Tinley (a 
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turtle ecologist and early proponent of bioregionality introduced in chapter four) and Willem 
van Riet, who later became Chief Executive Officer of the Peace Parks Foundation 
(McKeown 2015). This development plan argued that protectionism would not meet the 
needs of the people of the region for development, and pressed for a conservation approach 
which prioritised local community needs. The conservation area should be presented to 
communities as “to be developed as their game resource area (i.e. not for the whites, or 
government or Natal Parks Board) primarily for protein production and its by-products 
which would initiate a whole series of cottage industries along its periphery” (Tinley and van 
Riet 1980: 121, cited in McKeown 2015: 91). Though the report focusses exclusively on 
territory in South Africa, it is significant in that its authors (several of whom would also be 
influential in pressing for a linked conservation area in Mozambique) clearly advocate 
mixed-use zones in which designations including tourism, ‘tribal reserves’ (in the 
nomenclature of the time) and strict conservation sit side-by-side. Such faith in the ability of 
rational planning to combine potentially contradictory activities in a given space prefigures 
the ‘triple win’ promise of economic growth, conservation and cross-border reconciliation 
which would feature in later Peace Parks Foundation discourse. However, until the cessation 
of conflict in 1992, it was not possible to act on this vision in Mozambique. 
Land tenure in Mozambique was highly disputed in the post-conflict context. Most of 
Matutuíne’s population had fled the province and quickly returned after peace. Frelimo’s 
forced communal village policies had compounded internal displacement; one of my 
informants explained how several of the villagers currently resident in the MSR had been 
transported to a nearby government compound, but moved back again as soon as they were 
able (interview with MSR resident, 12 October 2013). These multiple waves of relocation 
meant that returning communities’ claims over land and over resources such as the charcoal 
trade, fish and game were contested and hard to ascertain (McGregor 1997). In addition, 
many transient people, especially demobilised soldiers, arrived without prior land claims and 
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were treated with hostility as interlopers (Lunstrum 2001). One resident interviewed at the 
time described the situation in the province as “now there’s no authority, everyone does what 
he wants” (unnamed local resident, cited in McGregor 1997: 12). However, rather than step 
in to calm matters, Renamo and Frelimo often stoked this toxic blend of tension and mistrust 
for party political gain in advance of Mozambique’s first election in 1994 (McGregor 1997). 
This confusion and lack of state public authority provided an opportunity for alternative land 
claims from the donor and private sector, who could present themselves as restoring order to 
what was labelled the “wild west of the east” (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 
2013).   
The context of contested authority in the region also enabled a variety of illicit activities 
which often overflowed national borders. Drug and wildlife product smuggling were a 
growing trans-border trade, effectively meaning that the Mozambique-South Africa 
borderlands were already trans-national (Duffy 2001). A long-time Ponta do Ouro resident 
informed me that people had always crossed the border in formal and informal ways for 
reasons of family connections and trade (especially the lower cost and greater availability of 
groceries and consumer goods in South Africa), but that until recently, these activities had 
not been regularised (interview with turtle monitor, 5 October 2013). Additionally, the 
southern coastal region, especially Ponta do Ouro town, attracted regular tourism from South 
Africa after the cessation of the conflict. Several South African informants referred to a 
special mystique possessed by the town, perceived as a permissive, exotic and Europeanised 
holiday idyll in contrast to repressive apartheid South Africa (see also Sidaway and Power 
1995). This, in turn, often produced wild behaviour. One informant described how “the 
moment they [tourists] crossed the border they lost all their morals, everything went pear 
shaped” (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 2013), and a reserve official described 
“South Africans [who] left their brains at the border, they think they can do what they like in 
Mozambique” (interview with PPMR official 1, 4 October 2013). The government was 
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reportedly unhappy with the way in which tourists tended to camp, often bringing supplies 
with them across the border which failed to create any significant economic development for 
local businesses. At the same time, the coastal region was beginning to undergo largely 
uncontrolled second home development, often by South Africans following the cessation of 
conflict, which was felt by conservationists to be threatening to the region’s biodiversity 
(interview with senior ANAC official, 9 May 2014).  
In contrast to this rich mix of licit and illicit human cross-border activity, wildlife 
movements were highly controlled by hard borders, a situation which began to be contested 
by conservationists. KZN objected to culling surplus South African elephants rather than 
allowing them to migrate into Mozambique (Duffy 2001), and critiqued the way in which 
lions which historically ranged Maputaland were now fenced at the South African border. 
KZN was also deeply involved in the region’s turtle populations, with its leader, Dr George 
Hughes having led cross-border turtle monitoring and research expeditions since 1963, and 
consequently was supportive of efforts to manage turtles in a cross-border fashion 
(McKeown 2015). KZN was deeply involved with setting up the turtle monitoring and 
conservation programme in southern Mozambique, which went on to be a rationale for the 
establishment of the PPMR. As a consequence of these contradictory ways of governing the 
border, it was decided that a strategic plan was needed to decide on the region’s future once 
and for all, one which could fulfil donor and government desires to make the most of 
Mozambique’s special natural qualities, could control unregularised movements and illicit 
border crossings, would bring governance back to a contested border, and would halt any 
future contestation over land rights in the province. In this way, conservation became a 
solution for multiple problems of perceived rural disorder, of unruly South African tourists 
and of contradictory border practices, while also satisfying continued efforts, often driven 




After the conflict finished for good in 1992, conservation scientists therefore renewed their 
interest in Mozambique’s historic national parks with vigour. However, in contrast to the 
individuals and small groups of the 1970s, conservation science was now firmly embedded 
in a rapidly expanding trans-national network of large NGOs (Dresner 2008; Scholfield and 
Brockington 2010). At the same time, the Government of Mozambique began to seek ways 
to increase investment in the country. The government radically altered the land tenure 
system, moving from a system in which all land is state-owned to a semi-privatised system 
in which individuals, communities, and businesses could hold the right to use and profit from 
the land (Lei de Terras/ Land Law, Law 19.97). This change in law was intended to 
encourage foreign direct investment as part of the neoliberalisation of Mozambique’s post-
war economy (Lunstrum 2008).  The land reform played a central role in this goal as it was 
primarily aimed at using Mozambique’s natural resources to attract international capital. The 
changes to the law enabled donors, in particular the World Bank, to argue that privately-run 
conservation was conducive to capital investment. These donors, aided by the new land 
regime, became interested in how to exploit the potential of the Matutuíne Province. It was 
felt that the biodiversity protection and tourism potential of the area could be better managed 
as part of the wider plans to bring order to the disputed region (interview with PPF 
consultant, 18 October 2013). The vision of a linked conservation zone based on historic 
Maputaland, combining resource-led development and biodiversity protection had found its 
political moment. 
In 1996, a World Bank report stated its aim to provide assistance to Government of 
Mozambique in policies, capacity and funding for trans-frontier conservation areas (World 
Bank 1996: iii). The project established three target areas for involvement in TFCAs, one of 
which was named simply ‘Maputo’. This proposed TFCA included the Maputo Special 
Reserve and the then-proposed Futi corridor which would link with the Tembe Elephant Park 
and the Ndumo Game Reserve in Kwazulu, South Africa. The report framed Mozambique as 
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extremely limited in its capacity compared to its neighbours South Africa and Zimbabwe 
(World Bank 1996: 4), and supported the involvement of external institutions like the PPF in 
determining and driving conservation and resource management priorities alongside the state 
(Virtanen 2005). At the same time, the DNFFB (in partnership with the World Bank GEF) 
called for a freeze on all land concessions in the province in order to ensure conservation 
interests were represented in the region’s land-use plan (McGregor 1997). The World Bank 
was interested in expanding South African protected areas into Mozambique, and McGregor 
(1997: 8) reports that the MSR was included in “ambitious trans-frontier conservation plans 
for Mozambique’s border regions, which have been so attractive to international donors”. 
The new land law provided the opportunity that donors needed to cement conservation 
claims. It should be noted here also that the World Bank, rather than the Peace Parks played 
a fundamental role in initially introducing TFCAs as the solution for re-ordering the disputed 
province. In this way, TFCAs were born, not just of concerns for conservation, but also from 
donor-led national development. Crucially, they also represent part of a long-running historic 
story in the province based on constructs of a historic Maputaland, and claims that 
conservation could secure the region’s development and ecological future.  
Before discussing the specific claims of the Peace Parks Foundation and the World Bank, I 
want to draw attention to an ambitious private sector plan which preceded the Lubombo 
TFCA.  In the mid-1990s, American businessman James Ulysses Blanchard III wanted to 
build a large theme park (AllAfrica.com 14 May 1999) dedicated to conservation and 
tourism on the stretch of land from the South African coast to Maputo Bay. Blanchard was a 
supporter of Renamo throughout the conflict, which he justified under a discourse of 
freedom, anti-communism and private enterprise. He lost no time in launching ostentatious 
private sector proposals in Mozambique post-conflict. In 1995, a proposal entitled The 
Machangulo Peninsula and the Expanded Elephant Reserve Development was submitted to 
the government. The plans were couched in terms of tourism and restoring the natural 
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balance of the Maputaland region, while at the same time promising economic growth and 
jobs for local people (Brouwer 1998). The planned reserve was described as “the world’s 
largest privatized game reserve” offering the “only sun, sea and safari experience in Africa” 
(Yager 1997: 78). The plans were critiqued at the time for prioritising the needs of wealthy 
international tourists at the expense of local livelihoods, and for marketing idealised visions 
of nature (Brouwer 1998). They were also met with suspicion by other conservation actors 
for being too focussed on commercial gain (Duffy 2001). Though the proposal was officially 
approved by the Mozambican Government in 1997, Blanchard died in March 1999 without 
his plans being realised. However, it is interesting to reflect on how far this concept 
prefigured the PPF’s vision of restoring large-scale conservation areas through private sector 
initiative, as well as rehearsing discourses of the unique ‘land and sea’ tourism potential of 
the Maputaland region.  
The key difference between Blanchard’s vision and that of the PPF is trans-frontier 
conservation’s emphasis on wider ecological, social and political benefits alongside 
economic gains, giving Peace Parks an added sense of moral weight. However, elsewhere in 
Mozambique, private philanthropists similar to Blanchard do control major conservation 
areas. I refer here to the Gorongosa National Park which is managed by the Greg Carr 
Foundation. Carr is an American philanthropist currently in conflict with communities over 
plans to restore ‘pristine’ hydrology by relocating communities from Gorongosa Mountain 
(Schuetze 2015; Walker 2015). Had Blanchard not died, it is very possible that his plans for 
Maputaland would have gained traction, as Carr’s have done in Gorongosa. As it was, the 
ambitious TFCA plans for the province were cemented by the Peace Parks Foundation in by 
a joint memorandum between Mozambique, South Africa and Swaziland on 22 June 2000. 
This act created the Lubombo as a Peace Park, which continued ideas about development 
and conservation discussed for several decades by conservationists, and blended these with 
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potent imaginaries of Edenic, primordial and pre-colonial Africa which can be restored 
through conservation, which I now turn to discuss. 
5.3.	Building	a	consensus	for	marine	TFCAs	
This section analyses how the consensus around TFCAs was built. The Peace Parks 
Foundation draws on powerful ideas, including invoking nature in crisis, changing 
livelihoods and recreating a pre-colonial Africa, which it was able to link with broader 
changes in attitudes towards conserving marine nature. These discourses were used to 
develop relationships between other key donors and the state, and ultimately to bring about 
the emergence of TFCAs and the designation of the PPMR. However, I also demonstrate 
how this was sometimes an imperfect and contested process, in contrast with the multiple 
promises of the trans-frontier discourse (Büscher 2013). 
5.3.1.	The	TFCA’s	conservation	and	development	promises	
Conservation ideas in Mozambique are frequently wrapped in universal and potent ideas 
about ecological degradation. The idea of crisis rests on a romantic conception of nature as 
something external and urgently at risk from human activities. The PPMR is often described 
in terms which invoke danger, decline and loss. A vivid sense of crisis was invoked by a 
reserve official: 
As human beings, we thought that the sea was for ever. And we didn’t manage it 
properly, and definitely the resource is gone. The fishing industry is going to…… 
collapse soon …….. We used to joke about it, but we’d say that you could go into 
the water and come back and you had prawns on your swimming costume. There 
were a lot of prawns. And now, they are gone” (interview with PPMR official 1, 4 
October 2013). 
 
The sense of nostalgia and mourning invoked here reflects Tsing’s (2005: 155) invocation of 
“the spirit of environmental prophecy: the looming, apocalyptic crisis of nature as revealed 
at the turn of the millennium, the chance to save earth through proper naming, and the 
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necessity, [of] doing so”. Recording and numbering through basic research and monitoring 
was frequently insisted upon as a central tool in the PPMR since once conservationists know 
what is there and how many are being lost, they can make a better case for the protection of 
habitats or species. Through these calculations, conservationists seek to both demonstrate a 
dystopian world in which we might not encounter such charismatic or useful animals, and to 
offer a means to save it. Crisis also brings with it normative implications; as Tsing argues, 
“conservation is self-consciously action-oriented as well as research driven” (Tsing 2005: 
158). This drive positions conservation within a particular ethic; one in which globalised 
conservation solutions are naturalised and normalised as the only way to address biodiversity 
crises, and crisis discourses justify intervention.  
The PPF undoubtedly plays on the same sense of emergency in its policy and marketing 
literature, but it also draws on ideas of restoring a pristine nature. A reserve official 
described the PPMR as something “[y]ou don’t find a lot of in the world anymore: 
untouched. There’s almost 40 kilometres of coastline adjacent to the Maputo Special Reserve 
that is really, really pristine” (interview with PPMR official 1, 4 October 2013). Similarly, 
the Peace Parks Foundation 2000 mission statement (cited in McKeown 2015: 95) issues an 
invitation to: 
Dream of an Africa without fences. Dream of ancient migration trails trodden deep 
by an instinct that time has never contained. Dream of a wilderness where the 
elephant roams and the roar of the lion shatters the night. Dream, like us, of 
experiencing Africa wild and free, where people can reap the benefits of nature and 
in turn support her. This is the dream of the Peace Parks Foundation. A dream that 
will only be realised through the establishment of Peace Parks.  
 
This powerful discourse promises to restore a previous imagined perfect state of nature, 
drawing on imaginaries of elemental Africa. Similarly, the most recent ‘Message from the 
CEO’ advances a vision of emergency based on the activities of subsistence livelihoods: 
The wildlife of Africa has seen more changes in the past 200 years than it has in the 
last two million. The decline of the world’s large herbivores is raising the spectre of 
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an ‘empty landscape’ in some of the most diverse ecosystems on the planet……….. 
Nearly all threatened species are in developing countries, where growing human 
populations, unsustainable hunting, high densities of livestock and habitat loss have 
devastating consequences for large, long-lived, slow-breeding, and therefore 
vulnerable herbivore species, their ecosystems and the services they provide (Peace 
Parks Foundation undated b). 
 
This passage is highly emotive, painting a dramatic and apocalyptic picture of ecological 
collapse spreading across the developing world. PPF’s particular brand of crisis-building 
enables it to claim authority over vast scales and over particular localities. It claims an all-
purpose solution which has global reach but which ‘works’ in countries with diverse 
political, cultural and economic contexts. 
Conservation crisis discourses also work by obscuring complicated stories of local resource 
use and relations with nature, framing subsistence livelihoods as ‘problems’ to be addressed 
(Schuetze 2015). The rapid decline in coastal marine life in the PPMR, and often in 
Mozambique more generally, is attributed to a large extent to subsistence livelihoods, 
particularly the use of certain types of fishing gear, overuse of coastal resources, and the 
historic poaching of turtles (along with coastal construction for hotels, private homes and 
businesses) (PPMR 2009, 2011). However, information about the impact of coastal 
livelihoods on fisheries is rather patchy, and other issues such as industrial fishing, illicit 
shark finning, industrial pollution, marine gas extraction and climate change are all 
contributing to the alarming depletion and contamination of ocean resources in Mozambique 
(interview with MICOA official, 14 May 2014). It is worth asking, then, why subsistence 
fishing using certain techniques and turtle poaching are singled out as particular issues 
needing intervention?  In making this observation, I do not aim to deny that marine 
environments are facing serious consequences as a result of human action, nor do I question 
the necessity for the turtle monitoring programme per se. Rather, the point at issue is why 
certain issues are emphasised within conservation discourse, and how and why such 
discourses then go on to justify particular plans and schemes (Li 2007b; Steinberg 2008). I 
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suggest that scientific discourses combined with a potent sense of crisis work to “define and 
claim resources” (Schuetze 2015:141).  The re-production of biodiversity crisis discourses 
while highlighting localised problems of subsistence livelihoods enables a globalised idea, 
TFCAs, to resonate as a specific solution for Mozambique. 
However, ideas of crisis along are not enough. The authority to intervene to produce TFCAs 
also requires a narrative of development. Far from invoking the human-free solution put 
forward by some of Mozambique’s conservationists (officially or otherwise), the PPF is one 
of the leading proponents of involving communities in conservation. The claim to provide 
alternatives to local activities that are deemed to be destructive is an important part of PPF’s 
appeal. The TFCA discourse invokes CBNRM’s notion that conservation works best when 
communities retain some entitlement over natural resources, and blends this with novel 
neoliberal discourses which promote market-led solutions, a hybridisation characteristic of 
neoliberal schemes (Brenner et al. 2010b; Harvey 2005). I now turn to discuss how these 
discourses emerged through networks of donor and state elites in Mozambique and 
internationally.  
5.3.2.	Institutionalising	TFCAs:	Donors	
As I have mentioned, throughout the 1990s and 2000s two complementary trends converged: 
First, the incorporation of marine protection through MPAs into wider discourses of 
sustainable development, and second, the TFCA discourse begin gaining significant traction. 
From having designated just one new MPA between 1965 and 2000, Mozambique began 
rapidly creating new MPAs, with five new parks between 2000 and 2005, in line with the 
2003 World Parks Congress 15 per cent MPA coverage targets (Wells, Burgess and Ngusaru 
2012). These parks aimed to participate in linking Mozambique’s coast and inshore waters as 
a single ecological region, stretching from South Africa to southern Somalia under the East 
African Marine Ecoregion (EAME). The designation of new MPAs dovetailed with the ideas 
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of bioregionality, development and community benefits put forward by supporters of 
TFCAs. The concept that the ‘right use’ of marine environments was to be brought about by 
creating economic incentives for conservation became central to the way that conservation 
thinking shifted throughout the 1990s and 2000s. A network of linked marine protected areas 
became seen as a central part of combatting these threats, and the EAME and WWF 
Mozambique promoted the concept that conservation could provide livelihoods for 
subsistence communities as well as broader growth by conducting high profile meetings with 
senior Mozambican ministers. Mozambican marine nature became re-framed as an asset 
which can “generate value-add in the form of monetary profit” (Sullivan 2006: 115). 
Consequently, the narrative became that communities should be motivated to protect the 
basis for such economic opportunity, and conservation became about creating regulatory and 
spatial frameworks for these incentives. Such narratives were sufficiently powerful to bring 
about a significant shift in funding from CBNRM to trans-frontier projects across southern 
Africa (Büscher 2013). As figure 5.1 demonstrates, the TFCA plans quickly developed into a 
project with major scope.  
Figure 5.1: Table showing TFCA phases in Mozambique 1970 – 2014 (drawing on 
World Bank 2015) 




1970 – 1980 Early promotion of 
cross-border initiatives  
State-led conservation, 
nationalisation of parks, 
focus on valuable resources 
N/A 
1980 - 1990s TFCA Phase One: 1996 
– 2005 
(donors: US$5 m. from 
GEF) 
Restoration of reserves for 
tourism; growing role for 
donors and private sector; 
post-1996 – creation of 
major TFCAs/ CBNRM 
Establish legal 
proclamation for TFCAs; 
Preparation of new 
regulation; Establishment 
of TFCA unit in Ministry 
for Tourism; Formal 
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establishment of 3 TFCAs 
(Lubombo, Great 
Limpopo, Chimanimani) 
2000 – 2014 TFCA Phase Two: 2005 
–2014  
(US$35.1m: World 
Bank, GEF, PPF and 
AWF) 
 
Expansion of TFCA 
network; push to meet CBD 
MPA targets of 12% 
coverage; domination of 
donor agendas; intensifying 
clashes between extraction 
and mega-projects and 
conservation. 
Redesign regulatory and 
institutional framework; 
Establish ANAC and 
Biofund; Approval of 
Conservation Policy (2009) 
and Conservation Areas 
Law (2014); Growth of 
tourism conservation in 
TFCAs; Infrastructure and 
community development 
programmes in TFCAs.   
Table 5.1 demonstrates the scale of the intervention, both in terms of funding and in terms of 
the ambitious restructuring of Mozambique’s conservation system. TFCA Phase 1 (1996 – 
2005) was funded by a US$ 10 million grant from the GEF trust fund (Word Bank 2005) 9. 
The project aimed to create a private sector-led “conservation-development nexus” (World 
Bank 2012: 3) in which TFCAs would support development through biodiversity 
conservation. Referring to the table, we can see that phase one established legal proclamation 
for TFCAs, prepared new regulation, established the TFCA unit in Ministry for Tourism and 
formally set up three TFCAs (Lubombo, Great Limpopo, Chimanimani). Phase two 
deployed an even larger amount of funding to bring about the wholescale redesign of 
Mozambique’s conservation regulatory system and institutions, including the creation of two 
new institutions, ANAC (Administração Nacional das Areas de Conservação/ National 
Administration for Conservation Areas) (discussed further below), and Biofund, a major 
                                                      
9 For clarity, the World Bank worked alongside the Peace Parks Foundation on the MSR and PPMR, 
with the PPF playing a partnership and co-financing role in contrast to its position as sole operator 
elsewhere in Africa. The World Bank funded the upgrading of infrastructure and the construction of 
headquarters and accommodation facilities for the MSR, and supports the PPMR’s turtle monitoring 
programme, while the Peace Parks Foundation provided technical and financial management staff, and 
is now responsible for the on-going development and management of both reserves. 
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conservation endowment to provide financial support for TFCAs and other protected areas 
(discussed in more detail in chapter seven), along with funding for TFCA community 
projects and infrastructure. 
However, what this table does not show is that the roll-out of the phases did not always run 
smoothly. My fieldwork post-dates the early period of the TFCA project by some years, but I 
was able to note that the PPF sometimes attracts criticism in Mozambique from other 
conservationists, often in contradictory ways. For example, some conservationists I spoke 
with were critical over community relocations in the Great Limpopo TFCA, but conversely, 
others considered it to be ‘too soft’ on communities allegedly involved in poaching. 
Furthermore, although this issue did not come up in my interviews, the World Bank’s final 
TFCA suggested that its collaboration with the PPF may not have always run smoothly 
(World Bank 2015: 21). The PPF, far from holding a hegemonic position in Mozambique 
was obliged to work with a range of other powerful conservation donors with similar, but not 
identical, agendas. Yet despite this crowded donor landscape, there was ample appetite in 
Mozambique for the PPF to pursue several large-scale TFCAs, and to stamp its ‘win-win’ 
formula on TFCAs in a project primarily funded by the World Bank. Why? I suggest that 
this can be partly explained by the PPF’s ability to skilfully draw on supporting discourses 
from other donors to defined and claimed resources, taking advantage of these overall trends 
towards bioregionality and community involvement and giving an impression of consensus 
around the TFCA model. In addition, the TFCA discourse particularly lends itself to 
managing contradiction and contestation, through “presenting an all-embracing and unifying 
model of meaning” (Büscher 2010: 644) which combines commitments to addressing 
ecological and development crises. However, this explanation is incomplete without an 
account of how the PPF secured and maintained influence with the Mozambican 
government. Its success is therefore also explained by the needs of the Frelimo state for 
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extensive NGO and donor interventions throughout the post-conflict period, which I now 
turn to discuss. 
5.3.3.	Institutionalising	TFCAs:	The	State	
The PPF commands high-level ministerial support, has huge financial clout, and, its 
supporters claim it can effectively go straight to the Mozambican Council of Ministers, the 
highest government authority, when required (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 
2013). Joachim Chissano, Mozambique’s President from 1986 to 2005, sat as a board 
member of the PPF from 2008. It was clear from visiting the Mozambican Department for 
Tourism, known as MITUR, that the PPF holds direct influence in this department. The PPF 
has supplied MITUR with extensive support, including a TFCA advisor who provides 
technical, logistical and financial support, and, most importantly, aims to “influence and 
empower decision-makers” (PPF memo, cited in Büscher 2010: 657). A PPF consultant 
described the organisation’s relationship with the Mozambican government as: 
Helping government to prove that [TFCA’s] can work, helping them with the 
technical side of getting the proclamation done, the mapping, the documentation, 
appointment of staff, until government can actually absorb that staff into their 
structures, even until today supporting salary components, infrastructure, equipment, 
………. it’s a cross-cutting support, whether its facilitation, political support, project 
support, fundraising, technical, whatever’s needed to get to the point where the job 
can be done (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 2013). 
 
The PPF’s mode of conduct here is presented as ‘under invitation only’, though the level of 
influence is clear.  
Phase two of the TFCA project particularly demonstrates significant influence over the 
Mozambican government, to the extent of creating a new conservation department. Until 
2001 Mozambique’s conservation areas were managed by the Ministry of Agriculture and 
Rural Development, part of the DNFFB. In 2001, responsibility was transferred MITUR 
under a newly-created special agency, the Directorate of National Conservation Areas 
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(DNAC) (Ministerial Diploma 17/2001). In 2009, DNAC was replaced by ANAC, created as 
part of the World Bank’s TFCA program. ANAC retains DNAC’s responsibilities and 
position within MITUR, but the key difference is that it has greater autonomy from the 
Frelimo government, and therefore more likely to enthusiastically implement the World 
Bank’s agenda of collaboration between government and private sector in the conservation-
development nexus (World Bank 2015). It would not be a step too far to say that the World 
Bank and the PPF enjoy an extraordinary amount of influence over Mozambican 
conservation policy.  
Such influence is often cited as evidence for the neoliberalisation of African states through 
partnerships with private conservation bodies, whereby the state provides legal authority and 
international legitimacy to the TFCA project in exchange for capacity and services from 
NGOs like the PPF (Duffy 2006a). However, this literature often attributes coherence to both 
‘the state’ and ‘donors’ which did not resonate with my experience in Mozambique. Despite 
the effective creation of ANAC by the World Bank, there was by no means a consensus 
within that department on conservation. In fact, I observed how some ideas were actively 
resisted by senior Frelimo figures in ANAC (who were often the same people transferred 
directly over from DNAC). For example, one such official who now no longer holds a senior 
role in ANAC put forward provocative discourses in a speech at the Conservation Science in 
Mozambique conference. The official pointedly failed to replicate the ‘accepted line’ of the 
conservation community, and instead discussed issues like rangers’ salaries and elephant 
population control. According to the conference organisers, this speech was supposed to be 
supporting emerging green development narratives, biodiversity conservation discourses and 
supporting the development of a science-based conservation policy landscape, and, for them, 
this episode provided evidence of ANAC’s inability to drive the necessary reforms. This 
revealed the often imperfect relationship between donor conservation agendas and the 
Frelimo state, characterised by a tension between the conservation narratives adopted by 
152 
 
Frelimo at independence (namely, utilitarian ideas which frame conservation as about natural 
resource use, livelihoods and jobs), and the globalised, science-driven trans-frontier agenda. 
In short, the ANAC that I witnessed was far from its idealised representation in World Bank 
literature. And, despite the presence of PPF-salaried officials and World Bank consultants, it 
often failed to enact the discourse and agenda under the trans-frontier conservation ideology, 
sometimes becoming instead an arena in which to rehearse long-standing Frelimo concerns 
about rangers’ salaries, animal population management and departmental structure. We see 
here an example of how elements of the political landscape sometimes resists neoliberal 
reforming, and how neoliberal agents and processes are bound to work with and through 
existing arrangements.  
This episode exemplifies the extent to which day-to-day Frelimo politics can interfere with 
the enactment of seemingly coherent projects like neoliberal conservation.  The project of 
neoliberal conservation in Mozambique has thus encountered existing institutional 
arrangements and an existing landscape of power relations, along with government officials 
with their own agendas and schemes. Attention to these “diversions and redirections” 
(Mitchell 2002: 271) reveal the contingent ways in which the project has been constructed, 
and how, in contrast to its hegemonic representation, the roll-out of TFCAs in Mozambique 
has at times been a fragmented and contested process. This theme of the fragmented nature 
of seemingly coherent concepts like the state and neoliberal conservation will be revisited 
several times throughout the course of this thesis. For now, I turn to discuss the production 
of TFCAs within a neoliberal political economy. 
5.4.	The	‘virtuous	circle’	of	conservation	
In this section I show how TFCAs insert conservation areas into regimes of “accumulation 
through conservation” (Büscher and Fletcher 2015: 273). Creating the conditions which 
enable market forces to produce ecologically beneficial outcomes involves rests on an 
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idealised ‘virtuous circle’ whereby pristine ecologies attract tourists, who then bring money 
and create opportunities for communities and economic development for the state, which in 
turn incentivises both sets of actors to protect the environment. I draw on Neumann’s (2003) 
analysis that the production of conservation spaces relies on dual ideas of nature; both an 
idealised and romanticised landscape where nature is preserved and social relations of labour 
or livelihood are erased, along with the idea of the park where these ideas of pristine nature 
and imagined ‘traditional’ African culture are commodified for tourist consumption (also 
Brockington et al. 2008; Igoe et al. 2011). In the PPMR, these ideas sit alongside the 
production of idealised neoliberal development subjects. This produces three modes of 
neoliberalisation: First, through the creation of scaled up conservation spaces which 
prioritise the needs of private investors and well-off tourists; second, through the 
construction of idealised spaces for eco-tourism, and third, at the level of the individual 
through the construction of ‘ecotourism entrepreneurs’. 
5.4.1.	Regionalising	conservation:	producing	eco-landscapes	
The PPF’s and the World Bank’s ideas support conservation interventions with huge 
geographical, political and social consequences, which can be seen as the production of what 
Exner, Bartels, Windhaber, Fritz, See, Politti, and Hochleithner (2015: 652) call “landscapes 
of value”. This claim combines three ideas: The idea that the PPMR and the wider Lubombo 
replicates and reproduces ideas of Edenic, ‘natural’ Africa as an object of aesthetic 
appreciation, the idea TFCAs adopt the “ecoregion as an organising concept of space” 
(Ramutsindela 2007: 27), and that such eco-landscapes are then inserted into regimes of 
accumulation related to investment in tourism and property (Noe 2015; Exner et al. 2015). 
Landscape is a contested term for geographers who often highlight the embodied, practical 
and political ways in which landscapes are constructed (see Merriman, Revill, Cresswell, 
Lorimer, Matless, Rose and Wylie 2008, and Rose and Wylie 2006). Exner et al. (2015: 653) 
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conceptualise a landscape of value based on the “exclusion of certain uses of land for moral, 
aesthetic, or touristic issues”, supported by narratives of idealised nature and claims that land 
must be both knowable and economically productive. The construction of landscapes of 
value through tourism is part of making land productive in a neoliberal era; customary, 
traditional and marginal land uses10 are not legible to neoliberal actors, and large-scale land 
use planning enables a monetary value to be placed on land (Noe 2015).  
However, conservation is about more than securing space; it is also about recasting 
conservation as a product for consumption (Büscher 2013). The construction of eco-
landscapes across southern Africa combines a scale-making of significant magnitude with 
ideas that nature can underpin particular kinds of commercial opportunities. Milgroom and 
Spierenburg (2008: 437) contend that TFCAs reconfigure conservation into a “transnational 
business opportunity” through the creation of large-scale spaces focussed on the needs of 
wealthy tourists and investors. This observation is certainly important to understanding the 
production of the PPMR, especially the role of the Southern African Development 
Corporation (SADC) and its Boundless Southern Africa (BSA) initiative. The SADC has had 
a long-standing interest in up-scaling conservation, with the support and assistance of the 
PPF. In 2005, SADC agreed to promote TFCAs as the main vehicle for tourism in the region, 
intensifying the link between wildlife conservation and economic growth. This was 
solidified in 2009, when the BSA initiative was launched to provide a marketing vehicle for 
TFCAs. BSA (2016, no page) describes itself as follows: 
Boundless Southern Africa is a major regional tourism initiative that jointly markets 
seven trans-frontier conservation areas throughout the sub-region.  It promotes 
African nations as viable and worthy collective tourist destinations, and encourages 
greater collaboration between SADC member states in the conservation and 
                                                      
10 These are also contested terms, see Exner et al. 2015 and Noe 2015 for a discussion. 
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preservation of the region’s rich natural and cultural heritage. 
 
A promotion from 2010, targeting visitors to South Africa’s 2010 football World Cup 
offered tourists the chance to hop from country to country, taking in “1 trail, 2 oceans, 9 
countries, 7 trans-frontier parks” which takes in “national parks, major rivers, deserts, 
Ramsar sites, World Heritage sites, canyons, mountains, desert cultures, vast landscapes”, 
but supported by “established amenities” and “sound infrastructure” (South African 
Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism document, shown in Büscher 2013: 76). 
Boundless also serves as an investment vehicle, promoting TFCAs as investment 
opportunities such as tourism lodges, with 290 million SA Rand (approximately £14 million) 
under negotiation in 2009 (figures cited in Noe 2015).  
An informant described the experience of a Boundless trip, beginning in the PPMR 
and travelling south to the iSimangaliso MPA in South Africa: 
To actually go here by sea kayak, to paddle from Mozambique into South Africa and 
then paddle the Kosi lake system and experience the culture of the Tonga people 
there, and then paddle back, and you are away for three nights in South Africa and 
the first and last night in Mozambique. First night being briefed, second, third and 
fourth night in the lake system seeing the fish traps in the Kosi system, right through 
into the forest seeing the four lakes of the Losi system, [imagine] experiencing 
that…. 
Would you get visa checked on the way? 
No, you do it under a manifest, cleared before the time, so they know where you are, 
you are under the control of a guide at all times, you travel across the international 
boundary and you don’t need to go through a border post. This has been done 
elsewhere in other TFCAs where trans frontier trails of this nature are being utilised 
for wilderness trails, cultural trails , historical trails, mountain bike experiences, 
canoe trails, high altitude mountain trails, so these have been done between two 
countries in different TFCAs, and there is a whole strategy for TFCA tourism 
projects [here in Mozambique] (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 2013). 
 
This extract demonstrates how processes of political scale-making work alongside the 
commodification of nature and culture. The creation of investment opportunities by TFCAs 
is contingent on a reconfiguration of nature as “derivative nature” (Büscher 2010: 261), 
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whereby value is located in the idealised visions of nature, and the social and discursive 
institutions underlying their production.  
Such a construct has profoundly geographical aspects, constructing scale, space and nature in 
highly political ways (Noe 2015). The wider TFCA network allows the PPMR to be 
constructed as one ‘node’ in a large multi-country network of linked conservation areas, with 
privileged access for tourists. This hinges on the borderless ideas promoted by SADC and 
BSA in which tourists can hop from conservation site to desert culture, unencumbered by 
inconveniences like poor infrastructure or passport control. This is particularly striking in the 
marketing material of the BSA, which promotes a vision of a wilderness southern Africa 
often at odds with the complex political, economic and cultural realities of the region 
(Büscher 2013). The idea that nature is valuable for the revenue it can generate from tourism 
also subjects it to particular demands and forms of discipline such as the adoption of 
common standards of infrastructure, governance and accommodation (Barry 2006), 
discussed further in the next chapter. For example, a senior member of ANAC reported to 
me that one of his main goals in office was to increase the quantity of international-standard 
hotels to service Mozambique’s conservation areas (interview with senior ANAC official, 9 
May 2014). In short, tourists are invited to visit a constructed and idealised version of the 
continent, of which certain zones and connections are then packaged and marketed as a 
commodity, constructed with a mobile and globalised elite in mind. TFCAs conceive 
southern Africa from the perspective of particular users (tourists, investors and 
conservationists) and present the landscape in relation to their needs through constructing a 
topography of connected ‘natural’ nodes backed up by service infrastructures. 
These dual processes of scale-making and derivative nature can be viewed through a further 
example. Although the PPMR was already an area popular with South African tourists, these 
visitors often stayed in private homes rather than commercial hotels, and did not contribute 
to local economies beyond sometimes shopping in markets and using campsites (interview 
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with PPF consultant, 18 October 2013). One of the PPMR’s key targets has been to seek 
major investment not provided by this informal tourism, “unlocking the ecotourism potential 
of the area” and creating “an environment conducive for investment” (PPMR 2011: 16). It 
would be unfair to suggest that only upmarket resorts have been established in the reserve 
(and indeed, construction, such as that shown in figure 5.2 below, has often been a source of 
headache for the reserve management, rather than uncritically welcomed simply on the basis 
of providing investment). However, it is accurate to say that several large, luxurious resorts 
are planned or have been recently constructed specifically to capitalise on the PPMR. One 
example is the White Pearl at Ponta Mamoli, which charges US $885 per night and offers 
transportation from Maputo International Airport via helicopter at US $360 per person. 
Figure 5.2: Coastal construction near to sand dunes, PPMR, October 2013  
 
The campsite at the beachfront in Ponta do Ouro town may also be transformed into an 
exclusive resort, and, similarly, the campsite at Ponta Milebangolale which caters for tourists 
wishing to visit the Maputo Special Reserve that I discussed in chapter two may also become 
a more upmarket resort. Construction has often been contentious, as luxury accommodation 
impacts on the ecology of the reserve, especially the fragile vegetated sand dunes and 
underground fresh water system provided by the inland lakes (interview with PPMR official 
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1, 4 October 2013). Resorts like the White Pearl embody many of the contradiction of the 
logics of ‘landscapes of value’. While on the one hand, wealthy tourists must be attracted 
and their expectations met in terms of luxury accommodation, on the other, the ‘pristine’ 
elements of the PPMR must be maintained. Although part of the remit of the PPMR is to 
manage this process in a suitable way (for example by resolving concerns about illicit 
building permission and seeking to solve the issue of water supply), it is clear that the 
premise of Boundless disguises rather than resolves this tension (Büscher 2013). 
5.4.2.	Producing	‘tourist	habitat’:	Incentivising	conservation	through	eco-
tourism	
The processes I analyse above demonstrates the spread of tourist habitat, where the needs of 
eco-tourists, who “see the environment in simplified (a-social, a-historical and a-ecological) 
terms” (Brockington et al. 2008: 146) materially alter space. The growth in the PPMR’s 
accommodation capacity is part of a wider infrastructure vision which sees the coastline and 
landscapes south of Maputo transformed into tourism destinations (interview with senior 
ANAC official, April 2014). The A Nova Katembe (‘a new Katembe’) plans for a satellite 
suburb extension to Maputo include a new road from Maputo International Airport to the 
Kosi Bay border, intended to attract a greater number of wealthy domestic and international 
travellers to the Ponta do Ouro coast. In this fashion, the PPMR is part of a wider strategy 
which encourages private investment in regional tourism infrastructure, underpinned by the 
production of an idealised vision of southern Africa via marketing. Ecotourism is thus at the 
centre of the construction of the PPMR as a landscape of value. Eco-tourism is characterised 
by the packaging of nature into new products, such as selling interactions with charismatic 
species like cheetahs or elephants (Lorimer 2010, Duffy 2013) and the production of new 
‘must see’ locations such as the Edenic, spectacular southern Africa conjured by the 
Boundless initiative. The model has been critiqued as sustainability-lite, focussed on the 
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needs of rich consumers rather than subsistence communities. It has sometime resulted in 
land grabs and displacement in Mozambique, thereby entrenching uneven power relations. It 
also disguises ecological costs at different scales (such as an increase in travel-related carbon 
dioxide production) (Duffy 2006b). Despite these contradictions, eco-tourism is at the centre 
of neoliberal conservation models because it secures the expansion of consumptive and 
incentive models while promising ‘green’ outcomes.  
The Management Plan (PPMR 2011: 17) sets out eco-tourism’s particular relevance for 
Mozambique as follows: 
Of key importance is that the government recognises that marine resources are the 
very thing that supports ecotourism in the area, thereby providing potential 
employment for Mozambicans. With the further degradation of the marine 
environment, the PPMR will lose its attraction to tourists, who will over time chose 
to visit other countries for a better experience. The long-term benefits to local 
communities are therefore dependant on long-term marine ecotourism marine 
resources (sic.). Short term benefits such as providing exemptions communities to 
use nets or denude habitats conflicts directly with the values of a marine reserve. 
An example of this would be as follows: If the number of scuba divers visiting coral 
reefs is regulated the condition of these reefs is maintained at a level that they 
remain impressive to scuba divers. The area maintains a reputation as a quality dive 
site and continues to attract clients through the marketing of the various businesses 
in Ponta do Ouro. As long as this balance is maintained, Mozambicans will have the 
opportunity to become involved in commercial operations through which local 
Mozambicans can be uplifted. Destroy the resource (the reefs) through too much 
pressure and the opportunity is lost to Mozambique. 
 
This passage contains much of interest in helping to understand how the logic of incentive-
based eco-tourism underpins the PPMR. It begins by implying that the government is 
insufficiently interested in supporting conservation for its own sake, and must itself be 
incentivised by the promise of potential employment for Mozambicans and the threat of 
competition from other tourist destinations. This discourse reflects concerns I heard 
elsewhere in Mozambique; that the government was disinterested in biodiversity 
conservation, and would only be attracted to a conservation agenda that could contribute to 
the economy in tangible and immediate ways. Eco-tourism’s emphasis on economic growth 
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appeals to this strand of thinking, and the overtly cost-benefit logic here is seen as necessary 
to make conservation appealing to state actors which are presented as motivated only by 
economic incentives, highly conscious of Mozambique as a ‘tourist product’ in urgent 
competition with its neighbours.  
The passage explicitly constructs marine natures as a resource, for example, the coral reefs 
must ‘remain impressive to scuba divers’ to enable consumptive activities to take centre 
stage in the strategy. Echoing earlier community-based natural resource management 
initiatives, communities’ well-being is said to be dependent on the long-term health of the 
reefs, with the promise of involvement of Mozambicans in commercial scuba diving 
operations11. However, the logic here is somewhat different to such initiatives, in that the 
communities themselves are also conceived as “tourism products” (PPMR 2011: 24). This is 
starkly put in the Management Plan: “They [users of the reserve] are the heart of the PPMR 
and through their existence the consumptive activities can be maintained” (PPMR 2011: 24). 
This can be interpreted as referring to well-off users, who must be attracted by idealised and 
pristine marine environments and romanticised interactions with people, but also as referring 
to other users such as the communities, who, it is hoped, will voluntarily participate in eco-
tourism business activities. Crucially, people and animals alike are actively marketed to 
tourists in reified representations of the PPMR. This was made clear in an interview with a 
PPF consultant, who described how interactions with conservation staff can be marketed: “[a 
tourist can] interact with a turtle monitor, or a field ranger, or management staff, or the 
community brokers so you can……get to understand their situation and operational 
                                                      
11 There has been a growing and increasingly successful focus by NGO Ocean Revolution, based in 
Inhambane in Mozambique, on making the industry fairer by actively involving a greater number of 
poor black Mozambicans in a profession historically dominated by white people, often well-off 
Western travellers or those with access to resources to purchase and run scuba diving businesses. The 
PPMR announced a similar initiative in 2016 to increase roles for Mozambicans in this industry, 
demonstrating this is an area where the reserve seeks to improve equality. 
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environment, you participate in activities, so it’s really getting out of your comfort zone, 
getting out of this bubble and actually going out there and doing aspects that are true to the 
area” (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 2013). Above all else, this is about creating 
and marketing the PPMR as a series of spectacular experiences: “I’ve yet to see a tourist go 
on a turtle tour who’s not been totally awestruck by the experience” (ibid).  
In sum, eco-tourism aims to deal with contradictions by providing a means of consuming 
nature in a sustainable fashion. It contributes to the PPF’s claim that conservation can also 
achieve social justice concerns – the ‘uplifting’ of Mozambicans. However, as I now turn to 
explore, this also requires the production of particular modes of self-governance – the re-
creation of communities as ‘eco-tourist entrepreneurs’. 
5.4.3.	Communities	as	‘ecotourism	entrepreneurs’	
The TFCA ideology claims that conservation goals are best achieved through incentivising 
people to maintain an environment that is appealing to tourists. Srinivasan (2014: 509) 
describes this as subjectification; “the process by which individuals self-govern (that is, work 
upon themselves) in accordance with various truth discourses about individual and collective 
well-being.” In the case of neoliberal environmental governmentality, this means persuading 
people to manage their own behaviour in line with particular conservation logics. This 
section discusses how this is achieved in the PPMR. 
One of the key community benefits is the 20 per cent community contribution, paid by the 
PPMR from visitor fees. Though they are not conditional on any conduct or outcome, these 
contributions are often described as incentives to communities for good environmental 
behaviour, providing impetus to change their behaviour from subsistence livelihood practices 
to taking part in the reserve’s income generation projects like the community lodge or turtle 
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monitoring12. A PPF community expert claimed that “the community needed to understand 
that they need to be involved in conservation to make sure we have more tourists, and if we 
have more people come, we have more people diving, we will be collecting more funds, and 
that will be increasing the 20 per cent revenues” (interview with PPF official, Ponta do Ouro, 
15 October 2013).  The reserve attempts to re-orientate community members toward this 
new incentive system through participation in eco-tourism business like a community-run 
luxury lodge, running guided trails or making handicrafts. Crucially, these activities are not 
intended to replace subsistence livelihoods in a like-for-like fashion (by for example 
providing other sources of food). Rather, the PPF aims to produce ‘eco-tourism 
entrepreneurs’, who actively seek out opportunities in tourism and conservation and thereby 
voluntarily link their own well-being to the ecological well-being of the reserve. This 
underlines the importance of the production of neoliberal subjectivities that “normalise the 
logics of individualism and entrepreneurialism…….. making individuals responsible for 
their own well-being and redefining citizens as consumers and clients” (Leitner et al. 2007, 
cited in Harrison 2008: 1200).  Here, the role of the reserve is to enable and normalise these 
entrepreneurial activities, in which it is expected the communities will wish to partake.  
An example which was often discussed was the idea of a resident who has been prevented 
from fishing, but who is now able to work as one of the reserve’s 60-70 turtle monitors. I did 
indeed meet several such examples of individuals who were able to make a living as a turtle 
monitor. However, it was not always clear that the transition from subsistence livelihood to 
‘eco-tourism entrepreneur’ is a straightforward one. Research from other eco-tourism 
destinations and my own fieldwork observations suggests that this transition may not work 
for all community members, with other skills required like language and service industry 
                                                      
12 The experience of working as a turtle monitor is discussed further in chapter six. 
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training to enable people to meet tourist’s expectations (Blaikie 2006; Brockington et al. 
2008). While that the PPMR has provided professional training for rangers and turtle 
monitors, along with formal contracts and agreed salaries, and for many, it offers the chance 
to enhance their livelihoods through solid and consistent employment which is welcomed by 
those in a position to take it up, it is also important to observe that transitioning to new roles 
in the eco-tourism industry may result in new forms of indenture and dependence rather than 
greater power over the conditions which support livelihoods (Dressler, Büscher, Schoon, 
Brockington, Hayes, Kull, and Shrestha 2010). For example, one NGO suggested to me that 
local communities should sell beach snacks or hand-made jewellery to tourists, an activity 
unlikely to greatly support livelihoods13. So while the onus is on PPF and the PPMR to 
create a regulatory regime which facilitates these ‘eco-tourism entrepreneurs’, the 
individuals are made responsible for their own livelihoods, provided they are willing, able 
and qualified to take up the ranger and turtle monitor positions on offer, or are able to invent 
for themselves some other means of making money from tourism. In short, under TFCA 
discourse it is assumed that communities can be motivated by incentives to protect nature.  
To sum up here, the PPMR represents both a continuity of previous enclosures and 
appropriations of nature, and also something novel in the neoliberal era. The enclosure and 
management of conservation spaces by private organisations has precedents in the 
Portuguese companies discussed in chapter four, which in many ways prefigures the huge 
influence enjoyed by contemporary actors like the PPF and the World Bank in enclosing and 
managing conservation space. While previous conservation initiatives sought to ensure 
communities benefitted from enclosures of protected spaces, we now see that one of 
conservation’s primary goals is now the production of opportunities for economic growth, in 
                                                      
13 I note here that the PPMR has a forthcoming community development plan which will add to its 
current activities of a community-run lodge and other schemes. 
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which communities are expected to proactively participate. In this way, the reserve 
reproduces the individualised logics of neoliberalism in a conservation context, while also 
making economic growth its central (rather than secondary) aim. Neoliberal conservation 
ideology dictates that nature is saved by submission to market ideals, and crucially, its 
practices actively reproduce and normalise this idea as the central goal of conservation. It is 
precisely this transformation of conservation to engine of economic growth which is 
characteristic of the neoliberal era (Büscher et al. 2012). Finally, as if to disguise this 
contradiction, neoliberal conservation makes grandiose appeals to restore a past Edenic and 
idealised Africa, and to protect it in an enclosed space while also opening this space to 
market logics and novel forms of governance.  
5.5.	Hybridised	public	authority			
The process of producing the PPMR also reveals entanglements and contradictions between 
state and private authority. The PPMR and wider Lubombo can be seen as a hybrid space in 
which national authority has nominal primacy, but in reality, state-like activities are carried 
out by PPF officials and funded by PPF finances, i.e. privatised governance. This aligns with 
Schouten’s (2016: 1) analysis of “entangled geographies of public authority”, in which 
“practices associated with statehood … are deployed for, and essentially infused with, what 
are best understood as private logics of accumulation”.  However, in the case of the PPMR, 
the public-private distinction is dissolved even further than in Schouten’s study, as 
demonstrated by considering the relationships between donors and the state in the 
establishment of the reserve.  
As described in the previous section, in the course of its establishment the Lubombo TFCA 
promised positive contributions to the region, as well as seeking to quash the post-war 
contestation over land rights. In order to bring these benefits, a new regime of governance 
was required, one in which the privately-funded PPF was effectively in control of the space, 
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enjoying the right to hold public authority, and to manage human and non-human lives in the 
name of conservation. This process is described by the PPF as one of invitation, whereby the 
PPF responded to proactive instigation by the Frelimo government to establish the Lubombo: 
It’s quite simple; the Peace Parks Foundation only works under invitation from 
government….. So when governments approach Peace Parks and specifically ask 
will you help us with the process, or do you want to get involved with this specific 
project, under that specific invitation we get involved (interview with PPF 
consultant, 18 October 2013). 
 
This interpretation places power firmly with the state, and positions the PPF in a subordinate 
and assisting capacity. However, it is clear from discussion in this chapter and chapter four 
that the state was under multiple pressures; to find a solution for the contestation in the 
Matutuíne region, to meet the objectives of international conservation governance to 
designate new conservation areas, as well as meet urgent post-war economic development 
needs. Combined with the then-hollowed out nature of the Mozambican state, it is clear that 
a large and well-resourced NGO offering a combination of political, economic and pragmatic 
solutions to a contested region would hold a great deal of power. When added to the 
discourse of meaning around TFCAs, it is perhaps no surprise that they were able to secure 
public authority via the Lubombo TFCA. The distribution of power between state and 
private entity was perhaps more aptly expressed by a reserve official, in a throwaway 
comment: “Ponta was [established by] Peace Parks Foundation. And the Government of 
Mozambique, of course. Actually, let’s reverse it. It was the Government of Mozambique 
and Peace Parks” (interview with PPMR official 2, 9 October 2013)14. 
                                                      
14   The legal basis for the reserve is clarified in the Management Plan, which cites authority from the 
Council of Ministers and underpinned by the Fisheries Law of 26 September 1990, Decree 3/90 
(Articles 35 and 69), the Marine General Fishing Law of 10 December 2003, Decree 43/2003 (Article 
114) and supported by the Environmental Law of 1 October 1997, Decree 20/97 (Article 11). The 
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While it may be necessary in legal terms for the PPF to be viewed as working ‘under 
invitation only’ in order to maintain a public presentation of state sovereignty, the day-to-day 
working of the reserve demonstrates the entanglement of state and PPF authority. This 
hybridised authority can be viewed in terms of a spectrum, with some activities requiring the 
concrete backing of state the apparatus, while in other spheres, the state is absent altogether. 
For example, the public material related to the PPMR clearly displays Mozambican 
Government and PPMR logos to display the sovereignty of the state. The boat launch site at 
Ponta do Ouro’s main beach is monitored with the support of the state’s navy, who count the 
number of fish landed and check they are within acceptable species and numeric parameters. 
However, PPMR rangers are responsible for ensuring licenses are purchased for tourist 
activities like scuba diving, and the militarised-style patrolling of the reserve is conducted 
solely by rangers (wearing military-style uniforms which mimic state authority as shown in 
figure 5.3 below) who carry authority to stop, question and fine citizens and foreign 
nationals, and to confiscate prohibited equipment such as certain types of fishing gear.  
 
Figure 5.3: Ranger patrols in the PPMR, October 2013 (author photograph) 
                                                                                                                                                         
latter is significant as it states that the Government has overall responsibility for the regime of 
biodiversity protection, and hence TFCAs view their authority as underpinned by the state. 
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The reserve also assumes the social responsibilities of the state in tangible ways. This 
includes delivering schooling and medical services to coastal communities which are not 
provided by central or regional government. This lack of social infrastructure often had 
grave consequences for residents, and means that the PPMR can make a great deal of 
difference by providing services, vividly described by a reserve official as follows: 
If you go to Mvkuza [a small coastal village within the MSR], there’s nothing 
there…….. no schools, no clinics. …….. Two twins died because there was no-one 
there to assist them……. About three months ago, we had to take six or seven of 
them to hospital in Belavista, almost dying. One of our turtle monitors….. died in 
Maputo. So they asked us to help to bring the body here. When my colleagues came 
with his body, they stopped by his house and found out that the baby was very ill 
also. And that day we had to take the baby to the hospital, and he’s fine now. But if 
we weren’t there, that baby would have died (interview with PPMR official 2, 9 
October 2013). 
 
Indeed, the reserve is really the only institution able and willing to provide these services 
because the state has withdrawn infrastructure and services from national parks. From the 
perspective of a resident or a visitor to the PPMR, state-like practices of patrol, detention, 
administering fines, preventing activities such as driving on the beach, and vital service 
provision for rural communities are all carried out by reserve officials with sometimes only 
the nominal backing of the state. However, it is also important to consider the political 
implications of this. This hybridisation of state and public authority reflects Lunstrum’s 
(2008, 2013) analysis that Mozambican state power was radically re-shaped, strengthened 
and extended through historically-specific partnerships with NGOs like the Peace Parks 
Foundation. In the case of the Lubombo TFCA, the state had much to gain through its 
partnership with the PPF; significant donor resources, a solution to a politically contested 
region; and, a programme which helped Mozambique to meet its international environmental 
governance commitments as well as promise development. The donor program has filled a 
significant vacuum left by the lack of local state services in the region. At the same time, 






In this chapter I have discussed how the idealised origin story of the PPMR belies its 
contested and political beginnings – the reserve is about far more than the extension of a 
South African turtle monitoring programme. It emerged as the product of post-conflict 
political contestations, which provided the PPF and World Bank an opportunity to promote a 
bioregional, incentive-based, large-scale TFCA solution on Mozambique’s southern coast. 
Donors engaged in political lobbying to garner support at the highest level, going so far as to 
construct new government agencies and laws to bring about the TFCA agenda. TFCAs are 
presented as solutions to protecting land, ocean and coastal systems from human depletion, 
and also as providing the material basis for a program of community development and 
conservation which turns on the idea of incentivisation. TFCAs thus partly represent the kind 
of neoliberal policy interventions highlighted by Brenner et al. (2010a: 330) through which 
“marketised, commodified forms of social life” are imposed and extended. I have also 
discussed the kinds of categories and truth discourses deployed by TFCA supporters; the 
need for a spectacular, scaled-up conservation model in which an externalised nature has 
value insofar as it supports tourism, underpinned by a neoliberal logic in which communities 
and state actors alike are “responsibilised” (Li 2007a: 233) and rewarded for good 
environmental behaviour. 
The TFCA ideology has identified particular threats to biodiversity and framed responses in 
particular ways, reflecting the way in which conservation assemblages present themselves as 
solving problems and providing solutions. TFCAs are presented as technical and a-political, 
despite their highly political nature. This technical disguises how trans-frontier conservation 
areas are a product of the historic political economy of the region, the particular goals of 
donors and underpinned by asymmetrical power relations. By keeping the ‘black boxes’ of 
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their development and conservation claims closed, TFCAs actors were able to maintain their 
interventions as technical solutions to what are often highly political problems through the 
wider waves of neoliberalisation in Mozambique and throughout southern Africa, providing 
strength and legitimacy to their claims. However, understanding neoliberalism as some 
external and internally coherent force which is then imposed on ‘nature’ or ‘the state’ is too 
simplistic an explanation. The production of the PPMR involved negotiation with multiple 
political processes in the two decades after conflict and leading up to the gazetting of the 
PPMR, culminating in an assertion of neoliberal, incentive-driven conservation as the ‘right 
arrangement of things’ for the PPMR.  
Reflecting on what this means for understanding of the Mozambican state and for the current 
theoretical framings of neoliberal conservation, it is clear that the discourse which instigated 
the production of the PPMR is undoubtedly neoliberal in several important respects. The 
TFCA ideology emphasises valuing and ‘saving’ nature by and through producing it as a 
commodity with a marketable value. The TFCA ideology encapsulates this discourse, aiming 
to re-create vast tracts of African land into scaled up conservation spaces whereby a ‘triple 
win’ of economic growth, community development and harmony and bioregional ecosystem 
management will be achieved primarily through re-making such landscapes as tourism 
products. This is a particularly Eurocentric ideology as nature is framed as an Edenic 
‘external’. This enables its construction as reified places of idealised interactions with 
charismatic animals or indigenous people, and, at the same time, shuts down any political 
debate about how this reshapes ecologies and human and non-human lives (Latour 2009). 
The idea that eco-tourism is the ‘right’ means of saving nature promotes certain activities 
and natural resource management systems as sustainable while negating others. Monied eco-
tourists are attracted through marketing schemes such as the ‘Boundless South Africa’ 
promotion, and the positive effects are supposed to trickle down to communities, provided 
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they act as neoliberal, incentive-driven subjects. The TFCA discourse is especially capable 
of absorbing the contradictions inherent in this framing (Büscher 2013). 
This is a spatially-articulated process involving the re-spacing of large areas of land for a 
particular vision of conservation. The PPMR and the attached MSR have been produced as 
‘landscapes of value’ through a combination of political appeal, institutional and donor 
support and the ability to create consensus despite contradiction. The PPMR can be viewed 
as a “specialised ‘space-time ecosystems’ designed to promote and intensify market-based 
calculations” (Brenner et al. 2010: 200). Private investment through tourism businesses, 
donors and large NGOs like the PPF is encouraged, supported by market-orientated 
regulatory reform characteristic of neoliberalism, in this case, the Mozambique’s new TFCA 
laws and institutions. The neoliberal conservation discourse is a strongly donor-led agenda, 
attracting huge amounts of funding by multiple actors, who have been responsible for 
shaping this re-regulation. Its increasing dominance in Mozambican policy circles is in line 
with roll-out of a ‘socially conscious’ third way neoliberalism (Büscher 2010).  
The chapter has demonstrated two important nuances to the ‘neoliberal conservation’ 
analysis, which, as I pointed out in chapter two, tends to be somewhat sweeping. The first 
relates to the framing of dispossession. For many of its critics, central feature of neoliberal 
conservation is its class politics, namely, the restoration and maintenance of elite power 
through accumulation by dispossession (Brockington and Igoe 2006). However, the 
discussion in this chapter has not shown that the goal is necessarily to remove all 
communities (though this will be discussed further in the next chapter). Rather, a notable 
characteristic of Mozambique’s TFCA discourse is the emphasis on reshaping community 
attitudes and behaviours through incentives. In this way, the PPMR aims to create an 
idealised community of subjects who are incentivised into ecologically responsible 
behaviour within an eco-tourism economy. Neoliberalism is thereby also the reorganisation 
of small-scale and personal (as well as political-economic) spheres of life, whereby 
171 
 
individualism and entrepreneurialism are normalised and subjects are encouraged to see 
themselves primarily as self-interested consumers and clients (Foucault [1979] 2010). This 
chapter has demonstrated the way in which PPMR residents and state officials alike are 
assumed to be operating under such subjectivity, which has, in turn, been a matter for 
extensive regulation and constant vigilance, requiring intervention to produce and maintain. 
In this sense, communities are not totally dispossessed from conservation, as they have been 
in other cases both historic and current (Benjaminson and Bryceson 2012; Neumann 2004).  
Far from it; the creation and engagement of an idealised community is a central goal of the 
reserve. As will also be discussed in the next chapter, the PPMR’s vision includes numerous 
development opportunities for communities and the reserve takes its role as provider of 
social services very seriously, often going beyond what might be expected. But, this is all on 
the reserve’s own terms, thus also replicating the paternalistic nature of conservation 
observed elsewhere (Adams 2013).  
The second is the importance of attending to neoliberalisation as part of a much longer 
historical socionatural dynamic, in which nature has been appropriated and commodified to 
generate capital growth under a variety of political regimes (Moore 2015a; Peluso 2012).  
The recent incarnation of neoliberalised conservation, embodied in the PPMR can be traced 
through colonial ideas about securing and preserving profitable animals such as ivory-
bearing elephants and habitats such as timber forests through protected areas. Through the 
influence of international bodies and key biologists throughout the 1960s and 1970s, this 
focus on conserving export resources morphed into a narrative based on linking conservation 
to globalised sustainable development and community-based ideals, and nationalistic 
promises that Mozambicans could now appropriate their own nature for financial gain. 
Throughout these changes, conservation has been produced by, while also enabled and 
legitimated capitalist growth, whether through securing the export of Mozambican elephant 
ivory and timber in the 19th century, or by encouraging tourism in the late 20th and early 21st 
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in a bid to ensure conservation contribute to sustainable development. This chapter has 
situated trans-frontier market-based conservation firmly within this historic trajectory. To be 
clear, I do not deny that there has been a major shift in conservation discourse that can be 
seen in the PPMR’s commitment to neoliberal ideology and governance techniques. 
However, I have also shown how these novel trends are also a continuation of historical 
dynamics of appropriation and commodification. 
The third nuance is the way in which neoliberal conservation is co-produced by specific 
political-economic contexts. With this in mind, I draw attention to how the establishment of 
the PPMR has demonstrated significant reconfigurations in the Mozambican state. In some 
respects, there has been a privatisation of authority. As with many other areas in 
Mozambique, donors have held huge influence over conservation policy exemplified in the 
regulatory innovations of the World Bank’s TFCA project of 1996-2013. This program tied 
state and donor commitments together so thoroughly as to create a new outpost of the World 
Bank within the Mozambican Ministry for Tourism. Similarly, I have shown how the PPF 
exercises huge influence over the state through embedded staff and the supply of services, 
and how other NGOs including WWF Mozambique have supported the state in the 
production of large-scale marine eco-regions which also replicate the ‘conservation-
development nexus’ discourse. The day-to-day service provision that PPMR officials provide 
to its residents demonstrates the extent to which non-state institutions play in the governance 
of the area, indicating a greater and complex role for NGOs due to the retreat of the state in 
this province.  
The close relationship between the state and donors also reflects the ways in which Frelimo 
power has been radically re-shaped, strengthened and extended through historically-specific 
partnerships with conservation NGOs (Lunstrum 2008, 2013). Certainly, the Mozambican 
state has had much to gain from such partnerships, and donor agendas have played a central 
role in strengthening some state capacities and actors, provided they have accorded with the 
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approved conservation agenda. In particular, the ordering of Matutuíne Province through 
conservation represents the fulfilment of state desires for political control, stability, the 
restoration of borders and national development. At the same time, the conduct of ANAC 
demonstrates the fragmented nature of ‘the state’ at other levels. Rather than becoming just 
the outpost of the World Bank TFCA project, independent from the Frelimo government, 
ANAC has also become a site where old issues, actors and debates continue to play out, 
thereby also resisting the privatisation of the state sphere. In particular, conservation is not 
immune to some Frelimo officials’ practices of self-enrichment, and idealised reform 
programmes like biodiversity conservation can get caught up in matters of prosaic Frelimo 
politics.  
Large-scale development interventions like conservation areas can thereby be viewed as 
particular sets of relationships, practices and truth discourses, rather than just a set of policies 
directed at appropriating nature for capitalism according to class politics. This also can be 
traced through the historic production of the PPMR, and is particularly evident in the 
extensive social planning involved in managing and governing communities which will be 
discussed in the next chapter. For the donor actors involved, using neoliberalised ideas in 
their programs provided authority to their claims to be bringing about social justice through 
the ideology of the market, while for the state, supporting and intervening to bring about 
TFCAs brought material benefits in the form of significant donor funds, while also helping 
to fulfil national calls for development and ordering post-conflict. I have therefore suggested 
that it is also necessary to look at the role that the TFCA discourse played as an expedient 
political solution to a broad variety of social and environmental challenges. The next chapter 








To produce a commodity is the work of the translator, the diplomat and the power-
crazed magician (Tsing 2005: 51-52). 
 
6.1.	Introduction	
As Tsing describes in the opening quotation, much discursive and political work is necessary 
to produce nature as a commodity. This chapter considers how this work is conducted, and 
sometimes contested, on a day-to-day basis. The PPMR now extends far beyond the turtle 
monitoring programme that was its ostensible rationale, and compresses many divergent 
interests into an agreed intervention. The degree of consensus around the PPMR that was 
apparent from the outset is remarkable. As Büscher (2013: 106) writes about the Maloti-
Drekensburg trans-frontier park (MDTP) in South Africa and Lesotho, also a PPF construct, 
“it was clear from the start of the preparation process that the MDTP was destined to 
materialise”. Büscher is not just talking the sense of manifest destiny that, as I described in 
chapter five, is characteristic of PPF discourse. Rather, Büscher is referring to the way in 
which there were already a number of influential people in favour of some form of major 
cross-border conservation initiative whose interests converged on the Maloti-Drekensburg as 
a way of achieving their different agendas. In the same way, those actors I outlined in the 
previous chapter who had long been committed to some form of trans-frontier protection of 
southern Mozambique’s coast seized their political moment once major donors emerged to 
back the process. Once the decision was taken to approve the wider Lubombo TFCA in 
2000, donor and conservationist interests quickly took on the task of representing the 
complex reality of the Mozambican coastal area in a technical plan which was legible to 
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state, donors and conservation managers, which was fundable, and which had clear guidance 
for action and parameters of success. The ‘will to conserve’ thus took concrete form as a 
means of ordering space and life. 
This chapter explores how the PPMR can be viewed as a particular mode of social ordering 
based on “artificially arranging things so that people, following only their own self-interest, 
will do as they ought” (Scott 1995: 2002). In the case of the reserve, what ‘ought’ to happen 
is structured by the neoliberal conservation discourse discussed in the previous chapter. This 
produces distinctive interventions in the material lives of people and animals, including 
regulatory and security activities, public services to outlying villages, employment, 
conservation research and monitoring, regularisation of many day-to-day behaviours of 
tourists, businesses and residents, conservation education programmes, the zoning and 
patrolling of particular spaces at particular times, the gathering of certain information, and 
the production of physical infrastructure like offices, signage and reserve-branded vessels. 
These combine with discursive techniques such as the construction of idealised beneficiaries 
(especially community members and animal populations, but also ideas about wider common 
sustainability) which permit the reserve to be interpreted as a success. The Management Plan 
adopts a consensus-based approach and promises multiple benefits provided its prescriptions 
are followed (PPMR 2009, 2011). These are the multiple technical, material and discursive 
manifestations of the ‘will to conserve’. 
At the same time, the reserve often overflows and resists its technical-managerial framing. 
The ‘win-win’ discourse that the plan represents is proving difficult to enact in some areas, 
necessitating a range of ambiguous practices and ideas to make the reserve cohere. This 
chapter is therefore also concerned with how the ‘will to conserve’ is contested, and 
subsequently reasserted, drawing on Mitchell’s (2002: 248) call to “take more seriously the 
variations, disruptions and dislocations that make each appearance of capitalism, despite the 
plans of the reformers, something different”. To offer an account of the sometimes 
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contradictory forms of power, rationality and governance which assemble the PPMR, I 
explore what the PPMR purports to govern (i.e. the concepts of communities, nature and 
marine and terrestrial space underpin the assemblage), how it governs (i.e. the knowledge, 
regulatory, managerial, technical and biopolitical practices that make it cohere as an 
assemblage), and the contradictions and tensions that arise and how these are managed. 
I begin with a brief analysis of assemblage, governmentality and materiality. I then set out 
the differing positions of actors in the PPMR assemblage, before analysing the specific ways 
in which the PPMR is made legible. These include using participatory and consultative 
methods to construct community members as willing participants in the incentive-based 
conservation model described in chapter five; the convergence on particular forms of 
expertise which support major interventions and link conservation to neoliberal ideas of 
growth; the performance of conservation values by different actors as a means of both 
promoting the reserve and creating conservation subjectivities; a governmentality of harm 
and care which supports the PPMR’s exercise of neoliberal biopower; and, the de-
politicisation and management of disagreement and dissent. Through these combined 
measures, the PPMR takes form as a manageable space with rules, regulations and 
acceptable conduct, but also as a fundable and legible concept which provides interpretable 
conditions of success. This builds on the previous chapter by showing how the process of 
assembling the PPMR as a coherent scheme and set of resources is necessary for its insertion 
into regimes of accumulation and its re-creation as tourist habitat. I conclude by reflecting on 
the contradictory ways in which neoliberal conservation works in practice. 
6.2.	Assemblages,	more-than-human	actors	and	materiality	
Assemblage is active process “to direct, conduct and intervene in social processes to produce 
desired outcomes and avert undesirable ones” (Li 2007a: 264). An assemblage has general 
resonance as an “identifiable terrain of action and debate” (Li 2007a: 266), in which a 
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number of actors work together with recognisable consistency to organise social worlds and 
direct actions towards a positive social outcome. Mosse (2005) observes that development 
projects are engaged in ‘meaning making’ through political processes of gaining support, 
maintaining a particular world view which supports their prescriptions for action, and 
providing reports of success which validate the project. Trans-frontier conservation thus 
represents a specific terrain of action and debate, in which the interests of different audiences 
are united under ‘will to conserve’. This foregrounds the operation of power in making an 
assemblage cohere; assemblage therefore means the active use of governmentality to 
organise conservation.  
Exploring neoliberalism as both a set of recognisable, if variegated processes and as made up 
of “local neoliberalism[s]” (Power and Mohan 2010: 473) requires attention to contingency 
in an assemblage. Li highlights this when she argues that “elements are drawn together at a 
particular juncture only to disperse or realign, and the shape shifts according to the terrain 
and angle of vision” (Li 2007a: 265). As I discussed in chapter two, understanding 
assemblage as a political practice sheds light on the operation of neoliberal conservation 
governmentality as an ongoing political activity; how it is used to frame action, manage 
contestation and materially shape life in the reserve. I highlight the importance of political 
techniques to unite different subject positions, focussing on how they themselves understand 
their own arguments, how they forge alignments, and how different subject positions play 
out in embodied and material practices. Li (2007a: 265) suggests there are six archetypal 
practices of assemblage: “Forging alignments” by linking various parties’ often conflicting 
objectives to the assemblage; “rendering technical” by transposing the “messiness of the 
social world” into “a diagram in which problem plus intervention will produce a beneficial 
result”; “authorizing knowledge” by stipulating what counts as supporting knowledge and 
encouraging its production while managing opposing views; “managing failures and 
contradictions”, that is, presenting project failure as manageable and contradictions and 
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contestations are as superficial issues which can be contained within the overall philosophy 
of the project; the use of anti-politics, which means reframing political issues as technical 
ones best addressed by experts and limiting the terms of any public debate to trivial or 
technical matters; and, “reassembling”, that is, producing unity and consensus by re-
interpreting existing ideas and terms in the terms set by the assemblage.  
Li’s analysis is advanced by Büscher (2010, 2013), who highlights three neoliberal modes of 
political conduct for the PPF in Africa: Creating and maintaining consensus (even in the face 
of contradictions); anti-politics; and, the use of political marketing to produce neoliberal 
conservation as hegemonic. Büscher’s work on the PPF has been very useful for making 
sense of my fieldwork, highlighting the importance of political and discursive practices in 
forging TFCAs, and the neoliberal contradictions at the heart of the TFCA model. His 
account, based on processes in South Africa and Lesotho in the mid-2000s emphasises the 
skill displayed by PPF officials in managing contestation. Büscher describes how conflict 
was often finessed by the TFCA authorities, and management techniques were themselves 
used to further reinforce the hegemonic status of the TFCA model. This indicates top-down 
attitudes and activities by the conservation authorities in this particular context. However, 
Büscher’s research presents neoliberalism as a more monolithic, coherent and totalising 
project than the processes I witnessed in the PPMR. In my study, I saw how the variations, 
disruptions and dislocations to the TFCA vision are sometimes not so easily managed by 
discursive techniques (though these were often successful), and I witnessed a greater 
tolerance for ambiguity within the day-to-day governance of the reserve.  
In turn, paying attention to how the material world is a political actor alongside political and 
social forces provides an opportunity to advance Büscher’s account. In his analysis, the 
‘nature’ that is the focus of so much dispute appears as rather a flat and powerless entity, 
rather than as a vibrant and heterogeneous force. Using assemblage methodology draws 
attention to how material objects, human and non-human subjects combine with technologies 
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and political-economic ideologies in shaping political regimes  (Barry 2013; Mitchell 2011). 
The non-human world is particularly relevant to the reserve through emotion and non-human 
charisma, which effects how conservation regimes are conducted. In addition, the ocean’s 
materiality and the biophysicality of its creatures play a role shaping governance regimes. 
The materiality of the PPMR can be understood as follows. Like land, coastal zones are 
made up of “heterogenous elements including material substances, technologies, discourses 
and practices” (Li 2014: 590). The material substances within the PPMR are highly 
heterogeneous, comprising land (the land between the high vegetated dunes and the low tide 
mark), coastal zones (the shifting place where the land meets the sea), ocean waters (the 
voluminous and dynamic coastal waters out to the three nautical mile line which forms the 
barrier of the MPA) and in-shore bay waters (in Maputo Bay). These areas include sub-tidal 
coral reefs, sea grass beds, rocky shorelines, sandflats, beaches and mangrove forests, all of 
which have different ecological properties (PPMR 2009). Some of these areas are used by 
people for subsistence such as mussel gathering on rocky shorelines, while others, such as 
coral reefs are only visited by scuba divers if at all. Like land, full exclusion of people from 
the ocean is impossible, so while marine zones can be partitioned, and access to them 
controlled, one cannot control all of the ocean all of the time.  
However, the ocean is different in several important respects to land. While it would be 
simplistic to describe land as static, the ocean clearly possesses a special dynamism, meaning 
that the place of the PPMR has to be considered in the context of mobility and dynamism 
(Steinberg and Peters 2015). The marine elements of the PPMR are constantly changing in 
substance, yet this is not entirely chaotic. Ocean inhabitants move freely through a three 
dimensional space, complicating conservation efforts to place barriers and fences to protect 
biodiversity, yet some like turtles and dolphins also maintain residencies and territories, 
meaning they can be exposed to human development such as coastal housing, hotels and 
fixed boat launch sites. Still, the ocean’s inhabitants are mobile and often move in ways and 
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into spaces inaccessible to humans, necessitating technology to research and view them. 
These dual movements recall Deluze and Guattari’s (1988) conceptualisation of smooth and 
striated maritime space, whereby the reserve’s techniques of mapping and enforcement of 
regulation can be seen as attempts to introduce order, territorialise, and striate an unruly 
substance though lines, grids and choke points. The ocean, in contrast, exerts a contradictory 
pull towards reasserting its own dynamics (Steinberg and Peters 2015). The ocean’s fluid 
and voluminous characteristics are important because they shape access and governance 
regimes. Access in the PPMR is often spatially controlled through choke points, specifically, 
through highly regulated landing points through which the reserve management can control 
who enters and exit the water, along with marine boat patrols and an extensive system of 
coastal patrols to organise who can remove marine creatures from the water. 
Technology plays a major role in excluding some people’s access while facilitating others. 
Access to the ocean itself is nearly always mediated by technology such as scuba gear or 
boats (technology which is coded with gendered, racial, class and other cultural aspects), 
whereas access to the rocky shoreline is controlled through governance and enforcement 
techniques that are more similar to land. The territorialisation of the ocean through 
regulation and management schemes is thus challenging, alternately enabled (by a calm sea, 
by good visibility) or disrupted (by storms or by depth). Access and rights to the ocean can 
be, and are often contested. The rights of fisher peoples to marine spaces and resources are 
articulated in blue-grabbing debates, while there are questions around the kinds of 
technological and regulatory relations which ascribe value to non-consumptive uses of the 
sea (such as through co-management regimes on the one hand, and market mechanisms on 
the other) (Mansfield 2004). In sum, while access and resource use regimes in the sea 
sometimes can be controlled through various access regimes, it has its own special 
affordances, namely unpredictability, dynamism, volume and inaccessibility, which make 
sovereignty and governance peculiarly challenging.  Consequently, a variety of techniques 
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are used to render the PPMR legitimate, to establish and maintain sovereignty, and to govern 
the space.  
The task of introducing the material world into political accounts is not as straightforward as 
simply noting and describing its capacities and how these impact outcomes. Barry (2013: 13) 
notes how the material world is itself subject to representation as part of knowledge regimes, 
arguing that “[e]fforts to regulate the unruly properties of materials have ….been long 
intertwined with attempts to produce disciplined and reliable forms of expertise”. This 
apparent paradox means engaging with material objects and non-humans even as they 
themselves are understood as “formed and progressively transformed through multiple layers 
of information production” (Barry 2013: 15). This requires, in part, returning to Li’s 
contention that the production of knowledge is a political act which shapes assemblages, 
analysed through understanding and critiquing both the role of scientists who produce 
knowledge (and thereby circumscribe understanding through means of scientific 
epistemologies), and how their conclusions are mobilised by other actors. It also necessitates 
attention to the forms of calculation and investigation, to the types of entities and objects 
denoted by this logic and how they are enrolled in political debates. Understanding these 
knowledge practices sheds light on how the material world is assembled as a resource for 
accumulation regimes. It also means attending to the co-production of materiality and 
knowledge; that is, understanding how the subjects discussed in technical and scientific 
debates, including the non-human, are also participants in them (Mitchell 2011). 
This discussion has raised several issues related to knowledge, power and materiality which 
remain the subject of ongoing theoretical debate. To be clear, I enrol assemblage in this 
chapter in the following ways. First, I conceptualise the PPMR as a socio-technical 
assemblage comprising human, non-human, material, technical and economic objects and 
conditions. Second, I understand the PPMR as held together as a seemingly coherent project 
through a series of tenuous and contested techniques as set out by Li. Third, along with 
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political techniques and devices I also bring in the material world of the PPMR as entangled 
with representation and discourse. Understanding how the PPMR is assembled requires 
attention to multiple modes of power discussed in chapter two, governmentality, and 
biopower. It also involves attending to the limitations of these forms of power and how they 
are resisted. This process of assemblage should be understood in relation to the wider thesis; 
rendering the PPMR into a governable and coherent resource enables it to be enrolled in a 
wider regime of accumulation. This brings us again to Tsing’s observation; the day-to-day 
political work in imagining the PPMR as a coherent assemblage is also vital to a broader 
scheme which recasts nature as conservation commodity. Having clarified the theoretical 
underpinnings of this chapter, I now turn to set out who are the players in the PPMR, and 
what are their stakes.    
6.3.	Actors,	claims	and	positions	in	the	PPMR	assemblage	
This section sets out the subject positions of the multiple actors involved in the PPMR, 
including those who are subject to the reserve’s Management Plan and those who are 
involved in designing and enforcing it. I primarily consider human actors’ positions, 
intentions and commitments, as accounting for the role of material objects and non-human 
life does not necessarily entail ascribing them conscious intentionality or a subject position. 
Communities with diverse goals. These include livelihood security and quality services and 
infrastructure, whether provided by the reserve (such as through direct benefits or 
employment), or indirectly through involvement in tourism (such as those employed by the 
market in Ponta do Ouro or in one of the many tourist businesses). However, rural 
communities, especially those who live within the MSR boundaries are also concerned with 
maintaining customary rights to practice agriculture and keep livestock. Coastal communities 
(such as Machangulu and Inhaca Island residents) are concerned with fishing rights and the 
prospect of alternative livelihoods once such rights are removed. Views are reportedly mixed 
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regarding the proposed relocation of some villagers to purpose-built housing out of the 
reserve; while some younger people are happy to take advantage of new accommodation 
services, older villagers often “have absolutely no interest in leaving” (interview with 
conservation scientist 1, 26 October 2013, who attended the original meetings with 
communities in the Maputo Special Reserve).  There are also imagined and idealised 
communities, whose purported needs and desires figure prominently in political discussion. 
Communities are often represented in contradictory ways; as responsibilised individuals who 
both can and should seek opportunities from tourism, as parties to community-based 
conservation schemes such as a community run lodge (i.e. as capable of self-government), 
and subjects whose use of the natural resources of the reserve needs careful management (i.e. 
as subjects of government) (Li 2007a). In sum, communities are seen as one of the prime 
beneficiaries of the TFCA project through enhancements to livelihoods, but are the subject 
of some ambiguous interventions. 
Commercial organisations which are subject to the Management Plan. They are nearly 
always run by South African operators and owners, often established long before the reserve, 
and include tourist lodges, restaurants and hotels, scuba dive companies and dolphin 
encounter organisations. The latter two categories are now subject to licensing regimes to 
manage impacts on the reserve’s ecology, but before the plan had been operating in what 
was viewed by the PPF on an “ad hoc, uncontrolled basis” (interview with PPF consultant, 
18 October 2013). Some of these organisations are deeply committed to the ecological and 
management principles of the reserve and were among those who helped to design the 
Management Plan, whereas other organisations operate on purely commercial terms (with 
varying interpretations of eco-tourism and commitments to what the reserve is trying to 
achieve). 
Donors including the Peace Parks Foundation, the World Bank and the Dutch Postcode 
Lottery. These are committed to global development and environment discourses of 
184 
 
community-based natural resource management and poverty reduction, and to trans-frontier 
conservation’s rhetoric of biodiversity protection through economic growth and through 
market-based means. They are also shaped by organisational exigencies, especially the need 
to maintain coherent policy ideas, and to performances of success (Mosse 2005). They are 
committed to the visible success of the reserve as a flagship conservation area. 
Reserve management committed to enforcing the Management Plan, and through this, to 
enact control and claim jurisdiction over the reserve against rival territorial and governance 
claims. The reserve management subscribes to a vision that trans-frontier conservation offers 
a sustainable, long-term future in the context of Mozambique’s increasingly extractives-led 
political economy and global challenges, and endorses Peace Parks’ framing of a ‘triple win’ 
solution. As individuals, they are often deeply committed to principles of biodiversity 
protection, and see major conservation schemes as ways of advancing this goal. Indeed, the 
PPF was often seen as a strong ally in achieving conservation goals against elements in the 
Frelimo government who were perceived as disinterested in conservation. The reserve 
management is also motivated by resolving the day to day compromises and contradictions 
thrown up through the enforcement of the Management Plan, and, in turn, works to validate 
both the plan and the broader model of TFCAs through demonstrating these problems can be 
solved. This is often a challenging process, with reserve officials pulled in multiple 
directions and sometimes subjected to threats of violence. The reserve also perceives a duty 
of care to residents of the PPMR and the adjacent MSR, though this attitude of care conflicts 
with some of the stated goals of the reserve to manage and control human behaviour and 
movement. 
Reserve staff whose livelihoods depend on their employment with the reserve. These include 
senior professional staff and rangers who appear committed to the Peace Parks vision and the 
enforcement of the Management Plan, and seasonal employees such as turtle monitors who 
are also required to perform as conservation advocates as part of their day-to-day work. 
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Conservationists and other NGOs, a diverse group including smaller NGOs and independent 
researchers alongside larger NGOS, all ostensibly committed to saving and protecting the 
ecological integrity of the reserve and to advancing the cause of marine protection 
throughout Mozambique. The issue of community involvement is polarising; while some 
organisations may be committed to some degree of community involvement (or at least to 
the rhetoric) others aim to secure strong protection where possible. Some conservationists 
expressed views in private that did not accord with their organisations’ apparent acceptance 
of CBNRM principles, arguing for conservation through habitat protection and species 
protection regardless of community impacts, and positing communities as the main source of 
damage to marine ecology. Conservationists are often deeply sceptical of both the 
Mozambican government’s capacity and its commitment to conservation (especially in the 
face of the resources boom), and feel they are not taken seriously by some elements in 
Frelimo. One conservation informant stated that officials do not see a direct benefit from 
making laws to protect marine environments, but are prepared to make life very easy for 
extractive companies (interview with Mozambican activist 2, 30 April 2014, Inhambane). 
Many, but not all, are Western researchers from well-known organisations or universities, 
though there is a growing emphasis on ensuring Mozambican academics and 
conservationists are supported.  
Visitors who are subject to the rule of the Management Plan. They often appear as an 
‘impact’ to be ‘managed’, especially where issues like coastal development, water, energy 
and transport infrastructure, and tourist activities like scuba diving are concerned. However, 
as both a real and imagined group, their presence is central to the idea that conservation can 
be made into a source of economic growth. As we saw in the previous chapter, large areas of 
southern Africa have been organised to reflect this premise. Based on several interviews, 
visitors also have their own rather romantic imaginaries around the PPMR which are often 
tied to swimming with dolphins and other marine life. They also often ascribe to 
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Mozambique’s, and especially Ponta do Ouro’s reputation for offering an ‘anything goes’ 
getaway.  
National state departments, which, as the previous chapter demonstrated, have a complex 
relationship with the TFCA agenda and with conservation in general. The official mandate to 
proclaim the PPMR was issued from the Ministry of Tourism. While this department contain 
officials that are deeply intertwined with donor agendas, these sometimes sit alongside some 
Frelimo politicians who are often accused of being more committed to personal gain than to 
conservation or development aims. In this sense, discourses of good governance and 
transparency also figure in conservation debates. For many of its supporters, the PPMR 
provides an opportunity to enact a ‘new’ Mozambique, one of long-term sustainability, 
order, and transparent politics. This vision is directly contrasted against perceived Frelimo 
short-termism, lack to attention to environmental and social goals, and crony politics. At the 
same time, there are also prominent Frelimo members committed to TFCAs and broader 
ideas of sustainability and green development, who provide projects with sovereign backing 
and legitimacy. Indeed, sovereign state support is essential to gazetting TFCAs.  
Regional government which plays little role in conservation but which is sometimes 
interested in what the PPMR symbolises. The town of Ponta do Ouro has been seen 
predominantly as a place where foreigners do business off of the back of Mozambique’s 
natural resources. It has occasionally been subject to intense, if sporadic scrutiny from senior 
officials. In one such visit from the provincial governor “lots of people got fines, they 
inspected everything, your venue, ……the conditions for your workers, your paperwork, 
your finances if they thought there was something wrong” (interview with business owner in 
Ponta do Ouro, 26 October 2013). Reportedly, the use of English on tourist menus, and 
accepting payment in South African Rand was also criticised on the grounds that “this is 
Mozambique” (ibid). For these political actors, the PPMR and its associated tourist trades 
provide an opportunity to play out concerns about forging a particular national identity, and 
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demarcating Mozambique clearly from its neighbour – concerns which are often shared by 
the reserve management. 
This section has set out the complex views of the different stakeholders in the reserve. 
Sometimes these interests dovetail, sometimes they diverge. The next section will look at 
how these interests are made to converge by applying Li’s techniques of assemblage 
(2007a). In doing so, I wish to demonstrate how the deceptively simple ‘win-win’ discourse 
of TFCAs is able to help its proponents hold many different ideas and interests together, but 
also how it is exposed to deep fissures and contradictions. 
6.4.	Techniques	of	assemblage	
6.4.1.	Building	consensus:	consultation	and	community	benefits	
This section reflects on how the PPF was able to secure the agreement of multiple agencies 
and groups of people with differing perspectives through emphasising community 
consultation and community benefits throughout the planning stages of the project.  
The planning for the PPMR was undertaken by a team overseen by Dr Roelie Kloppers, 
project coordinator for the Lubombo Trans-frontier Conservation Area, Mathew Prophet, the 
then-marine manager of the Maputo Special Reserve, and others from the Peace Parks 
Foundation, the Mozambican Turtle Group and Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife (to recap, KZN was 
highly instrumental in lobbying for an extension of its South African turtle project). The 
initial work was conducted around turtle monitoring, which was a key tool in discussions 
with the Ministry for Tourism, although, I have shown, the rationale actually went way 
beyond this. Some of this original team, especially Mathew Prophet, then played a central 
role in drafting the original PPMR Management Plan, working with Ministry of Tourism 
officials, Peace Parks and World Bank staff with contributions from national and regional 
Mozambican government departments and Peace Parks Foundation consultants.  The plan 
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was based on previous PPF management documents, IUCN guidance, and also drew on other 
marine protected areas plans from the Western Cape Nature Conservation Board in South 
Africa. There were good pragmatic reasons for basing the PPMR’s plan on other similar 
regimes; the comparison with MPAs in the Western Cape of South Africa was made on the 
basis that they are also “complex, with high visitor numbers to them and furthermore 
irreplaceable in terms of their biodiversity, like the PPMR” (PPMR 2009: 7), and several 
consultants were chosen on the basis of their extensive involvement with Mozambique’s 
coastal regions. At the same time, the composition of the team shows that experts with 
similar ideas about conservation were enrolled to produce the Management Plan 
(Ramutsindela 2007). It highlights the key figure of the conservation consultant in 
reproducing a particular kind of technocratic knowledge – what Kothari (2005: 425) calls a 
“tool-kit approach to development”. The PPF’s tactic of rolling out a relatively uniform 
conservation programme across many different contexts also reflects Barry’s (2006) concept 
of technological zones, whereby transnational spaces are constructed, not through sovereign 
national borders, but through the roll out of uniform technologies and forms of knowledge.  
This unified approach worked to smooth disagreements and to construct an agreed plan 
which could be signed off by relevant government departments. This process ran alongside 
an extensive public consultation programme. As one consultant who was extensively 
involved in planning for the PPMR and writing the Management Plan described, the 
consultation process was key to securing the legitimacy of the reserve from the perspective 
of the Mozambican government as it tied into its professed adoption of a participatory 
approach to policy-making. A PPF consultant explained how ministers were presented with a 
fait accompli, given political credibility on the basis of ‘stakeholder involvement’: 
I’ve been involved with the reserve since its inception, mainly with the preparation 
of the underlying material, so all of the planning, facilitation, and co-ordination of 
the facilitation process, stakeholder engagement to get it to a point where the 
stakeholder involvement gave it the credibility so that it could be authorised and 
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signed off by the minister in the process (interview with PPF consultant, 18 October 
2013). 
The process of developing the Management Plan thereby united multiple actors around this 
core principle of a consultative approach. However, consultation is often criticised as a 
cynical means for powerful businesses or governments to induce agreement among the less 
powerful, often used in controversial scenarios such as land use changes for extractive uses 
or conservation. Based on work in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and other locations 
in Africa, Hönke (2012: 56) demonstrates how participatory and consultative approaches are 
intended to “dissolve grievances” and give an impression of community involvement in 
decision-making, while Milgroom and Spierenburg (2008: 435) show how public 
consultation was used to produce “induced volition” in community relocations in the Great 
Limpopo National Park in Mozambique. Specific criticisms include circumscribing 
consultation to include only trivial matters, failing to communicate in local languages or in 
accessible ways, failing to consult widely or for long enough, omitting to recognise 
community power relations or other issues like gender, and the use of threatening or 
authoritarian tactics to force the desired consultation outcome.  
It is important to point out that many of these specific criticisms do not apply to the PPMR’s 
consultation programme. In fact, the consultation specialist was Mozambican and lived 
nearby, someone who knew the communities and cultures well. The consultation was 
conducted in local languages, and included multiple discussions with the 678 people who 
live in the reserve boundaries, and some of those from surrounding areas including buffer 
zones, the Futi Corridor and the MSR (Thompson 2014). The inhabitants are from the Ronga 
community, often governed through traditional authority, and are generally smallholder and 
subsistence fishers (Thompson 2014), and consequently were concerned about livelihoods, 
concerns which the consultation process strove to address.  The process also comprised 
discussions with multiple agencies, affected communities and businesses, and, as a PPF 
consultant described to me, went on for longer than expected as the reserve team was so keen 
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to ensure they had settled community concerns. The PPF’s consultation expert was able to 
point to concrete changes that had stemmed from community input, including various social 
and income-generating projects under the Lubombo Community Development Facility and 
forthcoming PPMR community development plan. The style of communication was aimed at 
achieving consent rather than authoritarianism. As a member of the reserve management 
described, “the idea is that we have to be there, to sit with the fishermen, discuss it, and 
create a relation of give and take. We have to agree, and then we start enforcing. Because 
otherwise we will be the police, and you don’t win that war” (interview with PPMR official 
2, 9 October 2013). In short, the PPMR reserve management considers that it can 
demonstrate substantive engagement with communities, and would claim to have adopted a 
markedly different approach than the cynical use of consultation such as that criticised in 
accounts of technocratic development. 
However, deeper discussions about the process revealed the use of consultation as a mode of 
political conduct aimed at securing legitimacy for the reserve. Mosse (2005) and Kothari 
(2005) describe consultation programmes as a means of constructing imagined communities 
and interpreting their needs, desires and what might be ‘best’ for them. Constructed 
beneficiaries then provide the necessary justifications for intervention. This persuasive tone 
was certainly present in the relationship between PPMR consultation staff and the 
communities, with much of the consultation described in terms of the need to educate 
communities. A community relations expert described how one of the key aims of the 
consultation was to:  
[C]hange the lifestyle, to change the mind of people. You know, you will find the 
old men [who] have been doing the same thing for 70 years, and ……. say no you 
can’t do this; you have to do this and that. And it is difficult to change that mind-set. 
At the beginning they say no, no , no, please leave us as we are, we’ll be more than 
happy to continue as we are…….. So that is the kind of problem we are getting. But 
we’ve had many meetings …….. and they now understand (interview with PPF 
official, 15 October 2013).  
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Official donor policy also sees consultation in terms of persuasion. MozBio15 guidance states 
that “[b]y choosing certain entitlements and the obligations associated with these as part of 
the zoning and development planning process, communities will effectively be beginning to 
buy into the conservation programme” (Thompson 2014: 48). ‘Buy in’ is clearly something 
actively sought by donors and managers of protected areas.  It implies more than co-
operation and compliance; it also connotes that communities will positively agree with the 
proposals in the policy and will re-work their lives where relevant to secure the outcomes put 
forward. Consultation, then, is a matter of persuasion. 
This persuasion was to be achieved by invoking the community’s so-called ‘natural’ interest 
in their own livelihoods and by generating the idea of rights and responsibilities (a classic 
neoliberal third way formulation). MozBio claims that “[t]he passive reception of benefits 
does not encourage buy-in to resource conservation” (Thompson 2014: 38, emphasis added). 
Similarly, a PPF official explained that: 
What happened is that when we started to talk about the restrictions [put in place by 
the reserve], people said, wow, what a lot of restrictions we are getting. That was the 
main problem, not saying we don’t want the reserve, because [we] explained what 
the reserve is for……..they knew they were to be consulted and informed in such a 
way that they understand the importance of having that area as a reserve. The main 
issues were, well, how will we live from now? That was the main question, not to 
say that we don’t want the reserve…….definitely they [wanted] to know what will 
be the result, is that is their main income product, they will want to know, from now, 
how will I survive? (interview with PPMR official 2, 9 October 2013). 
 
There is a clear importance attached to persuading the communities through offering new 
livelihood opportunities, pointing to the re-framing of discussion in terms of tradeable gains 
                                                      
15 MozBio is the name of the current funding project for Mozambique’s conservation areas 
implemented by MITUR and funded by the GEF and World Bank International Development Grant. It 
is the successor to the official World Bank TFCA project discussed in chapter four. These evolving 
projects and funding regimes discussed further in chapter seven. 
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and losses. This was made clear from another discussion I had with a reserve official, who 
explained that he planned to gain legitimacy for the reserve by stressing the extent of 
community benefits, but, crucially, also making clear that these would only be available if 
communities complied with reserve restrictions. In short, the consultation programme was 
conducted largely on the assumption that the community is motivated by calculable gains. 
This was summed up by an official as “now people understand what conservation is, this is a 
protected area and in the future [they] will get benefits” (interview with PPF official, 15 
October 2013). Under this logic, the reserve supports a supposed ‘natural’ interest in 
sustainably managing resources (‘natural’ in the sense that people should understand that it is 
in their interest), while also leaves the role of the TFCA expert and manager intact, as it is 
they who shape communities’ interests through education and governance, rather than 
through coercion or imposition. 
The idea of the incentive is also crucial in making the reserve intelligible to donors. I was 
able to see first-hand how the benefits offered to communities formed a powerful way of 
reporting the reserve back to donors when a delegation visited the PPMR. My fieldwork 
diary reports this meeting as a fascinating exposition of the ways in which the eco-tourist 
vision is portrayed to donors. I described it in my fieldwork diary on 16 October 2013 as 
follows: 
The PPF consultant made the case to donors that the future of the PPMR rests 
squarely with eco-tourism. What this means for the communities is that they must be 
found alternative sources of livelihood. They must be ‘incentivised’ away from 
resource use such fishing and into tourism businesses. This is not simply working in 
resorts; the PPF envisages a shift in livelihoods with locals retrained as marine 
guides and dive professionals. This will achieve the aim of having locals truly 
invested in conservation. The market for these ecotourism activities is an 
international professional middle class, described as ‘cash rich, time poor’ who 
travel under a green banner and are keen on outdoor activities. This means that 
communities must see the reserve in terms of tangible benefits which can be sought 




Under this persuasive argument, other ways of framing possible futures of the area become 
foreclosed, and the reserve becomes represented as the best possible solution. In fact, it 
becomes difficult to discuss the possibility that communities may not want the reserve, 
because it comes with associated benefits that they would be foolish to refuse (even though it 
places them into a relationship of dependency on the reserve and on the so-called ‘green’ 
international middle class traveller). This construction of ‘the community’ suits the 
normative foundations of the PPMR. 
In sum, the category of the community as a beneficiary of the PPMR was conjured into being 
through the consultation programme. The community provides an intelligible subject for 
development, giving reserve management, donors and government a clear reason to unite 
behind the plan. The complex material reality of the PPMR became represented as a 
manageable and fundable project centred on the cost-benefit formula and the desired 
relationship between a community motivated by benefits, and a tourism class motivated by 
‘green’ experiences. The job of the reserve is to produce the conditions that this relationship 
might thrive. In turn, this cost-benefit formula is reported back to donors as a means of 
securing further endorsement for the programme.  Importantly, this was not possible without 
being based on actual material consultation programmes and tangible benefits to the 
community. Consultation was therefore vitally important as a means of political conduct 
which shaped the debate in terms which suited the commitments of the TFCA agenda. 
Rather than consult on the principle of the reserve, the PPF sought views concerning 
community benefits, and used the consultation process as an opportunity to for persuasion. 
Consultation was also necessary to demonstrate the reserve’s participatory credentials to 
donors and the government. In addition, it framed the project as one which could find 
achievable and practical solutions to the many different objectives linked under the reserve. 
Together, these two ideas – the legitimacy offered by consultation, and positive-sum 




Conservation interventions are frequently defended by appeals to experts. This section 
discusses the expert justifications offered for conservation goals, and the particular points of 
convergence and disagreements over scientific knowledge in the assemblage. Along with 
consultation, consensus in the assemblage is brought about through the processes of 
promoting and interpreting conservation science, and through rendering messy material 
reality into a technical arena for intervention. Experts are also crucial in establishing 
legitimacy for intervention, that is, in supporting asymmetrical power relations between 
project authorities and development subject (Kothari 2005). However, the role of experts and 
the claims that they make also introduces multiple points of fragmentation. There is 
resentment in some areas for the elevated position that Western scientific researchers enjoy, 
while experts also disagree on conservation philosophy, particularly around the imagined 
‘ecologically friendly’ community that the PPF is trying to construct. Examining experts 
reveals their important role in making the reserve cohere, while also providing an 
opportunity to explore how fractures in the assemblage are handled.  
Much has been written about the privileged position of experts in conservation science and 
development. Critics claim that experts’ prescriptions for action are often anchored in 
uneven power relations and imaginaries about nature and society rather than better 
understandings of the ‘right’ thing to do (Ferguson 1990; Goldman 2003; Sachs 2009) 16. 
                                                      
16 I do not wish to adopt a simplistic ‘anti-expert’ position which posits that all forms of knowledge 
are equally (in)valid. Indeed, experts and experienced conservationists use their knowledge daily to 
contribute to the successful running of reserves or in the production of conservation knowledge. 
Expertise is vital in establishing the veracity of those issues which most preoccupy political 
ecologists, such as climate change. In addition, the researchers I encountered were often very self-
critical, and did not fit the caricature of a top-down expert who automatically assumes power and 
privilege. Several acknowledged racial, social and gendered inequalities in who gets to produce 
knowledge. They often recognised their own epistemological limitations, discussing incomplete 
195 
 
Castree (2005: 185) suggests scientists occupy a privileged position; “to say that one is a 
scientist is to distinguish oneself sharply from those people who produce supposedly ‘lesser’ 
knowledge (i.e. non-scientists)”. Expert knowledge is deployed throughout the PPMR 
Management Plan, which often refers to the central role that researchers from universities 
and NGOs had played in mapping the various ecological features of the reserve and deciding 
how best to manage them. I also refer back to the central role that a handful of international 
biologists played in lobbing for the reserve in the first place, as described in chapter five. 
One of the key aims of the ongoing management is the production of scientific information 
about the reserve, for example through discovering new species (several have been recorded 
already), monitoring nesting turtle populations, describing and counting fish species, and a 
long-running programme of recording and analysing interactions with resident pods of 
dolphins.  Conservation science is also increasing in prominence in Mozambique through the 
role of donors, which have dedicated funding and personnel to help Mozambique develop a 
scientific agenda for conservation. 
Much of the knowledge produced by scientific research in Mozambique – far from being 
neutral - was intertwined with conservationist’s assumptions, affective relationships and 
ways of looking at the world (Castree 2005; Demeritt 1998). All projects begin with a 
decision of what to investigate. These decisions are themselves not neutral, involving a 
combination of the affective qualities of the animals (as I learned from several interviews 
with Western conservation researchers, these can often be the same affective qualities that 
motivate eco-tourism), the animals’ existing visibility and accessibility as categories in 
conservation science, pragmatic attention to population numbers, along with strategic 
                                                                                                                                                         
methodologies and acknowledging that their research had merely opened up further questions rather 
than provided any clear basis for action. Rather, I critique the role of the expert in order to highlight 




decisions relating to funding and career progression. Researchers often favoured charismatic 
animals such as dolphins, whale sharks and other shark species, manta rays, turtles and 
nudibranchs (a colourful sea slug popular with scuba divers). Some even traced their 
research back to an emotional first encounter. For example, one described how “I was 
fortunate enough to meet a young female [dolphin] just going into her sexual maturity, and 
she was really sociable, and an hour later I climbed out of the water, and she was the 
ringleader that started this, what we call circle swimming and conscious interaction, [she] 
kind of initiated it and soon other females were following and the little babies were coming 
in as well” (interview with conservation researcher 1, Ponta do Ouro,16 October 2013). 
Here, the capacity of these dolphins to invoke an emotional response is important, and 
several researchers spoke in similarly passionate ways. This focus on charismatic animals 
links some experts’ motivations directly to the same imaginaries about the ‘natural’ world 
which motivate eco-tourism. This is significant, as these privileged expert positions continue 
to play a central position in shaping conservation interventions.  
Choosing what to investigate also requires that the subject must be ‘researchable’, that is, 
there must be an intelligible set of techniques and technologies by which the subject can be 
made visible and intelligible to a wider scientific community. This is especially important 
given the voluminous and changeable materiality of the ocean, of which only a tiny fraction 
is accessible to humans even with technology. Human abilities and capacities (often 
enhanced by technology) and the animal’s characteristics (such as size, range and aversion to 
humans) are both important in gathering data.  One researcher described how monitoring the 
activities of manta rays and drawing conclusions about their behaviour was very difficult, 
because of the complexity of human, animal and seasonal interactions, while another 
admitted that sampling only took place when researchers are able to get close enough to a 
particular shark, a very rare event mediated by weather and animal behaviour. It was also an 
activity shaped by a view of tagging as ‘macho’, described by Haraway (2008: 255) as 
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involving “fast boats; expert pilots; and agile, jocular, well-muscled scientist–divers ready to 
jump off a moving boat and embrace a large swimming critter who is presumably not 
especially longing to hug a human”. This makes a particular kind of research glamorous, and 
perhaps more likely to attract skilled researchers and funding. It also makes research stand 
out in a competitive academic political economy. One researcher often joked that she was 
happy that her particular subjects were so mysterious and challenging to research, as this 
would keep her in a job.  
Despite this epistemological uncertainty, the scientific literature offers several perspectives 
on what action is best to protect marine environments. Prominent researchers suggest the 
size of marine protected area is the significant factor in its success (Halpern 2003; Roberts, 
Halpern, Palumbi and Warner 2001), and others argue that, along with size, strict control and 
governance also contribute significantly to success (Charles and Wilson 2009; Singleton and 
Roberts 2014). A group of prominent marine researchers recently concluded that the most 
successful marine protected areas (with success defined in terms of fish species diversity, 
richness and number) are those with the least human activity (Edgar et al. 2014). This debate 
is very relevant to the type of mixed use, relatively small and tourist-heavy MPA encouraged 
under TFCA planning. Generally speaking, research suggests that the PPMR is far less likely 
than a larger, more remote and less used MPA to achieve its conservation goals. This 
uncertainty is compounded by the general difficulty in producing policy prescriptions from 
research. One researcher commented that “in general it’s very difficult to translate research 
results into management decisions” (interview with conservation official 7, Maputo, April 23 
2014). How, then, do researchers move from a perspective of acknowledged uncertainty to a 
position where they thoroughly advocate the normative and often wide-ranging interventions 
associated with TFCAs? And how does the TFCA discourse claim to be rooted in science 




Observations at the Conservation Science in Mozambique workshop provided an opportunity 
to understand the points of convergence whereby the ‘will to conserve’ is asserted through 
expert knowledge. I suggest there are three key ways in which the elevated role of the 
‘expert’ forms a point of consensus in the assemblage, despite the many questions raised as 
to its ability to provide guidance for action. First, as noted in chapter five, scientific 
discourses work to establish a sense of urgency and emergency in which some (indeed, any) 
intervention is perceived as preferable to none (Tsing 2005). I have already discussed the 
idea of crisis so will not repeat that discussion here. Second, there is consensus around the 
position of expertise as a means of educating and broadening support within the context of a 
wider assemblage dedicated to the principles of conservation science – the often-repeated 
assumption that ‘once people know more about a given ecosystem, animal or marine zone, 
they will become advocates for greater protection’. There is a need to perform research-led 
conservation, and the presence of experts is necessary for this. Third, knowledge works 
within a political economy. Conservation actors publicly unite around the power, supposed 
superiority and neutrality of science because it offers a clear delineation against perceived 
anti-scientific, ‘backwards’ and patrimonial forces in the Frelimo government, a political 
dynamic which is also bound up in debates about the need for a policy-relevant agenda.  
Turning to my second contention, the idea often expressed is that the education of ‘lay 
people’ through interaction with a conservation research professional will automatically lead 
to the adoption of conservation values and behaviours. One researcher explained how 
participating in dolphin swims might lead customers to change their behaviour:  
[Customers] are really moved ……. it’s really special to be able to facilitate that 
kind of experience and say to people, look, you don’t have to go and support the 
captive [dolphin] trade…. We really try with our guests …… to point out that there 
are alternatives like sustainable seafood initiatives, and that captivity is an issue, and 
that there are certain things they can do (interview with conservation researcher 1, 
Ponta do Ouro, 16 October 2013) 
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Other researchers expressed similar views, for example, one asserted that “probably most 
people in Mozambique have had very little education regarding the environment and 
especially the marine environment. And for us as divers, it’s easier for us to see the 
importance” (interview with conservation researcher 3, Inhambane, 23 June 2014). The 
assumption is that the more people in Mozambique were involved with scuba diving then the 
more they would be motivated to take part in conservation. A similar view was also 
expressed in the interviews I conducted with eco-tourism customers, with one describing 
how “the education aspects [of dolphin swims] are quite important to me, to think that we are 
learning more about what the lives of the animals….., more about how their lives are 
threatened by us” (interview with dolphin swim customer, Ponta do Ouro, 14 October 2013). 
Again, the assumption is made that through such an educational interaction, real tangible 
changes will be made to enhance the conservation of dolphins.  However, it is not clear that 
this link exists in reality, and even if consumers of conservation expertise are inspired to 
make concrete changes to their lives (for example, through ensuring ethical fish consumption 
to avoid dolphin by-catch), not all of the changes necessary are not within individuals’ power 
to make (such as measures to deal with climate change or ocean pollution).   
Despite these limitations, activities such as information days and marine activity days for 
local children (shown in figure 6.1 below) and interactions with tourists played an important 
part in legitimating the conservation area. Interactions with scientists played a central role in 
many of the scuba diving and dolphin encounter trips that I experienced. Throughout my 
research in the PPMR and in other locations in Mozambique, it was striking how it was 
presumed that this research and conservation culture was the only correct way of relating to 
and knowing the ocean. For example researchers were often present on boats, they 
accompanied scuba dives, and they explained scientific and eco-tourism principles to 
customers through regular public talks and informal discussions about their research. They 
were able to shape the behaviour of tourists and dive staff through detailed codes of conduct 
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which aim to minimise the impacts of marine tourism on animals and ecologies. In turn, 
commercial organisations gained reputational enhancement by being associated with 
researchers. This reasserts the position of the expert in the assemblage as one who is able to 
create a performance of conservation, and re-emphasises the professed advantages of 
conservation-based tourism. The interaction between researchers, commercial organisations 
and eco-tourists asserts the conjecture that scientific research goes hand-in-hand with eco-
tourism (provided behaviour can be shaped through such tools as codes of conduct). This 
view rests on an assumption that all Mozambicans are ignorant of, or do not care about the 
sea, a view which was rejected by the Mozambican activists with whom I spoke. It also 
provides a crucial point of agreement for donors and conservation managers, who are 
committed to demonstrating the ecological benefits of tourism. Such factors serve to reassert 
and legitimise the fundamental eco-tourism assumptions of the TFCA assemblage.  
 
Figure 6.1: Dia de Mergulho, a community day where children are educated about the 
ocean and marine conservation, PPMR, 4 October 2013 (author photograph) 
Conservation science also provides a point of unity for members of the assemblage to gain 
advantages within Mozambique’s wider political economy. Directly for some scientists, it 
provides material benefits such as permission to work in conservation areas on the basis of 
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taking part in outreach and educational activities such as the Dia de Mergulho.  More 
generally, several researchers observed that they need to make their research intelligible 
within a particular spatial agenda, namely, ANAC’s focus on marine protected areas and 
national parks. As one succinctly put it, “from a practical point of view, it makes more sense 
to talk about geographies than to talk about species” (discussion at Conservation Science in 
Mozambique workshop, April 22-24, Maputo). This imperative to scale-up protection by 
focussing on areas in proximity to existing MPAs reflects a particular geography of 
biodiversity where particular locations can be identified and brought into existing protected 
areas networks.  This scaling up also is reflected at a policy level, where some researchers 
feel funding is directed at the MPA network despite other sites also holding scientific and 
biodiversity merits. This was seen as a catch 22, in which protected areas dominate research 
funding, reinforcing and amplifying the existing conservation network and making it hard for 
conservation which falls outside of the protected area discourse to get funded. Such a 
dilemma demonstrates how knowledge must frame problems and provide solutions in ways 
that are actionable and intelligible within a wider discourse, supporting and reinforcing 
powerful dominant ideas in the quest for policy impact (Mosse 2005). This view is clearly in 
tension with the overt discourse of scientific research, which claims science is used to lead 
policy debates, rather than have its research priorities shaped by policy imperatives.  
The conservation workshop I attended in Maputo brought these issues into sharp relief. The 
event revealed significant tensions, misunderstandings and entrenched positions between 
ANAC and the scientific community. Many of my informants complained that they were not 
listened to by the Frelimo government, and claimed to find it hard to shape conservation 
agendas.  In turn, some Frelimo officials reportedly resent the privileged, Western and white 
nature of conservation researchers, and claimed conservationists are overly-focussed on 
frivolous concerns which are of little practical developmental benefit (interview with former 
Frelimo minister, Maputo, 9 May 2014; observations at Conservation Science in 
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Mozambique workshop, April 22-24, Maputo). Much of the conservation science in 
Mozambique is conducted by foreign researchers, funded by donors and conducted within 
high-profile conservation organisations whose conservation priorities reflect international 
concerns. This preoccupation with charismatic species and esoteric ecological questions are 
not necessarily priorities for Frelimo-dominated government departments, reflecting a point 
of fracture in the assemblage. This fault line is important because it produces distinct 
responses among some scientists, pushing several into adopting a strongly normative 
discourse in which conservation science is implicitly linked to a broader agenda of 
transparency, forward thinking and modernity, contrasted against an ‘old’ way of doing 
things by an ‘out-of-date’ Frelimo. This fault line between traditional Frelimo members and 
the scientific community is marked by the reassertion of the principle that science can create 
better policy, thereby addressing the point of fracture without compromising the overall 
commitment to a particular kind of authorised expertise.  
In summing up this section, I note how conservation science in Mozambique is entangled 
with affective relationships and gendered and privileged power relations, and can be 
perceived by Mozambicans as a Western preoccupation from which they are excluded. 
Nevertheless, conservation science in Mozambique is crucial to supporting the assemblage, 
and consequently its centrality is preserved and re-asserted through crisis discourses and 
through claims that education is an essential part of conservation, and through a subtle 
political alignment of the TFCA assemblage with rational and forward thinking discourses. 
This highlights the political role played by experts. I have also highlighted how the more-
than-human subjects of knowledge have themselves co-produced scientific knowledge in an 




This section discusses how the materiality of the reserve necessitates particular forms of 
governance and performances of conservation, drawing on the turtle monitoring programme. 
The programme employs around 70 people on a seasonal basis to patrol the beach, recording 
sightings and nest locations of around 800 turtles per season. The programme is credited 
with reviving the breeding turtle population in Mozambique, and seen as an important 
success story of the PPMR. The reserve has virtually eliminated poaching, down to “the 
excellent protection and patrolling effort in this area” (Videira, Pereira and Louro 2011: 3). 
A monitor described a typical evening’s work as follows: 
We work three or four months at night. [How many turtles we find] depends, we can 
walk and we find three or four. If we find the turtles coming out from the sea to lay 
their eggs…….we must wait until that turtle digs its hole and the time that it is 
starting to lay the eggs inside. We put the red light that [indicates] we can go and 
measure it. If it lays the eggs, we write [that] down. If it’s got a tag we’ll write which 
number plate is for it……. And after that, we wait for the turtles to finish, and then it 
goes back to the sea. And we carry on. So it takes 45 minutes doing that job. So 
sometimes we start work at half past 6, or half past 7, and we come back midnight or 
11. It depends on how busy we were that night (interview with turtle monitor, Ponta 
do Ouro, 5 October 2013). 
 
The programme forms a point of agreement for many actors in the reserve because it is 
successful at reproducing and performing the PPMR’s wider goals and objectives. For 
communities, it can mean the ability to provide a livelihood, thereby uniting conservation 
directly with development goals. A monitor described how “if we get those jobs, we are 
helping for our family…… It’s what mostly we are doing it for” (interview with turtle 
monitor, Ponta do Ouro, 5 October 2013). It also provides a means of reinforcing the 
tourism-based logic of the reserve, linking monitoring and counting is directly to the needs 
and values of Western tourists, reflecting a now-familiar principle of neoliberalised 
conservation in which interactions with charismatic animals become both the purpose and 
the justification for conservation (Duffy 2013).  
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These activities and infrastructures do much more than enact the Management Plan. The 
central conservation goals and attitudes of the PPMR are amplified and spread through the 
monitoring programme. The performance of conservation through the highly visible walking 
tracks of the monitors, and the 4x4 beach patrols of the rangers (shown in figure 5.3) 
demonstrates the reserve in action and performs its values, particularly since the turtle 
monitors and rangers are often well-known in the community. Part of their role is to perform 
the PPMR’s conservation ideals through the process of gathering information.  
Further, the turtle monitor is expected to take the PPMR’s values into the community, 
entrenching the subject position of the person who cares about conservation because it is in 
his or her own economic interest. One monitor explained how patrolling brings him into 
contact with would-be poachers, and this enables him to advocate conservation ideals to his 
fellow community members: 
The problem with that is that people [have for a] long time [said] that it is their meat. 
But now, now they are not allowed to kill [turtles]. So you can tell someone that, no, 
you are not allowed to kill those kind of animals now, but maybe they can’t 
understand…….. he can turn round and say, I have been eating the turtles for [many 
years], so you can’t just come to me and say I can’t kill the turtles. So that’s why we 
are making the patrol (interview with turtle monitor, Ponta do Ouro, 5 October 
2013). 
 
This explanation shows how monitors are involved in the production of what Tsing calls a 
“distinctive cosmopolitanism” (2005: 116) of nature conservation; that is, the reproduction 
of a characteristic set of values and ideas which are recognised globally. Becoming a turtle 
monitor, then, is about much more than counting turtles. It is about becoming part of a wider 
conservation mission, in which the process of producing conservation knowledge is also a 
process of securing and patrolling a particular space, and of performing and disseminating 
particular conservation ideas.  
The personal interactions into which monitors are drawn are also highly political; they 
reinforce and sometimes enforce particular ideas regarding poaching, drawing on the 
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authority and superior knowledge of the reserve. The monitors take globalised ideas about 
anti-poaching and turtle protection to their communities, drawing on and reproducing 
neoliberal conservation subject positions. In this sense, the programme entrenches the 
neoliberal governmentality described in section one, that is, the arrangement of things so that 
rational self-interested actors will act in desired ways. As well as this, the monitoring 
programme also rests on an intriguing logic of harm and care to the turtles, which I now turn 
to discuss in more detail. 
6.4.4.	Rendering	technical:	Managing	the	material	world	through	biopolitics	
Li calls the process of rendering technical “framing the arena of intervention”; that is, the 
“the work that must be done to represent the unruly array of forces and relations…….. as a 
bounded area in which calculated interventions will produce beneficial results” (Li 2007a: 
270). The reserve is constructed as a highly technical intervention characterised by a “faith in 
instrumental manageability to ensure results and effectiveness” (Büscher 2013: 107).  The 
language of ‘balance’, trade-offs’ and ‘management’ featured prominently in conversations 
with reserve management and PPF officials. These concepts purport to represent such 
complex arenas as communities, nature, resource use and the protection of animal life as 
arenas for technical and managerial intervention. At the same time, the PPMR is also a 
“domain of care and reform” (Srinivasan 2014: 502), particularly where non-human life is 
concerned. Along with discourses of rational management, conservation is also concerned 
with trying to direct the flourishing and protection of certain forms of life. This section 
discusses how the ethic of care is rendered compatible with the techno-managerial framing 
of the reserve through highly utilitarian calculations in which emotions are put aside in 
favour of rational discussions of the so-called greater good. Through analysing the 
governmentality of care, we see how the assemblage coheres around conserving and 
protecting life.    
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In her study of turtle protection in Odisha, India, Srinivasan (2014) observes that 
conservation interventions are often directed at the level of the population and habitat rather 
than at the level of individual members of the species. She describes “collective ontologies” 
whereby “populations, species and ecosystems occupy privileged positions and are taken for 
granted as the appropriate locus of concern and care” (Srinivasan 2014: 506). In the PPMR, 
the logic of population drives much of the Management Plan. The key ecological aims of the 
reserve are expressed as: 
Protection and conservation of marine habitats that are representative of the sub-
tropical coastal zone, thereby maintaining biodiversity and ecological functioning, 
including among other coral reefs, sea grass beds, beaches, mangroves, rock 
platforms and intertidal sand flats; Protection and conservation of over-exploited, 
endangered and endemic marine species and their populations, for example breeding 
turtles, bottom fish and dugongs (PPMR 2011: 22). 
 
However, many researchers observed that tourism risks harm to these very ecologies and 
animals. One organisation recorded a 60 per cent drop in interactions between dolphins and 
customers between 2009 and 2013 which they put down to the increased activity from 
tourism before the management began to be properly enforced. A researcher described how 
“the bay is teeming with boats and jet skis …….. so it must be a bit of a nightmare for our 
dolphins that are used to living in the coastal shallows…..they can’t risk being in the areas 
that they used to” (interview with conservation researcher 1, Ponta do Ouro, 16 October 
2013). The Management Plan must therefore balance the needs of conservation against the 
needs of eco-tourists who seek out direct encounters with charismatic animals along with the 
businesses which facilitate these encounters. Understanding conservation as the maintenance 
of representative habitat and species population numbers enables eco-tourism to overlook 
these cases of harm to individuals or small groups of animals. 
Through the use of biopower, defined as power over “life and population” (Foucault [1979] 
2010: 323), the PPMR entangles “harm and care” (Srinivasan 2014: 506) in the ways in 
which it conceptualises the dual goals of conservation and tourism. Harm and care refers to 
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the ways in which individual animals can be subject to harm in the name of the greater good 
of the population. This logic underpins the complex ethical calculations which justify zoos 
keeping one or two members of a species at considerable cost to the captive animals. It also 
supports arguments in favour of sport hunting, which sometimes provides funds to protect 
conservation more generally. In these cases, animals are literally sacrificed for the purported 
greater good of their species. Such calculations appear extraordinary and immoral if applied 
to humans (Singer 1995), yet, they underpin regimes of conservation biopower where some 
animals are allowed to die and some permitted to live as part of a broader series of 
calculations about how to manage life as made up of populations. Despite these 
complications, allowable harm provides a means for the logic of ecotourism to be made 
compatible with the conservation ethic.  
Such calculations can be seen in the PPMR. The reserve’s official programme tolerates 
interventions which cause discomfort to turtles, for example through invasive tagging. 
Although this may cause temporary pain and distress to the animal is considered to be a 
small price to pay in pursuit of overall population well-being. At the same time, overall 
tourism is encouraged, as long as steps are taken to mitigate impacts, such as by preventing 
driving on the beach and minimising lights which confuse turtle seeking a place to lay eggs 
and through managing boat traffic (PPMR 2011). Similar interventions were detailed by 
Srinivasan (2014), showing the remarkable similarity between the PPMR and the Odisha 
turtle programme. Such calculations are also found in the dismissal by the reserve of its 
resident one or two dugongs as irrelevant for conservation purposes as they do not represent 
a viable population. Conservation here is framed as concerned only with the well-being of 
viable populations, with individuals that cannot successfully reproduce being considered 
irrelevant for conservation purposes. While I am not arguing that the measures taken by the 
reserve to minimise harm to animal lives are ineffectual or unimportant, I do highlight how 
the underlying biopolitics of acceptable harm provide a means for the contradictory aims of 
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tourism and protection of vulnerable animals to be rendered compatible. This is important to 
provide insight into how biopower intersects with neoliberal processes.  
The governmentality of harm and care enables the reserve to handle the contradictions which 
are intensified by neoliberal pressures. Under a neoliberal logic, rare creatures and the efforts 
made to restore them to viability are themselves commercial opportunities (Smith 2007). The 
reserve relies on the ideas of mitigating and managing trade-offs to produce a “bandwith of 
the acceptable” (Srinivasan 2014: 507). For example, the potential harm to dolphins caused 
by excessive tourism numbers is managed through permitting only a limited number of 
operators and having them abide by licensing and code of conduct regimes. As discussed 
harm and discomfort may still result from interactions despite the undoubted care and 
attention paid by most operators, yet this is considered to be justifiable when balanced 
against the broader needs of the reserve to attract tourists and the good that may come of 
spreading knowledge about marine mammal welfare. A notable example from fieldwork 
concerned a pair of mating turtles, an occasion obviously encouraged by the population logic 
of the reserve and rarely witnessed by marine tourists. The turtles were disturbed by a 
wildlife photographer who jumped straight in the water to get a close-up shot, to the obvious 
discomfort of other guests (perhaps also inspired by Massey’s image of a macho ocean-going 
conservationist). The disturbance to the animals was justified by the photographer who 
considered that such a rare image, even if it risked resulting in a lack of successful 
reproduction for those particular animals, would have wider benefits in promoting the nature 
tourism of the PPMR, thereby indirectly supporting its conservation goals. 
Calculations of allowable harm also underpin the spatial arrangement of the reserve, 
whereby approximately one third is strictly protected as a sanctuary, and other parts of the 
reserve are dedicated to the intensification of tourist activities. For example, the reserve 
management discussed creating ‘sacrificial reefs’ to deal with the damage caused by scuba 
diving, whereby some areas would be given over completely to the activity in order to 
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protect habitats elsewhere. In debates like these, conservation management becomes an 
active process of intervening, tweaking and managing a complex range of human and non-
human interactions to produce outcomes which contribute the overall flourishing of a 
population or a habitat. Crucially, some harm is tolerated in the pursuit of this overall 
‘balance’.  
As I will expand on shortly, a similar logic of individual sacrifice is also applied to 
communities. The Lubombo Community Development Project Plan (PPF 2013: 15) states 
that the costs and benefits of the PPMR would not necessarily be spread evenly, and that 
“some……initiatives will require individual sacrifice for the benefit of communities”.  For 
example, some communities might be expected to cease agriculture and fishing to promote 
tourism opportunities, and they are also prevented from walking along certain roads and 
tracks to avoid impacting on tourists’ expectation of a pristine national park. The plan also 
states that residents should be restricted to certain areas of the MSR to avoid impacting on 
tourists’ experience. These arguments are justified by conceptualising development as taking 
place at the level of the population; development regimes may be harmful on an individual 
basis, but are in line with wider norms of the ‘greater good’.  
Returning to the concept of the assemblage, this section has shown how the biopolitical 
category of population is crucial to forging agreement around neoliberal interventions. The 
governmentality of harm and care provides a point of agreement in the assemblage for 
reserve management and donors to render complex issues of life and death as a matter of 
technical and rational management, primarily achieved through the ongoing calculation of 
trade-offs between different inputs and outputs. As Srinivasan (2014) notes, this becomes an 
increasingly powerful tool as conservation and development becomes ever-more ambitious 
in its win-win promises. Crucially, the logic of population well-being provides a means for 




There are many competing objectives which the PPMR works to cohere under the win-win 
discourse of neoliberal conservation. One of the most effective ways of doing this is through 
re-posing political questions as technical questions, and where this is not possible, re-
orienting issues into questions which can be addressed through a managerial framing 
(Büscher 2013; Swyngedouw 2010). This section discusses an example from my fieldwork 
where this anti-political strategy was most visible; the issue of planned community evictions 
from the Maputo Special Reserve. This case demonstrates how a difficult and political issue 
is re-framed in terms of technical questions about regulation, management and economics, 
thus making it addressable and intelligible under the TFCA assemblage. 
The Lubombo has a major community development initiative including healthcare, fresh 
water provision and livelihood opportunities. These achievements allow the PPF to claim 
that it is bringing much-needed community development. However, this stands in contrast 
with the planned relocation of several communities from the Maputo Special Reserve. As I 
discussed in chapter four, this is not the first time that communities from the MSR have been 
relocated. Villagers were deposed to live in communal villages under Frelimo’s socialist 
vision, though chose to return as soon as they were able. ICRAN (undated) reports that in 
1984 people from the area were forced by local administration to relocate to land nearer to 
the Maputo River but moved back following flooding (which caused some deaths). The 
current proposed relocations, at time of writing, have no date, and it is not known exactly 
who is scheduled for relocation. In line with the hybrid authority exercised in TFCAs, the 
relocations fall under the remit of the Mozambican government rather than PPMR or MSR 
reserve management. However, relocations are in line with the stated conservation goals of 
the Lubombo, and reserve officials were confident that “there was an agreement with 
communities……. there are a lot of houses built already for the resettlement” (interview with 
211 
 
PPMR official 2, 9 October 2013). The relocations are considered necessary to enable the 
removal of fences between Tembe Elephant Park in South Africa and Mozambique (shown 
in figure 6.2 below), allowing animals to travel up the Futi Corridor and into the Maputo 
Special Reserve. The goal is to “reunite the last naturally occurring coastal elephant 
population in Southern Africa, which historically moved freely along the Futi River and Rio 
Maputo floodplains…[thereby]….. creating a tourism product and benefitting communities” 
(Mr Fernando Sumbana, then-Minister of Tourism of Mozambique quoted in PPF press 
release, 24 June 2011). These animal populations include predators like lions, considered to 
be the main danger in allowing communities to remain.  




The planned relocations are a drastic move, and, if they go ahead may create multiple 
fissures in the assemblage. While reserve officials were keen to present me with interpretive 
community members who welcomed new housing outside of the MSR, I also received 
reports that many villagers were reluctant to move. And, as the history of the region 
demonstrates, people have repeatedly defied forced moves to return again and again to the 
area. The moves thereby risk undermining claims to respect community wishes. Moreover, 
should the relocations become acrimonious, conflict with communities risks contradicting 
the wider goodwill goals of a ‘Peace Park’. Following criticism of community relocations in 
the Mozambican portion of the Great Limpopo TFCA, donors like the World Bank are wary 
of the potential of relocations to cause controversy (interview with World Bank official, 
Maputo, 29 April 2014). There is clearly potential for relocations to cause cracks in the 
assemblage along any or all of these lines.  
How, then, is this controversial aspect dealt with in the logic of the TFCA? The view often 
expressed was that the villagers would be moved ‘for their own good’. The new housing 
would offer better conditions, including much-needed healthcare and other services away 
from the risk of human-wildlife conflict. This view was expressed by reserve official: 
So where will they go, is it up to them [the villagers]? 
No, it’s not up to them. It’s going to be discussed with them, but they are aware that 
one day, they are going to have to move. Most of them, they don’t want to. ……… 
[but] it’s complex. If you go to Mvkuza, there’s nothing there, I don’t know what’s 
the point of keeping those people there…….there’s no schools, no clinics…. The 
land is very poor so you can’t do agriculture, they don’t have land to produce 
vegetables in that area …….So what’s the point to keep these people there living in 
those conditions? If you do the resettlement actually they are going to get a better 
house, they are going to get land as big as they have now…… I really believe that 
for that specific community it’s much better [for them] if they are leaving (interview 
with PPMR official 2, 9 October 2013).  
This extract demonstrates how the debate is being de-politicised.  It describes an anti-
political re-framing of the discussion from one of land rights and consent, which are highly 
political issues to one of utilitarian costs and benefits, which can be technically managed in a 
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way as to produce overall ‘best outcomes’. This reframing is added weight by arguing that it 
is not legally permissible to have permanent infrastructure in a reserve, reinforcing the way 
in which this is being treated as a technical rather than a political affair. By emphasising the 
services that can be provided once the communities are relocated, it becomes possible to 
argue that they are better off regardless of their views about it, as the benefits offered by 
moving are considered to outweigh any desires to stay on land that is meaningful for the 
communities. While claims that communities would be materially better off are held in good 
faith by the reserve management team, this argument necessitates a disregard of values and 
benefits that might be considered unquantifiable or illegible in a trade-off logic, including 
attachment to land. This is only possible once the issues in play have been re-framed into the 
kind of utilitarian calculation permitted by the logic of the collective and the exercise of 
biopower. The passage also demonstrates a key tactic of political communications, namely 
the dilution of opposing views. By highlighting views from younger people who may be in 
favour of leaving, the claims of those who do not wish to leave are obscured and the 
impression of controversy around the plans is reduced.  
In sum, the ways in which the Lubombo manages its communities is deeply ambiguous. On 
the one hand, the reserve provides important services to many people, stepping in for the 
state. But on the other, the TFCA also requires that some communities be removed from the 
tourist gaze. As geographers have highlighted, being obliged to move from one’s home in 
the name of an idealised wilderness or, for that matter, a city is a moral and political injustice 
(Brockington et al. 2008; Lees, Slater and Wyly 2013), and reinforces a wider trend in 
Mozambique whereby community land rights, though formally protected under Mozambican 
law, are de facto being eroded by major developers, industry and the state (Fairbairn 2013; 
Nhantumbo and Salomão 2010). The issue of the possible relocations has thereby revealed a 
gap between the reserve’s claims to community development and the reality for some 
community members. It exposes the tensions between the TFCA’s commitments to peace 
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and community well-being on one hand, and to creating a pristine tourist paradise on the 
other. The anti-political techniques highlighted in this section are therefore vital for holding 
these contradictory elements of the TFCA assemblage together.  
6.4.6.	Dealing	with	dissent:	The	law	and	a	new	Mozambique	
The PPMR assemblage also had to deal with direct contestation from a series of different 
actors. I draw on two examples here: First, its dispute with the National Maritime Institute 
(INAMAR) over licensing, which provides an opportunity to examine how elements in 
Frelimo have resisted the TFCA agenda, and how the reserve has worked to legitimate its 
vision through appealing directly to globalised ideas of liberal governance, in particular, the 
liberal commitment to the rule of law. Second, I discuss the ways in which the reserve team 
deals with poachers and threats of violence against reserve officials, again through appeals to 
the rule of law and discourses of anti-corruption. This commitment plays a central role in 
forging the assemblage, emphasising again the contrast between ideas of a ‘new’ mode of 
political conduct (liberal, transparent, respectful of the law) against an ‘old’ way of doing 
things. This construction of the reserve as representing a new, better way of governing is 
played out through this dispute, and forms a crucial point of agreement for donors and 
reserve management.  
The INAMAR dispute concerns licensing fees from tourists. As I discussed in chapter five, 
one of the key means by which the PPMR contributes to community development is through 
direct donations. 20 per cent of reserve fees are given directly to affected communities for 
them to spend as they wish, making this an important aspect of its claims to bring about 
community development. The incentive system which underpins the PPMR’s approach to 
conservation is directly dependent on being able to raise fees from tourists for activities like 
scuba diving, dolphin safaris and sport fishing. This licensing system replaces an older 
system whereby visitors would buy licenses from the old INAMAR office at the seafront in 
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Ponta do Ouro town with revenues going directly to this government department. This office 
was supposed to stop issuing licenses for tourist activities once the PPMR was proclaimed. 
However, for much of the time while I was on fieldwork, INAMAR persisted with the old 
system in parallel with the new by issuing its own licenses, preventing the reserve from 
recouping some of its rightful revenue. This reduced the amount that the reserve could pay in 
community contributions, a situation which had a negative impact on several communities 
who in some cases had had their fishing rights removed or reduced on the understanding that 
they would receive compensation.   
The problem was framed by the PPMR and PPF as one of legal interpretation. INAMAR has 
formal mandate over licensing and safety surveillance of marine craft and fisheries 
compliance, meaning they felt entitled to continue to license activities like sport fishing. This 
conflicted with the Council of Ministers decree proclaiming the PPMR which transferred 
these rights to the Ministry of Tourism and then to the reserve (PPMR 2009: 3). However, 
INAMAR, it was claimed, did not care about this and was only motivated by money – 
“whoever gets the money in his pocket” (interview with PPF official, 15 October 2013) 
would continue to issue licenses. Eventually, the reserve launched a legal challenge against 
INAMAR and it was agreed that the PPMR (via the Ministry of Tourism) held the authority 
to issue licenses. I was informed that this was largely due to the invocation of the original 
Council of Ministers’ decision which proclaimed the PPMR in the first place. Note the 
appeal to the more powerful actors in the state who were known to favour the TFCA agenda, 
as well as a vindication of the rule of law.  
As a consequence of this dispute, while I was on fieldwork, the reserve management team 
chose not to install signage which would publicly explain the new governance regime as 
expressed in the list of rules, as “[we] are only going to put the signs when [we] can enforce 
it. Otherwise what’s the point?” (interview with conservation scientist 1, 26 October 2013). 
It was essential for the reserve to be able to issue licenses as a means of demonstrating its 
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public authority. Indeed, INAMAR was damaging the reserve’s authority by permitting 
activities such as jet skiing that were now against the reserve’s regulations. The successful 
legal challenge gave the reserve full authority to enforce its wide range of management rules 
and to prevent transgressions, and it was finally willing to display its new signs early 2015, 
as illustrated in figure 6.3. This moment was regarded as a significant victory in the ‘real’ 
establishment of the park, some five years after its proclamation, and, was celebrated by the 
reserve team as a victory for ‘new’ Mozambique’s more sustainable future. 
 
Figure 6.3: New signage in the PPMR (Photo credit: Miguel Gonçalves, January 2015) 
The second example concerns the way in which the reserve management dealt with direct 
transgressions such as poaching, driving on the beach, attempts at bribery from disgruntled 
tourists who wished to continue behaving as they had done in the past in the reserve, and 
more serious violent threats from organised poaching groups. While there is much more I 
could say about these fascinating day-to-day encounters from an anthropological perspective, 
I group them together here to illustrate how they all provided an opportunity for the reserve 
to assert its legitimacy based on its respect for the rule of law, anti-corruption and its legal 
basis. The reserve’s reaction to these encounters fed into the construction of a ‘new’ 
Mozambique. To take one example, a key reserve official often described himself as ‘un-
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corruptible’, and described multiple attempts at bribery and threats from various actors. 
These included South Africans who wished to continue sport fishing and riding jet skis in the 
reserve as had previously been permitted, operators in Mozambique who disagreed with new 
the restrictions placed on them by the reserve, young Mozambicans caught poaching turtles, 
and tourists caught driving on the beach, an activity forbidden under the Management Plan.  
This assertion was essential to mark the reserve team’s approach as distinct, both from 
perceived corrupt political conduct elsewhere in Mozambique, and from what was 
previously permitted in Mozambique, and to demarcate the space of the PPMR as marked by 
a new form of public authority.  
What can these disputes tell us about the PPMR assemblage? First, we see the importance of 
the rule of law in underpinning the reserve, and how this helps some state and NGO agendas 
converge. The disputes compromised the legitimacy of the reserve, and it became essential 
that the PPMR became seen as capable of enforcing its own regulations. INAMAR’s refusal 
to cease the old system was a particularly egregious challenge to its incentive conservation 
model and to the reserve’s public authority. A second observation is the fragility of the 
incentive model of conservation. In contrast to ideas that communities would ‘naturally’ 
move towards behaviours that might be in their economic self-interest, significant 
intervention and management was needed to defend the reserve’s regime, demonstrating the 
importance of continued intervention and activity to incalculate certain norms and bring 
about certain behaviours. This constant reassertion of the reserve’s legal and ideological 
basis is the absolute opposite of a laissez-faire process (Foucault [1979] 2010). On the 
contrary, creating a system whereby individuals are motivated to protect the environment by 
financial incentives involves extensive and ongoing intervention, underpinned by principles 
of control over space and private property rights and supported by global liberal ideas about 





This chapter has focussed on the ways in which the reserve is made to cohere through a 
governmentality based on the ‘will to conserve’. This has been mostly successful in drawing 
different actors together and uniting them around a consensus-based model which 
emphasises incentives for conservation. The role of the reserve is to manage this process 
through a series of technical and managerial interventions. Neoliberal processes thus take 
hold through the extension and intensification of market relationships, in this case, into 
nature preservation and development, along with novel ways of conceptualising and doing 
politics through the use of neoliberal governentality. The donor, state and conservation 
actors cohere around these ideas to a remarkable degree, and they form a central point of 
coherence for the reserve. The neoliberal framing of costs and benefits lent itself particularly 
well to this process, providing a key point of convergence for different actors and thus 
helping to hold the elements of the assemblage together. This contributes to an 
understanding of neoliberalism as a process which emerges through the actions of situated 
subjects within a particular political economy.  
However, the analytic of assemblage also exposes the hard work that is necessary to 
maintain the TFCA as a coherent idea in the face of contestation and tension (Li 2007a). 
During my fieldwork, I saw how the ongoing use of techniques including consultation, 
rendering technical, anti-politics and appeals to expertise were used to pull the reserve 
together, and to create it as a “technical field fit to be governed and improved” (Li 2007a: 
286) in the face of unruly material politics caused by the particular challenges of governing a 
fluid and changeable space. I also saw how the reserve tolerates ambiguity within its day-to-
day governance; the neoliberal consensus model does not operate to the hegemonic degree as 
suggested by other accounts of Peace Parks in southern Africa. An important example of this 
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is the contradictory message around community relocations. While I was assured that the 
plan was to eventually relocate some villagers, I also witnessed the extent of care that has 
gone into ensuring they receive substantial and much-needed medical and educational 
services from the reserve. This highlights the ways in which contradictory ideas can be held 
in tension, while still enabling the overall coherence of the assemblage.  
This chapter has sought to incorporate an analysis of biopower as an important means of 
governing life in the reserve. Biopower plays a central role in transitioning questions about 
land tenure, subsistence and historic-cultural claims of a marginal population, and the 
historic reproductive sites of turtles into questions about “balanced resource development” 
(Sachs 2009: 33). It suits a complex techno-managerial assemblage like the PPMR because it 
permits detraction from questions of the ethical treatment of individuals and redirects 
management interventions towards the level of the population, the community or the species. 
This enables the kinds of ambiguous interventionism required by neoliberal conservation 
while still supporting its claims to be pursuing ethical outcomes. The PPMR’s turtle 
monitoring programme demonstrates how biopower is used to resolve tensions in the 
Management Plan between the ethics of care and protection required by conservation, and 
the need to exploit the reserve to attract tourists and gain revenue. Biopower also is deployed 
to resolve the tension between caring for and developing communities, and the harm that is 
sometimes considered necessary to bring about the so-called ‘greater good’. Srinivasan 
(2014) suggests that biopower emerges precisely in response to these deep tensions. It 
provides an important means of reconciling the contradictory ethics of harm and care which 
are particularly evident as neoliberal conservation makes ever-grander promises to protect 
nature while providing political, development and economic gains.  
The changes that the PPMR aims to bring about are certainly not easy, and reserve officials 
often found themselves pulled in multiple directions through the demands of donors, tourists, 
businesses and government, while trying to maintain their central ethic of conservation. 
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Conservation areas can thus be seen as dynamic spaces of social change where actors work 
to bring about new nature-society relationships and ethics of care (Srinivasan 2014). While 
these desired changes are often motivated by a deep concern to protect ecologies and 
improve the lives of animals, they are also entangled with processes of capitalism, 
imaginaries of nature, particular ontologies of science, and are overlaid onto historic social 
arrangements and structured inequality (demonstrated here by the repeated ways in which 
MSR villagers have been moved under various regimes). They cannot be imposed onto an 
idealised beneficiary (whether conceived as nature that needs restoring to a pre-development 
state, or a community that can be constructed as an archetypal incentive-motivated subject) 
without causing tension and disruption. Consequently, while conservation areas are 
conceived as sites of progress and improvement by their proponents, they are also often sites 
of contestation. This chapter has thereby shown how conservation in the neoliberal era is 
concerned with obscuring this gap between discourse and reality through a number of 
remarkably powerful techniques which, for now, hold a fractured and contradictory 
assemblage together.  
As the PPMR compresses multiple issues into a single plan and attempts to deal with 
complex political issues through technical interventions and consensus-based discourses, it 
therefore becomes increasingly important to highlight the actual material consequences 
(Büscher 2013). This is at the heart of the political ecology approach to conservation. 
Consequently, the potential relocation of communities from the MSR to facilitate the 
idealised land and marine tourist experience of the TFCA, and the complex entanglements of 
harm and care highlighted are deliberately framed in this chapter in political and ethical 
terms. The ‘win-win’ framing and biopolitical utilitarian ethic disguises these important 
questions about how the costs and benefits of the PPMR will be distributed, and the basis on 
which these costs are decided. Addressing these questions directly allows us to consider the 
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fragility of the socio-technical assemblage of TFCAs, and how conservation might be 
conducted in alternative ways.  
The ability of the PPMR to hold contradictory ideas in tension speaks to the ambiguous way 
in which neoliberal processes take hold. Büscher (2013: 207) suggests that this ability to 
exploit the gap between the idealised representation and the complex reality is at the heart of 
what he calls “the bubble of neoliberal conservation”. The obfuscation of difficult and 
contradictory outcomes is not the end point and the purpose of the TFCA assemblage; it is in 
fact its primary mode of operation and the source of its strength. The win-win rhetoric 
enables the multiple actors to claim that conservation is legitimate and beneficial, and 
maintains the ‘future positive’ orientation of development and conservation policy vital to 
making the assemblage cohere (Mosse 2005). Extending this observation beyond the PPMR, 
we see how conservation is increasingly conducted through neoliberal norms characterised 
by a consensus-based discourse and the dominance of market-based regulatory restructuring. 
The case of the PPMR thus exposes the dialectic at the centre of neoliberal processes; it 
seeks to capitalise on new frontiers even as it stimulates and exacerbates contradictions.  
The next chapter takes up this question of capital frontiers directly. It builds on the 
arguments of chapter five which showed how the PPF and World Bank took advantage of the 
fragmented state and non-state authority produced by Mozambique’s post-conflict political 
economy to forge the PPMR as part of a trans-frontier conservation construct, and this 
chapter, which has explored the contradictory realities of neoliberal conservation in action. 
In chapter seven, I go beyond the borders of the PPMR to consider how conservation is 
entangled in the deepening contradictions in Mozambique’s political economy; that of its 









Get ready for the Fourth Way! (Peck 2010: 108) 
 
7.1.	Introduction	
This chapter further explores the relationship between neoliberal capitalism and nature. It 
discusses what it takes to construct nature as a resource and make it investible in a changing 
neoliberal context which may constitute, as Peck predicts above, a new ‘fourth way’ of 
neoliberalism to deal with contradictions of previous iterations. In chapter five, I set out how 
the PPMR represents the material manifestation of a particular ideology which aims to deal 
with complex and historical-contextual specific questions of post-conflict development and 
ecological change through a ‘win-win’ rhetoric of economic growth, political co-operation 
and cross-border ecological restoration. In chapter six, I highlighted how neoliberalism can 
also be seen as a form of governmentality aimed at organising social, material and non-
human life, and highlighted the contradictions as processes of neoliberalisation entangle with 
life in the reserve. Now, I turn to examine neoliberal capitalism and nature through looking 
more widely at Mozambique’s contemporary political economy. In particular, I examine the 
co-occurrence of conservation and extraction and the increasing focus on green economy 
discourses, policies and projects. While the PPMR still provides an important lens through 
which to analyse this relationship, I also extend my discussion to consider national debates 
and examples of development from across the country.  
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When I conducted my first fieldwork session in October and November 2013, Mozambique 
had just emerged as one of Africa’s “rising green economy stars” (Nhamo 2013: 124). Just 
over a year previously it had launched its Green Economy Roadmap at Rio20+, declaring the 
green economy represents “the future that we, Mozambicans, want [and] the future that the 
rest of humanity dreams about” (President of the Republic of Mozambique, Armando Emílio 
Guebuza, quoted in WWF press release, June 2012). By the time of my second field trip in 
March 2014, Mozambique had produced a more detailed Green Economy Action Plan 2012-
2013 and had conducted a green economy workshop in November 2013, hosted by 
government departments and attended by major donors including the Ministry of 
Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA) and the Ministry of Development Planning 
funded by the Dutch Government and attended by donors including the United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), 
WWF and the African Development Bank (AfDB). These actors began to assemble around 
the green economy theme, and in April 2014 I interviewed officials from Mozambique’s new 
conservation endowment, Biofund, along with several donors. These interviews confirmed 
the growing emphasis on the green economy discourse in environment-development donor 
and policy elite circles which has continued apace since the end of my field research.  
Mozambique has also been intensifying its extractives-led and industrial development. Gas, 
coal, industrial fishing and agriculture, and other mega-projects are booming across the 
country and increasingly these projects are coming up against conservation. Mozambique’s 
major natural gas fields in Cabo Delgado coastal waters lie largely within WWF’s Rovuma 
Basin Bioreserve. In Niassa National Reserve, also in Cabo Delgado, there are rumours of an 
alteration to the reserve’s boundary in order to permit gemstone mining, which may in turn 
be used to subsidise conservation. In the PPMR, there has for several years been the on-and-
off threat of a deep water coal port at Ponta Techobanine, with obvious ecological 
consequences for the marine reserve. Mozambique’s current development is characterised on 
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one hand by an extractive resources boom accompanied by increasing concern around 
political mismanagement, appropriation of land for industrial and agricultural mega-projects 
and lack of broad-based development (as discussed in chapter four), while on the other, it is 
developing a green economy and focusing more intently on biodiversity conservation.  
The objective of this chapter is to understand the co-emergence of these two apparently 
opposing trends, which are replicated in several other African states and beyond. For 
example, South Africa has committed to becoming a low carbon economy under CoP 21 
whilst also expanding its globally-significant mining industry, Botswana is expanding 
extraction of shale gas in the Kalahari Karoo while gearing up its green development 
strategies and has recently attracted controversy for selling shale gas rights for within its 
Kgalagadi Trans-frontier Park to UK company Karoo Gas, while Kenya is adopting green 
growth principles in its climate change and national development policies while also 
pursuing extractives opportunities such as a major crude oil pipeline (Business Daily Africa 
May 2016; EN 2012; Guardian December 2015).  Bebbington and Bebbington (2016) 
highlight conflicts caused by extractives-led development against social and ecological 
pressures in Bolivia, Ecuador and Peru, while Arsel and Dasgupta (2013) describe how 
China is grappling with legitimacy crises caused by extractive and uneven development and 
ecological depletion by explicitly engaging with questions of environmentalism, broad-based 
development and sustainability imperatives. 
The co-production of extractive industrial development and conservation provides an 
opportunity to consider the ways in which questions of nature, development and 
conservation are framed and debated as neoliberal processes intensify. This goes right to the 
heart of contradictions of neoliberal capitalism; the unsustainability of the growth imperative 
based on depletion and degradation of the ecological resource base (Kovel 2007; Moore 
2015a; O’Connor 1991), and allows us to consider more closely the questions asked by 
Bakker (2009, 2010) and Castree (2008a, 2008b), particularly, what precisely is new about 
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the neoliberalisation of nature and what ‘natures’ and what techniques of neoliberalisation 
are involved? Drawing on examples from the PPMR and from Mozambique more broadly, 
this chapter considers how is Mozambique’s conservation sector is currently responding to 
the intensification of extraction, and the new discourses, policies and institutions that are 
being created. While I acknowledge that uses of land and natural resources for accumulation 
purposes have long been related to conservation (for example, Neumann 2003 describes how 
the setting aside of land for the Serengeti National Park in Tanzania in the 1920s was 
intimately related to the need to create other land as agricultural resource), I am interested 
here in the contemporary relationship between extractives-led growth and recent 
developments in conservation policy and practice. The chapter sets out how the rise of the 
green economy is linked with Mozambique’s post-colonial political economy, and explores 
how green economy ideas are mobilised. Exploring these contemporary trends in 
Mozambique can contribute to an understanding of the historical co-production of 
neoliberalism and nature.  
The chapter engages with these debates by first discussing the various definitions of the 
green economy and its emergence in international development discourses. I then explore 
questions related to crisis, capitalism and so-called green development in a theoretical 
discussion, before setting out the discursive, institutional and regulatory construction of 
Mozambique’s emerging green economy. I contrast its ‘win-win’ rhetoric with early 
indications of uneven development, dilemmas and political trade-offs, and then reflect on 
what this juncture in Mozambique’s development can tell us about the current neoliberal 
project and current imaginaries of modernity in Mozambique’s ‘fourth way’. The key 
argument put forward in this chapter is that the rollout of Mozambique’s green economy is 
targeted at ameliorating the extractives industry, suggesting a close and material relationship 
between the two sectors. This adds to current understandings of neoliberal nature processes 
by demonstrating a particular example of how the green economy is intended to directly 
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mitigate (and, argues Klein 2013, to obscure and disguise) the ecological and social 
contradictions of capitalist accumulation (Büscher and Fletcher 2015). However, I also show 
how Mozambique’s green economy has distinctly Mozambican flavours, being also rooted in 
the post-war elite status quo between powerful state factions and donors. This shows how the 
green economy is not only an ecological fix to permit the further neoliberalisation of nature 
and must also be read in the context of Mozambique’s historically-specific visions of 
modernity and current political economy.   
7.2.	The	green	(and	blue)	economy	in	Africa	
There are several definitions of the green economy of relevance to developing countries. The 
United Nations Environment Program (the UNEP) report Towards a Green Economy: 
Pathways to Sustainable Development and Poverty Eradication contains the most 
commonly-cited definition, as follows (UNEP 2011: 1): 
[The green economy] results in improved human well-being and social equity, while 
significantly reducing environmental risks and ecological scarcities. In its simplest 
expression, a green economy can be thought of as one which is low carbon, resource 
efficient and socially inclusive. In a green economy, growth in income and 
employment should be driven by public and private investments that reduce carbon 
emissions and pollution, enhance energy and resource efficiency, and prevent the 
loss of biodiversity and ecosystem services. 
 
The Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD 2011: 9) notes that 
“green growth means fostering economic growth and development while ensuring that 
natural assets continue to provide the resources and environmental services on which our 
well-being relies”. It is worth noting here that ‘growth’ is a central concept in this definition, 
focussing attention already onto how green economic discourses are about the active 
production of opportunities for capitalist accumulation. Similarly, the World Bank suggests 
that “green growth is about making growth processes resource-efficient, cleaner and more 
resilient without necessarily slowing them” (Hallegatte et al. 2011, cited in Resnick, Tarp 
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and Thurlow 2012: 217), emphasising views expressed in sustainability discourses that 
economic growth is compatible with progressive and environmentally sound development 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987). WWF acknowledges that the 
green economy “can mean different things in different contexts to different people” 
(Wreford 2012: 24). However, the organisation also claims that green economies “improve 
people’s wellbeing, and restore, maintain and enhance the healthy natural environment that 
people and other species need to survive and thrive” (ibid). The Green Economy Coalition 
states that “our vision is one of a resilient economy that provides a better quality of life for 
all within the ecological limits of the planet” (submission to the United Nations Conference 
on Sustainable Development draft text, cited in Wreford 2012: 24). These definitions all 
invoke a by-now-familiar ‘win-win’ between economic development and positive 
environmental outcomes. 
The marine environment has also been brought within the green economy rubric, sometimes 
labelled the blue economy17 or blue growth. The concept is defined by WWF as “the use of 
the sea and its resources for sustainable economic development” (WWF 2015b: 2). Though 
this term is less widely adopted in the environment-development literature, WWF has 
attempted to lead the development of the blue economy and has recently published its 
Principles for a Sustainable Blue Economy (WWF 2015b). These principles frame the ocean 
primarily as resource, pointing out the role of the marine environment in food security and 
livelihoods. Oceans are also brought into the energy debate, as demands for renewable 
energy from off-shore wind increase, and the ocean’s role in cultural heritage is also briefly 
mentioned. In line with the green economy, the plan calls for a natural capital accounting 
approach to bring oceans to the attention of policy makers and governments. In 
                                                      
17 Not to be confused with the Blue Economy open source South-South development movement. 
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Mozambique, the blue economy has received less attention as a separately branded issue, but 
marine natures are prominent in its green economy planning, including marine fishing, 
habitat protection and conservation, marine eco-tourism, renewable energy and marine gas 
extraction (Government of Mozambique 2012; WWF Mozambique 2013, 2015b).  In 
addition, donors and NGOs have recently become interested in blue carbon planning, which 
aims to value, conserve and sustainably use marine ecosystems which are known to be stores 
of carbon such as mangroves, and thereby secure payments for ecosystem services (Herr, 
Pidgeon and Laffoley 2011). In Mozambique, the IUCN and Cordia (a marine research 
NGO) have recently conducted a marine ecosystem service valuation survey in the 
Mozambique Channel in the north of the country, concluding that Mozambique’s third 
largest mangrove forest in Africa should be valued and protected as a primary national asset 
(Nunes and Ghermandi 2015). In sum, reflecting the swift rise of the green economy, blue 
economy concerns are also growing in Mozambique, driven by key donors like WWF. 
However, the green economy does not simply repackage sustainable development ideas. 
Dealing with environmental change and addressing past mistakes of resource degradation 
and pollution is said to require a new way of thinking, new economic opportunities, and new 
products and services and markets. New techniques and policies are considered necessary to 
address, and then exploit, previous crises in earlier forms of neoliberalism (Bakker 2010; 
Peck 2010). The key hoped-for corrective at the heart of green economy thinking is to make 
preserving rather than degrading nature valuable within the capitalist system. Capital 
investment can turn away from fossil fuel extraction and towards conservation-based 
tourism; from unsustainable forestry towards bioprospecting and payments for ecosystem 
services.  It is important to note that the green economy is also targeted at the social 
legitimacy crisis of neoliberal capitalism by promising rapid growth for developing 
countries, thereby emphasising the importance of social equity and a broad understanding of 
growth to take into account social equity and human wellbeing. 
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The shift implied by the green economy relies on new forms of knowledge which seek to 
quantify earth’s resources through concepts of ecosystem services and natural capital. 
Though these concepts are related, and slippage between them often occurs in green 
economy discourse, they are distinct. Natural capital refers to the stock or assets, while 
ecosystem services are the benefits, or goods and services that are provided by this stock. 
Ecosystem services extends the notion that nature is valuable for its extractable commodities 
alone (like gemstones, oil or timber) to include non-extractable functions like climate and 
temperature regulation from the atmosphere, water provision from reservoirs and 
watersheds, storm protection and flood control from vegetation, pollination of crops from 
insects, and cultural, recreational, spiritual and social services including eco-tourism, 
outdoor pursuits, scientific research and aesthetic appreciation (De Groot, Wilson and 
Boumans 2002).  The language of natural capital deliberately borrows terms from financial 
accounting and investment banking to communicate its central concept that nature provides 
the basis on which social and economic activities depend, and as such, its value needs to be 
properly described and accounted for. Only then, its supporters claim, can meaningful steps 
be taken to mitigate environmental damage and protect ecosystems as the basis on which 
future profitability depends. Managing nature through conceptualising it as a capital asset 
has important pragmatic appeal; in a world where power is held by governments and 
corporations primarily driven by the so-called ‘bottom line’, natural capital thinking is seen 
as a means of making nature visible and making it matter. In a short space of time, the idea 
of natural capital has become the dominant narrative in global environmental policy circles, 
framed as a pragmatic response to ecological crisis and a means of making ecologies and 
environments legible and appealing to politicians, the private sector and the general public 
(UNEP 2011).  
The green economy is being formulated in Africa-specific ways. While the definitions 
discussed above imply that a green economy is an end result, the African Development 
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Bank’s (AfDB) definition implies a process by which development policies and projects are 
re-orientated. The AfDB (2015: 5) defines the green economy as about “pursuing inclusive 
economic growth through policies, programmes and projects that invest in sustainable 
infrastructure, better manage natural resources, build resilience to natural disasters and 
enhance food security”.  This definition emphasises issues of relevance to Africa (as 
understood by the AfDB and other development bodies). The emphasis on inclusive growth 
echoes earlier calls from the South to ensure an even share in global wealth. While the focus 
on issues of natural disasters and food is understandable considering the challenges faced by 
the continent, the AfDB here echoes the technocratic framing of issues of climate and food 
crises which dominate development. Nhamo (2013) puts forward three key components to 
make green economy visions meaningful as a development strategy in an African context, 
arguing that the green economy must bring about development benefits in contexts where 
countries are pursuing economic growth above all else, must be funded and supported 
externally (also Resnick et al. 2012), and  must emphasise climate change adaptation aspects. 
So while the green economy clearly reflects historic development agendas of poverty 
reduction, job creation, equity and liberalisation, as well as a technocratic mainstream 
development framing, it is also providing new means for African bodies to articulate 
development visions. 
Green development ideas are producing a wide variety of novel engagements with 
developing countries such as biodiversity offsetting, ecotourism, payments for ecosystem 
services, biodiversity conservation and carbon sequestration. Examples include the 
production of biofuels across southern and Eastern Africa, including Mozambique (Resnick 
et al. 2012, Smith 2010), payments for ecosystem services in Costa Rica (Matulis 2013), 
economic development through new conservation prospects in southern Africa (Büscher 
2013) and bio-prospecting for genetic material in Madagascar (Neimark 2012). Of all of 
these interventions, conservation in particular is seen as an important way in which new 
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‘green’ products and services can be developed (Büscher et al. 2012; Brockington and Duffy 
2010; Brockington et al. 2008; Duffy 2010, Neves 2010). In addition, new relationships are 
being forged through these activities between major corporations, donors and major 
international NGOs such as WWF and the IUCN (Igoe et al. 2011). Büscher and Fletcher 
(2015) discuss the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), a 
coalition of major corporations such as Rio Tinto and Shell which is increasingly working 
alongside the IUCN to produce green economy ideas and projects. It calls for “a new agenda 
for business leaders” (WBCSD 2010: ii, cited in Büscher and Fletcher 2015: 280) in which 
they will gain from green economy innovations. Examples such as these are notable because 
they provide evidence for a transnational elite class, often with corporate interest in 
extraction and pollution, which is currently focussing on producing the green economy. Most 
interestingly, this business audience would not ordinarily be aligned with the goals of the 
WWF or the IUCN in the minds of the public, but, as we saw with the Peace Parks 
Foundation’s Club 21 (the US $1 million donors discussed in chapter four) such alignments 
form a way for corporations to claim intellectual leadership in the formation of environment 
and conservation policy. The key difference between the logic of the WBCSD and Club 21 is 
that the WBCSD is actively seeking new ways of financialising and then profiting from the 
opportunities presented by saving a degraded nature, while Club 21 offers its members the 
chance to bolster their reputation through donations to a conservation cause. This subtle 
difference between these two examples illustrates the central innovation of the green 
economy. 
With this in mind, the green economy is often understood as a neoliberal project, a green 
‘fourth way’ which combines the roll-back and ameliorative tendencies of the ‘third way’ 
with a new wave of accumulation based on the intensified capitalisation and financialisation 
of nature. As seen already in this thesis, this is the idea that nature appropriation must serve 
commercial purposes and ecological goals; indeed, it is only through commercial 
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relationships and practices that nature will be saved. Under this reading, the green economy 
becomes defined as “the non-material use of nature into capital that can simultaneously 
‘save’ the environment and establish long-term modes of capital accumulation” (Büscher and 
Fletcher 2015: 270). Its insistence that natural capital first be measured, then economically 
internalised through “the use of market-based instruments [and] the creation of markets” 
(UNEP 2011: 19) reflects neoliberal ideology. It also reproduces the apolitical pretences of 
neoliberalism, claiming that it “does not favour one political perspective over another” 
(UNEP 2011: 7) while at the same time promoting particular framings of resources and 
access that will undoubtedly create winners and losers as green economic strategies are 
realised (Arsel and Büscher 2012). Its promise of growth plus thriving ecologies amplifies 
earlier promise that economic growth need not be sacrificed provided it takes place 
‘sustainably’. It also has paternalistic tones, characterised by Resnick et al. (2012) as  just the 
latest in a long history of policy prescriptions for improvement issued by the North to the 
South (although this can be complicated by acknowledging the ways in which the discourse 
is reinterpreted and put to use in an African context). 
However, the green economy also represents a departure from ‘business as usual’ capitalism 
(Wanner 2015). It acknowledges that continued neoliberal growth has been responsible for 
ecological crises, and some of its proponents urge a change in economic doctrine as a 
consequence. The UNEP (2011: 1) even states that "unfettered markets are not meant to 
solve social problems”; instead, the state is supposed to actively intervene by producing 
policy, jobs and money.  The green economy can clearly accommodate a broad range of 
capitalist ideas, though it is not necessarily uniform or cohesive. While it continues to 
position economic growth through managed capitalism as the central mechanism by which 
development can be achieved, as we will see, it also requires large-scale government and 
private investment into projects and infrastructure, which is not in keeping with the historical 
rhetoric of small-government, free-market neoliberalisation outlined in chapter two. This 
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question as to whether the green economy signals an intensification of, or a significant 
change to neoliberal doctrine is thereby an important, yet currently open and unresolved 
question, which I discuss further in this chapter. 
In sum, the green economy is underpinned by similar ecological modernisation idea as 
earlier iterations of ‘sustainable development’. These include the position that economic 
development and ecological sustainability can be rendered compatible through new policy 
making principles aimed at integrating environmental concerns, use of technology, the 
involvement of the private sector and nature reconceptualised as an ecosystem service 
(Davidson 2012). At the same time, the green economy also encompasses novel dynamics in 
ecological governance, institutions and regulations, new relationships between NGOs and 
major corporations, new discourses, along with new ‘green’ products, services and practices. 
Under the green economy, the protection of nature requires the expansion of capitalism, but 
according to some proponents, it also seeks to reshape, limit and redirect its forces. This 
necessitates further exploration of why the discourse has emerged at a time of intensifying 
crises in of both ecologies and capitalism, to which I now turn. 
7.3.	Capitalism,	crises	and	the	green	economy		
Moore (2015a) presents capitalism as a cyclical process whereby nature is understood as a 
resource and a commodity to be mastered. Periods of stable accumulation, when capitalism 
expands to appropriate untapped resources, are followed by crisis, when these sources of 
nature become less and less valuable, prompting the seeking and exploitation of novel 
frontiers (see also Harvey 2010). This reassertion phase involves the new capitalist 
hegemonic power taking steps to deal with the contradictions of the foregoing phase and 
exploit the opportunities presented. For Moore (2015a: 304), capitalism has adopted a 
“cheap nature strategy aimed at appropriating the biological capacities and geological 
distributions of the earth in an effort to reduce the value composition of production, thereby 
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checking the tendency towards a falling rate of profit”. In other words, it is dependent on the 
exploitation of ‘cheap nature’ which was secured historically through the appropriation of 
labour, land and nature through agriculture and colonial trade in raw materials. We might 
also insert here the historical enclosure of nature through conservation processes such as 
early national parks which secured natural resources for colonial governments and company 
institutions such as in Mozambique (Mondlane 1969). Most recently, this dynamic has been 
expressed through developments in technology, and in the financialisation and capitalisation 
of novel forms of nature such as the use of agrochemicals to produce cheap food from 
increasingly denuded soils. While scholars have long highlighted the instability caused by 
the finiteness of ecological resources and the contradictory drive for ever-greater 
accumulation (O’Connor 1991), they have recently began to focus on what this crisis 
tendency means for the future of capitalism. Are we seeing the “end of cheap nature” (Moore 
2015a: 247), and thereby the end of capitalism itself, as Moore (2015a: 305) speculates when 
he argues that “[t]he shift towards financialisation….. has been a powerful way of 
postponing the inevitable blowback. It has allowed capitalism to survive. But for how long”? 
This analysis speculates that current multiple crises are signalling the terminal demise of 
capitalism based on a collapse of the capacity of nature to allow a surplus and thereby permit 
capital accumulation.  
An alternative view is offered by scholars who posit a new phase of accumulation through 
the financialisation of a degraded nature, in which neoliberal developments like eco-tourism, 
payments for ecosystem services, biodiversity offsetting, carbon markets and biodiversity 
banking take centre stage (Apostolopoulou and Adams 2015; Büscher and Fletcher 2105). 
This perspective argues that Moore’s account fails to give proper regard to a new phase in 
capitalism’s development whereby conservation, protection and preservation of the 
dwindling and degrading resource base presents new opportunities. In other words, the 
financialisation of nature signals not an end-phase, but rather takes centre stage as the 
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primary means by which value can be extracted from nature-capitalist relations. This is 
conceived as attempts to fix the fundamental contradiction produced by extractive capitalism 
by “combin[ing] the preservation of nature as a resource for future capital accumulation with 
the exploitation to support current accumulation” (Apostolopoulou and Adams 2015:18).  
This argument can be summed up as stating that there is a qualitatively novel phase of global 
neoliberal capitalism which deals with contradictions by capitalising nature through re-
allocating value away from ecologically damaging forms of growth towards solving 
ecological problems. As discussed in chapter two, these products are not yet producing a 
hugely profitable new wave of accumulation, and often have other ideological and 
performative goals. In short, the green economy is an attempt (though not necessarily a 
highly lucrative one) to transform crises in nature into new opportunities for capitalist 
expansion. 
To summarise so far, the multiple crises caused by waste, pollution and degradation of the 
natural resource base are surely profound crises for neoliberal capitalism. The debate is 
whether their presence signals an end to the latest historical round of accumulation, or an 
opportunity for a novel round of accumulation based on new techniques of neoliberal nature. 
Mozambique’s green economy provides an opportunity to consider this question. To do so, I 
also need to discuss the question of ‘ecological fixes’ (Bakker 2004), that is, the means 
through which negative externalities, such as pollution, are dealt with in regimes of 
accumulation. Whether or not they signal the end of capitalism’s cheap nature strategy, these 
externalities are certainly becoming ever-increasing opportunities for an increasing variety of 
novel accumulation strategies, e.g. pollution credits trading and biodiversity offsetting for 
pollution permits (Büscher and Fletcher 2015; Smith 2007). The green economy can be 
conceptualised as an ecological fix where capital actors find new ways to profit from 
environmental degradation, and where “state bodies us[e] neoliberal environmental measures 
to solve problems arising within the state apparatus or the wider economy and society'' 
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(Castree 2008a: 146). Under this analysis, Mozambique’s green economy is understood as 
the state plus capital actors seeking novel opportunities from degradation while also aiming 
to address under-development and to improve the public’s perception of the licence to 
operate of the extractive sector.  Under this theory, the green economy is driven by ‘rational’ 
motivations of maximising profit while dealing with tensions (Bakker 2009). 
As this chapter explores, this conceptualisation has significant explanatory power in the case 
of Mozambique. However, there are two related critiques of this picture. First, as Bakker 
(2009) observes, the neoliberalisation of nature is not a straightforward economic process, 
and “[t]he diverse (and often competing) logics at play when the market encroaches upon 
new socionatural frontiers are simply ignored” (Bakker 2009: 1783). Non-capitalist ideas 
and processes sit alongside capitalist ideas in Mozambique and elsewhere (Mitchell 2002), 
leading to the need for clarity as to what is and is not an example of the neoliberalisation of 
nature. As Bakker (2009: 1783) puts it, there are a “broad array of goals - political, social, 
cultural, and environmental - which both drive and mediate the neoliberalisation of 
nature………which often have a tangential and uneasy relationship with neoliberal projects” 
and which may “extend well beyond mere profit maximization or mediation of tensions 
within a regime of accumulation”. Second, the green economy is rooted in a continuation of 
dynamics of colonialism, development and sustainable use which have long been central to 
the capitalist modes of production (Peluso 2012), and which have often had limited success 
in mitigating the excesses of extractive capitalism.  These critiques draw my attention to how 
Mozambique’s green economy shares characteristics with post-independence ideas of 
development through large-scale state modernisation projects which do not cleanly fit the 
characteristics of neoliberalisation. 
To summarise, the green economy can be conceptualised as an ecological fix to solve 
intensifying crises in the depletion of the natural resource base while permitting the growth 
of extractive capitalism. It intensifies techniques of the financialisation of nature, which for 
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some indicate the exhaustion of capitalism’s tactics to perpetuate the historical pattern of 
accumulation and crisis resolution, while for others it signals a novel round of accumulation 
based on new techniques of neoliberal nature. The green economy must also be placed in 
historical context as the latest iteration of ecological modernisation, and, it sits alongside 
other development strategies and visions in Mozambique. This debate is important as green 
economy discourses replace sustainable development in business and donor circles, even as 
crises accelerate globally (Brand 2009). The chapter therefore reflects on the current nature 
of neoliberalism as a social and environmental programme through analysing a concrete 
example of a green economy in production. The issues discussed in this section are thrown 
into sharp relief by Mozambique’s current incarnation as important new conservation 
opportunity and exciting commodity frontier, which I now turn to discuss. 
7.4.	Mozambique’s	green	economy	
This section directly addresses how Mozambique’s conservation sector is responding to the 
intensification of extraction. It details relationships that created and launched Mozambique’s 
green economy, and outlines the policies and institutions that are being created.  
7.4.1.	Forging	strategies	and	alignments:	The	Government	of	Mozambique,	
the	UNEP	and	WWF	Mozambique		
Mozambique’s green economy was launched at Rio 2012, but it is necessary to go back 
several years to understand its emergence. As chapter four demonstrated, since the end of the 
conflict in 1992 international NGOs and donors have been highly influential in Mozambique, 
providing the government with resources, policy and funding, and continuing to place key 
personnel into government departments. This period began the discursive construction of 
Mozambique as a conservation opportunity. The idea of Mozambique as a post-conflict 
arena in need of huge restoration back to an idealised former glory which motivates many 
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conservation parks is important (Walker 2015). However, I highlight in this section the 
different idea of Mozambique as an area of pristine rich biodiversity which needs a new 
response to an intensifying growth in industrial development. This response, it is argued, 
involves both protecting nature from development, but, crucially, also finding ways to 
benefit from it (World Bank interview, Maputo, April 2014, WWF 2013). Mozambique’s 
lack of capacity in environmental governance created a vacuum where policy can be created 
very quickly, and where influence within government has been easily secured by large 
international donors and NGOs. This scenario reflects what Jessop (2008: 193) calls “fast 
policy”; that is, policy which is made under a dynamic of rapid experimentation involving a 
narrow range of stakeholders. Such a dynamic of experimentation and reduced attention to 
process enabled large NGOs and donors, themselves increasingly motivated by the need to 
align conservation goals with industrialisation, to quickly establish green economy policies 
in Mozambique. 
There were several years of preparatory work undertaken by WWF Mozambique’s 
environmental governance unit, along with the UNEP and UNDP. A meeting between WWF 
Mozambique and the then President of the African Development Bank, Donald Kaberuka, in 
July 2011 in Tunis was a key point in the development of green economy policy. According 
to WWF and AfDB press statements, the meeting was initiated by Kaberuka who invited 
WWF to put forward partnership ideas on issues including “climate adaptation, mitigation, 
biodiversity and ecosystems, as well as the proposed Green Fund for Africa” (AfDB and 
WWF (2011), no page.  At the meeting, the AfDB “expressed the Bank’s willingness to 
learn from the wealth of expertise of WWF” in pursuit of “the promotion of environmentally 
sustainable development”. The scope of WWF across Africa, having “more than 1,000 staff 
in 18 African countries” and its “extensive development knowledge and network going all 
the way from the heads of government to local communities” (ibid) was lauded as key to 
WWF’s elevated position as an important and visible part of the green economy. 
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Mozambique’s initial green economy policy, ‘Towards a Green Economy’ (Government of 
Mozambique 2012a) was the product of a Green Economy Conference held in Maputo in 
April 2012. This regional conference aimed to link the strategies of Kenya, Tanzania and 
Mozambique, and largely reflected WWF’s regional Coastal East Africa strategy (WWF 
2012b, 2013). Through this work, WWF’s influence now extended to initialising the green 
economy in Africa. 
One of the central planks of WWF’s green economy vision was the compatibility between 
the extractives sector and green development. It argued that Mozambique is a strong 
candidate for a green economy as its economy is based on natural resource extraction, and it 
ran several types of resource extractives together in a straightforward list - gas and coal, fish 
and agriculture, forests and tourism (WWF 2013). WWF subscribes to the view that the 
extraction of such resources can be compatible with biodiversity conservation if properly 
managed. But, its policies extend beyond this. WWF also promoted the view that “new 
revenue to be generated by growing oil, gas and mineral extraction sectors can play a strong 
role in supporting sustainable development and the transition to a Green Economy” (WWF 
2012b: 1). This introduced the idea that the extractives sector could provide financial 
contributions to support conservation to promote its corporate social responsibility 
programme and its social license to operate, a view which later became supported by other 
green economy players in Mozambique (interview with Biofund official, Maputo, 9 May 
2014). In short, the WWF’s strategies promoted the idea that extraction could begin to 
actively support conservation significant traction in Mozambique. Such a stance is in line 
with its international entanglements with the extractives sector; as Klein (2013: 1) reports, 
the WWF is one of several environmental organisations which has refused to divest its 
significant investment from assets in the extractives sector, while at the same time 
encouraging policies which “create the illusion of progress while allowing the fossil fuel 
companies to keep mining, drilling and fracking with abandon”.   
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WWF’s tolerance of extraction appears to extend even to its protected bioregions, as it has 
not voiced opposition to major gas extraction in the Rovuma Basin Bioreserve in Cabo 
Delgado in the north of Mozambique. Instead, it aims to provide an alternative use of nature 
to rival the gas boom. Its website describes how: 
Large economic developments including extractive mining and industrial agriculture 
is taking the area [Cabo Delgado] to extraordinary transformation that could either 
lead to ecological and social degradation seen elsewhere in Africa, exacerbated by 
climate change, or a more secure future through protection, management, and 
sustainable use of the unique natural assets now at risk (WWF 2015, no page).  
 
This frames Mozambique’s green economy in the discourse of a realistic response to 
ecological crisis. WWF argues here that the categorisation and use of nature as ‘natural 
assets’ is the best and most pragmatic way to govern the environment in the face of 
inevitable and transformative development. Under this formulation, Mozambique’s nature is 
abstracted as a set of natural assets, enabling it to be atomised into various components 
rather than a systemic or related whole. These components can then be protected, managed 
and used in ways that are deemed to be sustainable. WWF’s framing glosses over the ways 
in which extractive uses of nature like mining intersect and compete with biodiversity 
conservation and other ‘green’ development, invoking ‘win-win’ ideas as seen elsewhere in 
this thesis. The WWF brand is a powerful one in this regard. It works to re-frame 
Mozambique’s position in Africa, presented as being able to avoid repeating previous 
mistakes and to take a different development trajectory to other countries. In contrast to the 
unsustainable development dominating the rest of the continent, it is argues, Mozambique 
can use the green economy to adopt a more sustainable path.  
Mozambique’s green economy is also being driven by other development donors, 
specifically, the Green Economy Joint Programme (GEJP) which comprises the United 
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), the United Nations Development Programme 
(UNDP), and the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UNDESA). 
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The project is funded by the Government of the Netherlands which works in several 
developing countries, adopting an approach which uses national level actors, in this case 
WWF Mozambique and the Ministry for Coordination of Environmental Affairs (MICOA). 
The GEJP has conducted activities under the rubric of ‘capacity building’, such as holding 
networking and briefing sessions with national partners. The green economy vision is also 
supported by the USAID mission in Mozambique which has played a role in developing the 
regulatory changes related to conservation and extraction in line with discourses of green 
development, as well as dedicating funding and effort to biodiversity conservation directly. 
This is often discussed through the lens of tourism: USAID claims to be helping 
Mozambique to “advance[e] a sound conservation sector that supports a nascent tourism 
industry and capitalizes on the biodiversity and natural resources of the country in a non-
extractive way” (USAID undated), clearly reflecting the values and rhetoric of the green 
economy.  
To summarise here, the development and policy direction of Mozambique’s environmental 
policy has been driven by external agencies, especially international NGOs like WWF and 
donors like the UNDP. In particular, WWF Mozambique has appeared as one of the most 
influential and capable national partner under the GEJP structure, lending its green 
credentials to the production of a discourse which positions the green economy as necessary 
given the inevitability of extractive and industrialisation in Mozambique. These agencies 
have been able to gain such influence through a variety of means: They donate large sums of 
money to support particular programmes, provide thought leadership, and have strong 
connections, exemplified by the ways in which WWF was able to take its strategy to the 
highest levels of the Mozambican government. The discourse of the green economy is thus 
produced and re-produced through this network of agencies and through their relationships 
with a small number of senior ministers and departmental contacts. This continues the 
dynamic from post-conflict Mozambique, in which international agencies like the PPF 
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worked closely with the state. But, now there is a novel convergence on green economic 
principles. This rhetoric is expressed by a variety of institutions and cross over several 
projects in the areas of conservation, tourism and extractives governance. Crucially, the 
green economy has rhetorical power, promising success and ‘win-win’ benefits, and as a 
consequence, has been amplified in official strategies.  
7.4.2.	Launching	the	green	economy:	Trade-offs	and	dilemmas	
The Green Economy Roadmap was launched at an event at Rio in 2012 attended and 
supported financially by WWF and the African Development Bank (Government of 
Mozambique 2012b). The importance of the launch was underlined by the presence of the 
then President of the Republic, Emilio Guebuza, along with the then Head of MICOA, the 
President of the AfDB and the Director General of WWF. The roadmap (Government of 
Mozambique 2012a: 7) defined the green economy as follows: 
A green economy is one which values and invests in natural capital – incorporates 
the Earth’s assets (soil, air, water, ocean, flora and fauna) and all its ecosystem 
services into economic growth and social considerations. Ecosystem assets and 
benefits are essential for humanity, since they provide food, fiber (sic), water, health, 
climate stability, energy, amongst other essential services; and builds social capital 
which contributes to the eradication of poverty – establishes relations between 
persons, organizations, laws, and policies that promote equitable distribution of the 
benefits that come from the use of natural capital. 
 
This definition reproduces core green economic ideas around the conceptualisation of nature 
into discrete and commodifiable assets. Alongside this framing of nature, Mozambique’s 
articulation emphasises issues of equity and social capital. This reflects the UNEP’s position 
that the green economy has special relevance for developing countries which can be framed 
as ‘rich’ in natural resources which can be put to wise use for development. Mozambique’s 
strategy is clearly drawn from this dominant "pro-growth, pro-jobs, and pro-poverty-
reduction" discourse (UNEP 2011: 6-7), a win-win-win promise that has understandable 
resonance in a developing country. Mozambique’s initial production of the green economy 
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discourse thereby links its crises of poverty and ecological degradation, and posits the green 
economy as the answer.  
More detail was provided in the Mozambique Action Plan 2013-2014 which stressed the 
hoped-for developmental aspects of the green economy18. In this plan, the AfDB (2015: 7) 
states its aim as: 
To build an inclusive country, with widespread middle income, based on the 
protection, restoration and rational use of natural capital and ecosystem services, 
ensuring efficient and inclusive development within the planetary boundaries. 
  
The Action Plan’s strategy fleshes out the mix of institutions, and financial sanctions and 
incentives that are required to tackle poverty and economic growth in a ‘green’ way. 
Interestingly, the policy puts forward a central role for the state in public spending and 
investments in areas that favour the green economy, specified as agriculture, energy, urban 
planning and young people, and aims to limit public spending in areas that reduce natural 
capital (more on funding of these below). It also advocates the creation and promotion of 
taxes and market-based tools to stimulate the green economy market. There is a strong focus 
on marine and coastal resources, with Mozambique’s coastal natural capital identified as 
including biodiversity, which can attract tourism and maintain ecosystem services, alongside 
extractable hydrocarbons (AfDB 2015). The idea of a green development future which 
unproblematically exploits natural capital alongside extractives like coal and hydrocarbons is 
gaining political traction in Mozambique, but, crucially, it is firmly rooted in Mozambique’s 
political economy, advocating a strong role for the state and large-scale investments in 
infrastructure and state programmes, alongside green neoliberal market-led solutions.  
                                                      
18 The Mozambique Green Economy Action Plan was approved by the Council of Ministers on 
October 15th, 2013, and waits to be published officially. It is referred to and directly quoted in other 
documents, as referenced. 
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The green economy has subsequently been updated again in 2015, again by the African 
Development Bank, and this new strategy represents a more extensive “attempt to 
incorporate green growth principles in national policy planning” (AfDB 2015: 60), as well as 
provide concrete policy prescriptions for involving distinct sectors. The AfDB bases its 
policy strategy on several principles characteristic of green economies, including 
comprehensive natural capital mapping and participatory and consultative processes, along 
with promoting payments for ecosystem services, and integrating green economy thinking 
throughout the fisheries, tourism, forestry, energy, agriculture, water and urban planning 
sectors. It places a high priority on tourism through TFCAs, which I will shortly discuss. 
However, analysing discourses and policy proposals on paper is somewhat of a narrow 
exercise. It is necessary to consider how Mozambique’s green economy may roll out, and 
how it will overlay on, and interact with Mozambique’s current ecological, political and 
social landscapes. This is a challenge as there are very few concrete plans; as it stands, 
Mozambique’s green economy largely consists of policies and plans, designed and 
reproduced by policy elites in meetings, interactions and public events.  
In the absence of concrete green economy schemes, current trends in land contestation 
perhaps shed light on how schemes may play out, particularly the large-scale land changes 
which would be necessary for PES schemes or the development of bioenergy. Under 
Mozambican law, while all land is owned by the state, the right to use land can be granted to 
companies, collectives, organisations or individuals under a DUAT (Direito de Uso e 
Aproveitamento da Terra/ right to use and benefit from the land) (Article 10, Mozambique 
Land Act No. 19/97). Informal communities who occupy the land for more than 10 years 
have their land rights guaranteed by law (Article 12, Mozambique Land Act No. 19/97). 
However, special conditions apply where the land will be used for mining or other 
commercial purposes (Article 12 and Article 2, Law no. 20, 18th August 2014), and 
economic activities are increasingly taking priority over informal land rights, often causing 
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conflicts which are not always properly addressed by consultation and community 
involvement approaches (Centro de Integridade Publica 2014; Nhantumbo and Salomão 
2010). As discussed in chapter four, the resources boom has resulted in large land transfers 
away from traditional and informal users to major international corporations and there are 
multiple cases across the country of conflict between communities and extractive or 
industrial uses. These issues are recognised in the AfDB’s strategy, which proposes an 
Initiative for Community Land which “helps rural communities secure land tenure rights to 
promote long-term investment into agriculture” (AfDB 2015: 30). The initiative reflects 
discourses around land rights seen in national debates around extraction, where appeals to 
international liberal norms of transparency and rights have successfully been used to call 
large companies to account. However, this presents somewhat of a double-edged sword 
through further embedding liberal discourses of participation and consultation, raising 
political dilemmas for activists in how they frame questions of national interest and national 
development (Symons 2016). These issues may intensify should the ambitious green 
economy plans come to fruition.  
To draw an explicit parallel between existing land use dilemmas and green economy 
proposals, the AfDB’s strategy appears to call for similarly large changes in land use to bring 
about the green economy. These include including scaling up agriculture under a 
conservation farming programme, creating tax incentives for planting biomass for biofuels, 
and conducting a feasibility study for payments for ecosystem services along with major 
spatial projects including the use of public private partnerships (PPPs) to create a gas-
powered public transport service and new PPP toll roads to link to newly-created major 
agriculture zones. The transfer of rights and tenure from community hands to large private 
investors clearly indicates a process of large-scale land appropriation, reflecting Parenti’s 
(2015) analysis of the environment making state as the sole entity with the power to transfer 
land sovereignty to capitalist actors, thereby producing novel environments. This also raises 
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important questions of justice; given that land rights are so controversial in Mozambique, 
and given the potential for consultation to be used to quell dissent for land grabs and to de-
politicise (Milgroom and Spierenburg 2008; Hönke 2013) it will be essential to watch how 
the changing topographies brought about by the green economy impact issues of livelihoods 
and access to land. I now turn to discuss in more detail how the green economy intersects 




Mozambique’s green economy strategy is nothing if not ambitious. It calls for major 
innovations in land tenure, market-based conservation and major investments in 
infrastructure, green energy and services, often in conjunction with the private sector (AfDB 
2015).  This section argues that the green economy is complex as represents an 
intensification of neoliberalism through ‘fourth way’ logics of participation, green 
development and large-scale public-private investment, while at the same time addressing 
the major contradictions of extractives-led development through conservation. However, it is 
not a totalising or hegemonic “march of triumphal green capitalism” (Fairhead, Leach and 
Scoones 2012: 254). Rather, the green economy provides a new discourse through which 
conservation claims can be asserted, as well as novel opportunities and pathways for 
accumulation through donor financing. In this sense it is as much a product of 
Mozambique’s post-war political economy as it is of global neoliberal discourses.  
7.5.1.	Conservation,	tourism	and	the	green	economy	
Trans-frontier conservation is at the centre of Mozambique’s green economy plans for the 
tourism sector. The AfDB, World Bank and other major donors are agreed that TFCAs, 
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especially areas with marine components represent an opportunity for vastly increased 
tourism numbers. These revenues can be claimed as contributing to the green economy. In 
this sense, TFCAs underpin tourism as a green economy strategy.  This can be clearly seen 
by tracking the phases of Mozambique’s roll-out of TFCAs against broader phases in 
neoliberalism, conservation and extractives growth. Starting with the period during the late 
1970s and 1980s when neoliberalism was rolling out globally, it is notable that Mozambique 
was mired in conflict with conservation a low priority. This phase is still important to 
consider, however, as it demonstrates the rapid changes required in subsequent phases. 
Moving to Mozambique’s TFCA phase one, the table demonstrates how this coincides with 
the swift emergence of neoliberalism in Mozambique post conflict, and reflects global trends 
in conservation towards CBNRM as dominant paradigm.  
Phase two coincides with the global phase of spectacular accumulation through globalised 
networks, expressed in conservation trends through the intensification of financialisation. 
Notably, there was a significant change in conservation legislation under TFCA Phase Two. 
Mozambique’s new conservation law encourages the involvement of the private sector in 
managing and funding conservation areas. It states that “any public or private body 
authorised to exploit natural resources in a conservation area or its buffer zone, must 
compensate for its impacts and ensure that there is no net loss of biodiversity.” It further 
notes that conservation must be “reconciled with the interests of public and private sectors” 
(AIM report 483). These laws establish the principle that, while priority should be given to 
prevent damage to the environment, should damage occur, there is the responsibility to 
“repair or compensate for the damage caused by them to ensure that no net loss of 
biodiversity or natural resources occurs” (ibid). This is aimed at preventing biodiversity loss 
in the context of a growing scramble for Mozambique’s natural resources.  
Alongside the rollout of new regulation, the TFCA phase two project created a new financial 
institution. Biofund is a conservation endowment that was established in 2013 and formally 
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launched in June 2015. Its main role is to manage a lump sum endowment of $23m USD 
from major international donors including Conservation International, the GEF and the 
WWF, invested to provide between five and six hundred thousand USD per year for projects 
(interview with Biofund official, Maputo, 9 May 2014). It expects to raise around US$100 
million over the coming years, though does not specify a timescale (Biofund, undated). 
Clearly, this is an institution with access to significant funds. There will be more discussion 
of this institution shortly. 
Moving to the current phase, MozBio, and the launch and rollout of Mozambique’s green 
economy, Figure 7.1 shows that these events also coincide with the intensification of 
“derivative nature” and “fictitious conservation” (Büscher 2010: 216; Büscher and Fletcher 
2015: 286). These concepts refer to the processes whereby conservation value becomes fixed 
to financialised nature derivatives such as carbon forestry markets. Nature becomes a 
‘fictitious commodity’, a new product derived from nature for the purpose of being sold 
through constructed mechanisms of legal certification, land division and tenure (Brockington 
2011). In conservation, as discussed in chapter five, values can also become abstracted from 
the place itself, for example through the marketing of idealised visions of nature and through 
tourist products based on interactions with the conservation administration. These derived 
products then facilitate new regimes of accumulation, through trading in natural capital-
based markets such as carbon credits and though private investment in conservation regimes. 
The chart demonstrates how the transition from Phase Two to MozBio shifts the focus from 
the creation of major new conservation areas and the consolidation of TFCAs to focus more 
attention on financing and economic growth through. MozBio will focus on new policies for 
tourism investment, especially on those conservation areas that are considered to have the 
greatest tourism potential, especially marine protected areas. It will promote nature-based 
tourism growth, and, crucially, use the Biofund to attract financing from different sectors.  
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Figure 7.1: Table showing conservation trends, TFCA policies, green economy development and key trends in the extractive sector (adapted from 
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The developments in Mozambique’s conservation policy and ideology described in this 
section correspond with broader changes in global regimes of accumulation and shifts in 
neoliberal ideology towards intensifying financialised solutions to conservation problems. 
While Mozambique’s conservation remains underpinned by TFCAs, there has been a notable 
and very recent shift towards focussing on increasing tourism revenues along with seeking 
new sources and mechanisms for funding conservation. These are directly related to the 
developments in the governance of extraction shown in figure 7.1. I now turn to discuss 
these in more detail.  
7.5.2.	Extraction	and	the	Biofund	
This section discusses the ways in which Mozambique’s green economy strategy is directly 
targeted at ameliorating the extractives industry, suggesting a close and material relationship 
between the two sectors. It focusses particularly on the Biofund. Biofund has two meanings. 
The first refers to financial wealth, and denotes its role as funding provider and fundraiser. 
To this end, it is expected to use its funds to support conservation initiatives including the 
PPMR, which has already applied for funding. This also denotes its role as a mechanism for 
fundraising, whereby funds raised from the resource extraction industry can be put to 
conservation use. This is in some ways analogous to sovereign wealth funds which save 
some tax contributions from extraction for a common purpose. The second meaning of 
Biofund refers to its hoped-for role as a literal biodiversity fund. It is proposed that Biofund 
will act as a ‘piggy bank’ for natural capital; a vehicle for finding new ways to value and 
protect conservation natures, described by a Biofund official as follows: 
Nature is our life support system, for any society this is the first value of nature. But 
nature also has a value that … you can exchange. This is the second value of nature. 
But to come to a sophisticated point where you can say ‘I have a list of things…… in 
this country, diamonds, forests….’…. The time will come when nature will be listed 
like all other resources that might be important. For example, nature is not part of 





This is a clear endorsement of conceiving nature in terms of natural capital, in which 
exchange value is derived from discrete and commodifiable natural assets. Biofund’s 
financial analogy sees it protecting reserves of nature, enabling extraction to take place 
(which will, of course, fund conservation anyway), while providing future security against 
ecological catastrophe.  
A central goal of the Biofund is to reconcile the increasing focus on extractives with the idea 
that development can be sustainable. This contortion is to be achieved in three ways. The 
first two are related, and encompass both the extractives sector making direct donations to 
the Biofund, and through enabling the sector to take part in biodiversity off-setting. Raising 
conservation revenues from the extractives sector is considered to be something that the 
Biofund can begin to enact fairly quickly.  The launch event claimed that “biodiversity may 
be one of the transparent use options of income earned from natural resources in the mining 
industry” (UNEP 2015), a view that was reflected in my interviews. However, at time of 
writing it is not clear that any donations have been made to the Biofund by extractives 
companies, though it is certainly possible to see how this might be appealing to industry as 
part of securing its environmental and social mandate to operate. Similarly, the AfDB’s plan 
proposes that damage caused by extractives sector within Mozambique can be offset through 
contributions directly to the conservation sector, a move also encouraged under the 
Conservation Act of 2014. It is not clear whether this means financial offsetting, which could 
be achieved through the natural capital framing of nature (whereby damage to an ecosystem 
in one location could be calculated to be worth a certain amount, for which compensation 
must be paid), or whether this means protecting ‘like-for-like’ natures elsewhere to 
compensate for extractives damage in a location. Mozambique’s adoption of off-setting 
would thereby open up conservation areas to calculations which may permit damage 
elsewhere, a view which sees large and wealthy investors (whose primary business may be 
pollution or extraction) able to take advantage of nature’s free labour several times over: By 
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relying on ecosystems in their core activity; through securing legitimacy though direct 
payments (Sullivan 2009); and, in that a further round of accumulation potentially accrues to 
those managing the off-setting payment system, in this case this, the Biofund (but also 
potentially private sector partners).  
The third means of reconciling extractives with ecologically sustainable development is 
through the idea of a green economy transition initially funded by the extractives boom. The 
plan specifically refers to Mozambique’s large natural gas deposits as a cleaner energy than 
other fossil fuels like coal or oil, and claims that a combination of revenues from gas to fund 
the national-level investment into green economy projects and infrastructure, combined with 
the use of the gas to provide much-needed energy to Mozambicans will facilitate a ‘green 
transition’. However, there are immediate political-economic problems with the green 
economy transition that its supporters do not acknowledge. As I have mentioned, and as 
observed by the AfDB, the gas boom is expected to be extremely lucrative. No published 
estimates exist as to how much will accrue to the Mozambican government, but to give an 
indication, it is estimated to be worth US$212 billion to Anadarko, one of its main partners, 
alone over the life of the project (Bloomberg Business 17 December 2014), of which around 
4 per cent on the profits of production would be due in taxation (Petroleum Law 21/2014, 
18th August). The actual revenues available for the government to use in civil projects may 
be far lower than current celebratory discourses indicate for several reasons. President Nyusi 
revised Mozambique’s Petroleum Law in 2014 to secure the low 4 per cent production tax 
rate for 30 years and to also allow a significant amount of the revenue paid to be accounted 
offshore (Bloomberg Business News 17 December 2014). A donor observed that Anadarko 
is likely to structure construction of the gas infrastructure project in a strategic way to offset 
capital gains against new infrastructure construction for a long as possible, thereby further 
reducing and delaying capital gains liability (interview with donor 2, Maputo, 6 May 2014). 
In addition, Mozambique’s debt crisis of 2016 discussed in chapter four means gas revenues 
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will now be diverted to serve hitherto unreported national debt and to make up a shortfall in 
promised capital spending on gas infrastructures (Hanlon 2016). All this raises serious 
questions as to whether Mozambique’s current political economy will be able to divert any 
of its gas revenue to a hoped-for green transition.  
In sum, the green economy aims to reconcile the needs of Mozambique to extract its mineral 
resources with ideas of sustainability through three policy innovations: The funding of 
conservation from extractive companies through the Biofund; the establishment of 
biodiversity off-setting mechanisms whereby conservation can provide credits to permit 
extraction or provide a means to off-set damage in conservation areas; and, through directly 
funding a green economy transition through taxation. These innovations add weight to the 
idea of the green economy as a direct “denial of the negative environmental impacts of 
‘business as usual’ capitalism” (Büscher and Fletcher 2015: 273).  However, despite its role 
as ecological fix, my fieldwork also revealed how the green economy is being mobilised by a 
range of actors pursuing conservation claims and national development visions, which I now 
discuss.  
7.6.	The	uses	of	the	green	economy	
Mozambique is a resource-rich and illiberal state which is governed by a strong state-party 
(Kirshner and Power 2015). Despite the influential position of donors and the demands 
imposed by conditionality, Mozambique’s government has become adept at using 
development funding and discourses to strengthen itself, to maintain webs of patronage, and 
to protect a remarkable degree of stability post-1992. It is therefore necessary to explore the 
uses of the green economy in Mozambique’s post-war political economy, returning to 
Bakker’s (2009) call to “expand our appreciation of the drivers for neoliberal strategies 
beyond the merely economic” to include state visions of development, and Ferguson’s 
(2010) observation that neoliberal strategies can be put to work for a mixture of political 
255 
 
goals by different audiences. I explore this first through seeing how neoliberal development 
sits with visions of modernity characterised by a strong state and ‘big projects’, and second, 
through seeing how the green economy provides conservationists with the means to contest 
extractives-led growth. 
7.6.1.	The	green	economy	as	national	development:	Visions	of	modernity	
This section explores Mozambican visions of national development, and how these are 
articulated through tropes of green and extractives-led development. Biofund is headed by 
Bernardo Luis Honwana, a person of some reputation in Mozambique and internationally. 
He is the author of We Killed Mangy Dog, a seminal collection of short stories about 
Portuguese colonialism, race and identity which formed the cultural basis of Mozambique’s 
revolutionary socialist vision, a former national Minister for Culture and a retired senior 
UNESCO director. Honwana’s appointment is a reflection of the power and status of 
Biofund, and indicates that the new green economy agenda also involves senior Frelimo 
members at the highest level. While Biofund is certainly in tune with international donor 
priorities, particularly around preventing poaching, correct financial reporting, and using 
innovative conservation technologies like payments for ecosystem services and biodiversity 
offsetting, my fieldwork revealed how neoliberal ideas of natural capital, off-setting and 
public-private funding were often articulated in terms which recall the language of the 
Marxist-Leninist attempts to build an idea of national identity out of a fragmented set of 
communities. For example, a Biofund official considered that “we need to nationalise 
conservation”, to conceive conservation as something that can become part of a new 
Mozambican identity. Conservation was represented as a “new form of solidarity”, in which 
it stops being something which is imposed from abroad, but instead becomes part of a 
“Mozambican agenda………..[whereby] nationals want to visit Ponta do Ouro, to see 
elephants…[so it becomes] part of our culture” (interview with Biofund official, Maputo, 9 
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May 2014). So, while the green economy reorients the elite network around its vision, the 
green economy is also being used by senior Frelimo members to articulate a new vision for 
development which forms a counter-point to the dominant extractives-led growth agenda.  
In this way, Mozambique’s green economy takes neoliberal nature innovations and language, 
but blends these with calls which are reminiscent of Frelimo’s early Leninist vision of 
modernity based on the wholescale transformation of society through superior knowledge 
and social design, the same confidence in science and intellectual progress and the ordering 
of nature and people in the interests of productivity which led to its preoccupation with 
large-scale projects like mechanised farming and industrial development (Newitt 1995).  
This is not an argument that since the state is involved, Mozambique’s green development 
project is not thoroughly neoliberal. Far from it; the national state is at the heart of the 
neoliberal capitalist project. What I wish to point out here is the way in which the state is 
involved invokes both neoliberal modus operandi of supporting new markets and novel roles 
for the private sector alongside rather more developmental statist modes of large-scale 
investment. The AfDB’s proposals for financing the green economy include, as discussed, a 
Green Economy Investment Fund (GEIF) which will be part-funded by the extractives 
sector. It is also seeking direct investment from donors for the GEIF, and advocates that 
Mozambique uses this revenue to broaden its development away from over-reliance on 
mega-projects. It advocates large-scale ‘public’ spending (this is a term used tentatively as I 
acknowledge that public spending in this case also includes FDI and donor revenues along 
with public-private finance in the following areas: Transport (including the expansion of gas-
powered public and private vehicle support infrastructure, toll roads, public transport, tax 
incentives to promote clean vehicles, a green transport master plan); water (including 
irrigation, water supply and sanitation management, adoption of new approaches to water 
basin management, infrastructure to capture and store water, flood and drought prevention, 
PPPs for water supply, sanitation and water recycling); energy (including hydropower, 
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biofuels, tax exemption incentives for clean domestic technologies, renewable energy 
investments and public energy efficiency programmes), and several more proposals in the 
areas of urban development, land planning, agriculture, forestry and fisheries. This is not 
insignificant; AfDB’s vision consists of major investment across large-scale project, tax 
incentives and duties, and governance.  
In part, Mozambique’s green economy has become a means of advancing national 
development plans. These centre on a particular vision of modernisation; the state-led, large 
project oriented visions for development which characterised the post-independence period 
alongside neoliberal strategies. In other words, Mozambican state bodies appear to be taking 
a neoliberal approach to nature for reasons related to visions of modernity and the need to 
negotiate relationships with donors, alongside the need to maintain the opportunities for 
accumulation presented by the extractives boom.  This flexible approach to development, in 
which the green economy can be mobilised for multiple goals reflects historic Mozambican 
development strategies of mobilising donor and FDI funding alongside imaginaries of 
rational social ordering based on large-scale interventions.  
7.6.2.	Extraction	and	conservation:	Contesting	‘un-green’	development		
Turning now to the second use the green economy, many in Mozambique’s conservation 
community view the growing extractive sector as a major challenge, making the green 
economy a powerful discourse to contest so-called “un-green” (Apostolopoulou and Adams 
2015: 15) development. It can therefore be seen, like the neoliberal discourse that 
conservation must contribute to growth, as a means of making environmental issues relevant 
to “a global political economy that is alienated from ecological and developmental realities” 
(Büscher 2013: 219). The stakes can be very high. Throughout my fieldwork, particularly in 
October and November 2013, there was anxious speculation circulating in the PPMR that a 
proposed deep water coal port had been given the final go-ahead. Rumoured to have been 
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planned since the colonial era, the port would export 90 million tonnes of coal over the next 
30 years from the Botswana Kalahari Karoo Basin, destined for international markets 
including India and China. In July 2011 the Mozambican and Botswanan government jointly 
announced that the port would go ahead, followed in April 2013 the awarding of the 
concession for the construction of the 30,000 hectare port complex and an industrial 
development zone covering 11,000 hectares, claiming that construction would be completed 
by 2015 at a cost of US$7 billion. In addition, a feasibility study for a rail link connecting the 
port with Botswana’s coal fields was announced in May 2014 (Mining Weekly 30 May 
2014). At that stage, no official plans had been released, though they were thought to include 
a retail centre, a football stadium, perhaps even luxury apartments.  As shown in figure 7.2, 
the complex would be situated in the sanctuary part of the reserve, destroying a major coral 
reef and protected turtle nesting sites, and requiring the draining of inland freshwater lakes. 
 
Figure 7.2: Map of PPMR showing possible location of Techobanine Port Complex 
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In contrast to the tense situation in 2013, email and telephone conversations with a reserve 
official throughout 2016 revealed that the port is now unlikely to go ahead, though rumours 
still continue at time of writing. This is for a combination of reasons. Geopolitical 
developments include the impact of a global slowdown in demand for coal, particularly from 
China, and the Paris 2015 agreements aim to reduce coal use. Botswana has recently turned 
from coal towards shale gas, partly due to technical difficulties in extracting the coal itself. 
There are consequently plans to extract coal bed methane and shale gas and export via 
pipelines instead of coal, negating the need for a port and rail complex (CMM undated, 
Guardian December 2015). This combination of political-economic, technical and material 
developments is at least as significant in dashing the hopes of the Techobanine port 
supporters as any environmental concerns. However, the debates and rumours which 
circulated about the port throughout field work in 2013 and 2014, alongside developments in 
green economy and conservation institutions reveal much about how conservation actors 
position themselves in relation to ‘un-green’ development like the port, and the co-
production of green and un-green development.  
Conservation actors often expressed their support for a broadly imagined ‘green 
development’ against what they viewed as a powerful clique in the Frelimo government 
which favours extraction at all costs. This was raised by several interviewees, who described 
individuals within government who were more interested in personal gain and showed a 
disregard for conservation especially.  One stated that the priority of these Frelimo vested 
interests was the extraction of fossil fuels, and that this posed a threat to conservation: 
This is pretty well established I think, conservation is not a priority, it’s the lowest 
on the totem pole, they want economic growth at any point. So if they find …… coal 
and gas and other minerals it doesn’t matter where they are found, their priority is to 
develop those industries and I think they will worry about marine ecosystems ……. 
as an afterthought.  Right now their main focus is growth, economic growth 




Another informant suggested that Frelimo was linked to the proposed port through General 
Jacinto Soares Veloso, described as “…….. an old general ……… He’s Frelimo and now 
part of the private sector” (interview with Mozambican NGO, Maputo, 26 April 2014). 
General Veloso is a former member of the Mozambican government, and has several 
business interests in the extractives sector including Pathfinder Minerals which exports 
substances used in ceramics, and was recently financially linked to the UK Conservative 
Party via former Africa Minister, Henry Bellingham (The Telegraph, November 2014). An 
informant described how General Veloso became set on securing the rights to construct the 
port and, in the view of this informant, conducted secret meetings with the authorities in 
order to secure land rights. Several other interviewees also identified a group within 
government, and characterised them as a Frelimo cartel behind the port. This adds to claims 
discussed in chapter four that Mozambique’s governance can be somewhat shadowy in its 
decision-making and relies on personal links, especially where gains from the extractive 
sector are concerned. Crucially, it is within this context of intensifying extraction and opaque 
decision-making that supporters of conservation must negotiate and operate.   
For many involved, the port exemplified the clash between ideas of extraction and ideas 
about sustainability through conservation. Due to the dredging of inland lakes that would 
have been required, along with the destruction of what was described as “the biggest and the 
most important coral reef in southern Mozambique” (interview with PPMR official 2, 9 
October 2013), the port was viewed as a particularly egregious threat to one of 
Mozambique’s flagship conservation areas. Moreover, the type of development associated 
with the port was viewed as elitist: “they talk about a marina there, a soccer field, also luxury 
houses, a mall, I don’t know what that has to do with the port” (ibid). In contrast, the reserve, 
left intact, was seen to represent a very different possible future to the port, presented as 
offering long-term sustainability through tourism and healthy ecosystem services along with 
tangible commitments to community development. For the PPMR, the discourses embedded 
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in the green economy were cautiously welcomed as it provided a means to present an 
alternative conception of a development future to fears of an unchallenged extraction-based 
growth agenda. Perhaps unsurprisingly, conservationists in Mozambique were willing to 
make strategic alliances with a neoliberal conservation agenda, as it provides a means to 
contest what they view as a real and immediate threat to the reserve’s future.  
However, the use of green economy ideas was also something imposed on conservationists. 
While adopting the language of ecosystem services and natural capital valuations sometimes 
provided a means of making conservation visible and important to the supporters of an 
extraction-led development agenda, this was also something that was sometimes required as 
part of a wider development political economy, rather than something voluntarily 
undertaken. When I asked in October 2013 about how the decision-making around the port 
would be conducted, a reserve official commented: 
That’s the first question the guys at the top ask: How much [money] do we make 
with tourism and conservation? And it becomes very difficult to show in money the 
value of the area. Because it’s not just how many tourists do you bring here, it’s all 
the ecosystem services that is really difficult to quantify. So it really comes down to 
that: How much money can we generate with tourism in the area? How much money 
can we generate with the port in the area? (interview with PPMR official 2, 9 
October 2013)  
 
This discussion illustrates how the green economy discourse is used in Mozambique to make 
an economic case for conservation, especially when the extractive agenda seems most 
egregious. It also shows how conservationists find the concept difficult to operationalise, that 
it is very difficult to use the concept to come up with monetary values for a marine reserve, 
and that they are cognisant of its internal contradictions, indicating a pragmatic use of the 
ideas rather than an uncritical acceptance. In short, the ecosystem services discourse is 
resisted as well as accepted by biodiversity-focussed actors.  
The debate over the Techobanine port was tentatively concluded in early 2016 with news 
that the PPMR is shortly going to be announced as a UNESCO World Heritage site, the 
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culmination of several years of discussion. This theoretically negates the port as UNESCO 
sites must be kept free of extractive uses19. As a PPF consultant informed me, the PPF was 
central to negotiating this designation, actively working with the government to seek other 
locations for the proposed port. What can this episode tell us about the current uses of the 
green economy by the conservation sector? The idea of a green economy which enhances 
and intensifies economic development is powerful currency in Mozambique, providing 
useful tools that can be used to achieve political goals. Yet, this vision sits alongside other, 
broader conservation agendas and networks which it interacts with, but also contradicts. For 
the reserve management, some aspects of the green economy agenda are valuable in certain 
circumstances, yet considered in a different context, the green economy represents just the 
latest in a stream of donor prescriptions which must be adhered to secure funding, and may 
not have that much relevance to the day-to-day practice of conservation.  
7.7.	Discussion	and	conclusion:	The	co-production	of	extraction	
and	conservation	
In this chapter, I have explored the current and dynamic emergence of Mozambique’s green 
economy. I have sought to explain how Mozambique is responding to the intensification of 
extraction through renewing and repackaging green development ideas into a green economy 
strategy, and what ideological and institutional shape the green economy is taking. My 
conceptualisation of the green economy has positioned it as both as a product of 
Mozambique’s specific post-colonial political economy, but also of wider processes, 
                                                      
19 In direct contrast to the news of the UNESCO designation, rumours of the port still persist, and the 
Zimbabwe Chronicle reported in September 2016 that the go-ahead had been given for a major rail 
network through Zimbabwe, Botswana and Mozambique, terminating at Ponta Techobanine “where a 
sea port will be built….. [to]…..facilitate investment in mining, logistics and industry” 
(Macauhub.com September 2016). 
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relationships and configurations of neoliberalism. I have suggested that the green economy 
engenders a close relationship between extractives-led growth and biodiversity conservation 
through processes which intensify the neoliberalisation of nature, and can therefore be read 
as an ecological fix, but I have also sought to explain the ways in which its adoption can be 
about more than economic processes.  
With this in mind, my first conclusion must be that the green economy entrenches the 
neoliberal ideology that protection of nature requires the expansion of capitalism. This claim 
is based on its introduction of new mechanisms and new institutions which aim to intensify 
the financialisation of nature, including natural capital accounting, and mechanisms such as 
payments for ecosystem services and biodiversity offsetting. The Biofund is at the centre of 
these processes, functioning both as a means to seek and manage payments and new funding 
mechanisms, and as a literal fund of biodiversity whereby Mozambique’s natural capital can 
be preserved. The green economy seeks to use conservation as a means of accumulation, 
though to be clear, the green economy is imagined as a far more extensive programme than 
just conservation-based tourism. These processes reshift the focus away from seeing 
ecological crises as a ‘loss’ to capitalism; rather, the green economy allows capitalism to 
open new avenues of accumulation and to thrive on crises (Sullivan 2009). Recalling the 
conflicts in the PPMR as a result of eco-tourism discussed in chapters five and six, we can 
see how the green economy rhetoric directly addresses these contradictions also.  
Mozambique’s green economy is intimately related to its extractives boom, serving as a fix 
for the fundamental tension between capitalism’s need to further exploit nature for new 
services, and its need to preserve the natural world as a basis for life (Apostolopoulou and 
Adams 2015). It aims to achieve this through using contributions from extractives 
companies, including voluntary contributions to the Biofund as part of a company’s 
responsibility programme, through formal government revenue raising through the Green 
Economy Investment Fund, and through the idea of a temporary intensification of gas 
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extraction to facilitate a green economy transition.  Through these financial mechanisms, 
Mozambique’s green economy is aiming to directly address the contradictions of the 
extractives sector. This claim adds to a broader scholarship which views the green economy 
as an effort to disguise and offset the increasing crisis-ridden modes of capitalist production; 
“a ‘pre-emptive strike’ precluding any possible chance for the development of sane, 
animated nature–society engagements” (Büscher and Fletcher 2015: 293).  
It is also clear that the green economy has not arisen in Mozambique simply through 
immanent processes of global capitalism; rather, it has been engendered and promoted 
through NGO and international development institutions, particularly WWF Mozambique, 
the IUCN and the AfDB, and it has also been fostered through the World Bank and Peace 
Parks Foundation TFCA project through the idea that conservation represents a source of 
green growth for Mozambique. With that in mind, it is also necessary to view the green 
economy within the context of Mozambique’s wider political economy. While it certainly 
seeks to establish markets where none have existed before, it also aims to reshape, limit and 
redirect capitalism’s forces. Mozambique’s green economy can thereby also be read as a 
kind of new ‘green deal’ or ‘fourth way’ neoliberalism which acknowledges that unfettered 
markets cause social and ecological problems, and seeks to redress concern in Mozambique 
over a lack of investment though major public spending projects. It thereby poses both threat 
and opportunity to those who would take a more radical stance against extractives-led 
development. As the debate around Techobanine Port demonstrated, those who oppose 
greater degradation through extractive-based exploitation are sometimes obliged to adopt 
green capitalist language such as ecosystem services in order to participate in donor 
negotiations. In addition, situating the PPMR in the wider context of green growth, and 
seeking powerful allies such as the Peace Parks Foundation and UNESCO was successful in 
securing the reserve’s future (though geopolitical changes in coal demand and Botswana’s 
shift to shale gas may have been more important). In other words, the green economy 
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appears to be becoming established as an important pragmatic option that is open to those 
who seek to oppose extraction. While this provides opportunities, which, as the port episode 
shows, can be effective, this consensus forecloses more radical alternative nature-society 
relations. Nevertheless, the green economy is providing a means to pursue alternative visions 
of modernity to Frelimo’s extractives-led development. I do not wish to overstate this point, 
and am certainly not arguing that the green economy represents the kind of progressive or 
radical alternative nature-society configuration sought by many political ecologists. Rather, I 
wish to point out that, as Peck (2010: 106) argues, the “practice	of neoliberal statecraft is 
inescapably, and profoundly, marked by compromise, calculation, and contradiction”. Some 
of these practices, as Ferguson (2010) has observed, can be used to pursue goals that can be 
labelled progressive.  
The debates discussed in this chapter speak to a much deeper question of how social change 
takes place within the context of a neoliberal hegemony: Are we seeing capitalism collapse 
under the weight of its own crises? Or is this the emergence of a novel, post-neoliberal round 
of ‘green’ accumulation? Mozambique’s experience with rolling out a green economy has 
certainly given cause to question how long the contortions of sustainable development can 
continue to make sense in the context of the aggressive pursuit of extractives. However, it 
remains unclear how far this indicates a forthcoming end-game for capitalism, or, indeed, 
whether this is something it is possible to predict. What is clear, however, is that the patterns 
of appropriation and accumulation through conservation and extraction replicate 
Mozambique’s postcolonial history of uneven development, and risk exacerbating rather that 






A beautiful fairy-tale …… always tries to hide somehow the horrors and violence 
and primitivity of much accumulation (Peluso 2012: 100). 
 
8.1	Introduction	
This thesis has traced the unfolding of a conservation scheme in a neoliberalising political 
economy. I have investigated the establishment and the management of the Ponta do Ouro 
Partial Marine Reserve, a marine protected area which forms part of a trans-frontier 
conservation area in southern Mozambique. I have taken three points of engagement with the 
PPMR: The historical production of the reserve in the context of Mozambique’s post-war 
political economy; its management through a combination of authoritarian public authority; a 
neoliberal governmentality, and biopower; and, its entanglement with dynamics of 
extractives-led development and an emerging green economy. My thesis has focussed on an 
example of the ‘actually existing’ neoliberalisation of nature, and examined the processes 
and goals of incorporating conservation into dynamics of economic growth. I have also 
explored what takes place when this idealised scheme of conservation and development 
intersects with the lives of people and animals in the reserve, exposing multiple 
contradictions: Between the desire to positively improve the lives of animals and people and 
the impetus to produce ‘landscapes of value’; between the acknowledgement and silencing 
of different political and ethical positions; and, the way in which the reserve overflows the 
rational scheme for the techno-managerial management of socionature. In this conclusion, I 
go back to my overarching research goal of understanding the historical co-production of 
neoliberalism and nature, and explain how my three points of engagement with the PPMR 




I began in chapter one by situating the thesis at the juncture of intensification of the 
exploitation of marine resources under neoliberalism and the increase in protectionist and 
neoliberal market-based conservation solutions. I suggested that Mozambique provides a 
fascinating place to understand these dynamics in more detail because it is currently scripted 
as an exciting ‘triple frontier’ for marine conservation, tourism and the extractive industries, 
and has a long history of being at the forefront of neoliberal policy experimentation. I then 
set out research questions to help me delve into these dynamics in more detail. My 
overarching research goal has been to understand the historical co-production of 
neoliberalism and nature in and beyond Mozambique. This goal was broken down into three 
sub-topics, as follows: The historic governance arrangements, policies, discourses and 
imaginaries which led to the production of the PPMR; the practices of politics which enable 
the reserve to be held together as a coherent project; and, the discursive, policy and material 
links between Mozambique’s conservation sector, the extractive agenda and its green 
economy.  
Chapter two argued for a hybrid conceptual approach drawn from eco-Marxism, 
poststructuralism and assemblage. I made the case for distinguishing between neoliberalism 
as a political ideology and ideal-type, based on privatisation, marketisation, de and re-
regulation, the reshaping of the public sector to create market proxies and the re-orienting of 
civil society towards voluntary and individualistic solutions, and neoliberalisation as a 
variegated historical process of regulatory change and specific techniques of government. 
This process-based formation is a useful response to the recent claims that scholars have 
been unable to clearly state what neoliberalism is, and how individual cases connect to a 
broader extra-local project.  I then discussed the neoliberalisation of conservation, that is, 
“how nature is conserved in and through the expansion of capitalism” (Büscher et al. 2012: 
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4). Neoliberal ideology aims to conduct conservation through techniques of commodification 
and financialisation of nature, arguing that this is the most logical and pragmatic way to 
generate ‘win-win’ benefits of development and protecting ecosystems. However, I also 
identified how the neoliberal conservation literature can present a sweeping account of 
neoliberalisation (both conceptually and politically) and how it would benefit from a more 
nuanced focus on hegemony, continuity and change and agency.  I set out how I planned to 
build on this critique by providing a framework for an account of neoliberal conservation 
which takes into account the existence of non-neoliberal factors, plans and schemes, and 
suggested this could be achieved through an assemblage approach. My review of the 
literature then turned to discuss the state and territoriality, drawing parallels between the 
production and governance of conservation and extractive spaces, and the role of the state in 
re-spacing Africa for the pursuit of neoliberalised and other development agendas.  The goal 
of this discussion was to draw a parallel between conservation and extraction as hybrid 
spaces which are linked to regimes of accumulation by state and private actors, as well as to 
situate both forms of socionature in a neoliberal context. 
In chapter three, I discussed how I put this conceptual frame to work. I proposed a flexible 
methodology which comprised an analysis of neoliberal ideology and policy, attention to the 
practice of politics to tease out the limits of neoliberal nature in relation to other rationales of 
improvement, and a non-anthropocentric view of agency. I also justified using a case study 
approach, by definition focussed on one locality, to explore neoliberalisation as an extra-
local, coherent, and yet variegated phenomenon. I conceptualised the field as a conservation 
nexus, focussing on the field of power as made up by conservation authority figures, donors, 
managers and researchers, and government officials to explore ways that neoliberalism is 
practiced, and how this can reveal aspects of structural power and politics. While this 
research design was useful in that I was able to explore the ideologies and practices of 
neoliberal conservation closely, this also raised some ethical and political dilemmas in my 
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positionality and relationship with reserve authority figures. I consider my approach was 
justified (and has many similar models in the political ecology of conservation literature) 
although I acknowledge that other researchers may have adopted a different strategy, for 
example through focussing less on elites in the ‘conservation-development nexus’ and more 
on communities or oppositional NGOs. This chapter also set out my methods, explaining my 
use of ethnographic and qualitative approaches, especially semi and non-structured 
interviews, and observation. I discussed how I brought coherence to my research data 
through academic engagement, teaching and writing.  
Chapter four focussed on the historical and political-economic context of Mozambique, 
discussing its dynamic and often violent transitions through Portuguese colonialism, socialist 
construction, aid dependency and free market economy. I explored discourses of 
Mozambique as donor darling and example of Washington Consensus success, arguing that 
this pattern of donor engagement afforded Frelimo the chance to consolidate power, while 
also producing a state-party deeply reliant on private sector loans and investment. This has 
resulted in patrimonial political practices and unbalanced development. This chapter 
highlighted the agency and power of Mozambican elites in shaping their own trajectory after 
independence. At the same time, conservation organisations and donors have used 
Mozambique’s post-independence transitions to develop and consolidate an enormous 
amount of influence. My intention in this discussion was to situate the emergence of TFCAs 
in Mozambique’s particular social, political and ecological landscape, particularly its history 
of colonial legacies, the changing paradigms of international development and conservation 
donors, and Frelimo politics. 
Chapter five built on this historical analysis to show how the PPMR was the product of 
particular imaginaries of nature; first as historic and pristine Maputaland, replete with huge 
numbers of elephants, turtles and other biodiversity, and second, as resource which can be 
managed for development, particularly through tourism. These dual and sometimes 
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contradictory ideas began to be articulated throughout the 1960s and 1970s by a small 
number of ecologists working in southern Mozambique, and had their political moment post-
conflict when state and donor actors (the PPF and the World Bank) were seeking resolution 
to the so-called wild west of Matutuíne Province. Building on colonial imaginaries of 
Mozambique as rich in natural resources and the colonial structure of the Maputo Special 
Reserve, the province was reimagined as a trans-boundary resource area, where nature could 
be both protected and sustainably used, and donor and state goals met. The chapter identified 
three modes of the neoliberalisation of conservation. The first is the insertion of the PPMR 
into a regime of accumulation whereby the reserve is part of a large multi-country network 
of linked conservation areas, with privileged access and services for tourists and investment 
opportunities for the private sector. The second is the discourse and accompanying practices 
that participation in conservation must be incentivised through eco-tourism. The third is the 
active production of communities as ‘eco-tourism entrepreneurs’, whereby people and 
animals are actively marketed to tourists in reified representations of culture and nature. 
These work together to produce the PPMR as tourist habitat. This chapter also provided 
important insights into the state. The state has indeed been central to the production of the 
PPMR, and Frelimo-state power has been radically re-shaped, strengthened and extended 
through partnering with the World Bank and the PPF to produce Peace Parks (Lunstrum 
2008). However, this does not mean there is a united commitment to conservation, and I also 
highlighted how conservation can be a contested arena where day-to-day Frelimo politics 
play out.  
Chapter six delved more deeply into the conflicts and contestations produced the PPMR as a 
means of ordering space and life, and how these are managed by political practices. I framed 
the PPMR as a technical development programme aimed at intervening in human and animal 
life to produce desirable outcomes, and drew on Li’s (2007a) conceptualisation of 
assemblage as an active process which aims to direct social conduct and manage contestation 
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through political techniques of consensus-building, rendering technical, performance and 
anti-politics. I showed how the neoliberal incentive-based discourses I identified in chapter 
five worked alongside the management of life through a population logic to try to bring 
about an idealised ‘virtuous circle’ of conservation, in which large populations of 
charismatic species like turtles attract tourists, who bring financial resources to both 
communities and the state, in turn incentivising both sets of actors towards conservation-
minded behaviours. The role of the reserve is to manage this process through a 
governmentality of conservation based on the management of communities and animal life 
through technologies of calculation and regulation. This conservation biopower works 
alongside a more disciplinary and authoritarian power, whereby communities may be 
relocated, possibly against their will, possibly willingly with further persuasion, to help 
creation the conditions for the virtuous conservation circle. I showed how the consequent 
political and ethical contradictions require intense work to de-politicise and manage 
contestation, especially through the rhetoric of participation. This chapter concluded by 
arguing that neoliberalisation processes take hold because of, not despite the gaps between 
idealised representation and complex reality. The power of discourses of individual 
entrepreneurship, a pristine nature saved by the market and the rhetoric of consensus and 
consultation lies in the way they help maintain the ‘future positive’ orientation of schemes of 
betterment. Crucially, this discursive tool has been remarkably powerful in enabling the 
material expansion of those neoliberal processes of accumulation through private investment 
in tourism and appropriation of space for tourist habitat, and the production of conservation 
as a capital frontier.  
Finally, chapter seven placed recent institutional and regulatory developments in 
conservation in the context of Mozambique’s resources boom. It engaged again with the 
debate of capital frontiers, this time showing how particular narratives of conservation are 
being expressed in an emerging green economy discourse. There are multiple competing 
272 
 
visions for a new Mozambique, which provided the opportunity to reflect on contemporary 
debates relating to the future of capitalist expansion. I showed how Mozambique’s green 
economy attempts to reconcile development (particularly extractives-led growth) and 
conservation in three ways: First, by providing an ecological fix for extractives growth 
through voluntary donations and formal revenue-raising from extractive companies; second, 
through its narrative that a temporary intensification of extraction is permissible to facilitate 
a broader and longer-term sustainable transition; and, through the Biofund, by facilitating 
biodiversity offsetting and by providing a literal fund of biodiversity (conceptualised as 
nature that is protected in conservation areas to mitigate against the loss of biodiversity 
elsewhere). The chapter also pointed out the central role played by WWF Mozambique in 
attempting to reconcile extractive and green growth through these measures. While accepting 
the broad thrust of arguments that capitalism as a world system is increasingly threatened by 
its own internal contradictions, the chapter demonstrated how the green economy repositions 
ecological crises from a loss to capitalism into new avenues of accumulation. However, I 
also discussed how these ideas sometimes sit uneasily together, with traditional biodiversity-
focussed actors both pragmatically accepting, but also questioning and resisting the value of 
the new green economy discourse.  
8.3.	Main	conclusions:	Neoliberalisation	and	Mozambique’s	
nature	
The ostensible goals of the reserve include the protection and the sustainable use of nature in 
the interests of development. The reserve would, justifiably, claim numerous successes in 
this regard, most notably including: The restoration of nesting turtle numbers; the protection 
of marine habitat from excessive sport fishing and jetskis; the various community services; 
and, the likely confirmation of the reserve’s future as a UNESCO World Heritage site 
against the threatened Techobanine port development. However, my thesis is not intended to 
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be a cost-benefit weighing of these outcomes. Rather, I have explored the underlying claims, 
rationale and imaginaries, along with the abilities of different actors to exercise power that 
have produced the PPMR. With this in mind, I return now to the overall purpose of the thesis 
and set out my study’s key contributions in relation to the original research question. 
Mozambique is, once again, undergoing dynamic changes as it negotiates a booming 
extractives sector and increasing focus on protectionist and neoliberal forms of conservation. 
As the contradictions and urgent challenges of this agenda become greater, it is even more 
essential to examine the political and intellectual underpinnings of the neoliberal governance 
of conservation and development. I asked what the case of the PPMR can reveal about the 
historical co-production of neoliberalism and nature in and beyond Mozambique, and I now 
turn to set out the contributions of the thesis to understanding this question.  
8.3.1.	The	political	ecology	of	development	and	conservation	
Deciding what nature is, and who nature is for, is an inherently political process. Once nature 
is represented as lost Eden in need of restoration and protection, as a source of natural capital 
to drive economic growth or as set of resources to enable community development, it then 
becomes possible to justify interventions which are highly political. The space of the PPMR 
as a conservation and development intervention is deeply rooted in globalised discourses of 
conservation based on ideas of an ancient Africa in need of restoration, combined with 
increasingly dominant ideas that conservation must address multiple crises of development, 
economic growth and biodiversity depletion. These ideas, through the powerful narratives of 
Peace Parks’ vision of reconciliation, development and bioregionality have been presented as 
superior to the so-called chaos of the post-war informal resource regimes, and the current 
informal land uses in the MSR.  Through the imposition of landscapes of value and a scaled-
up regime geared at eco-tourism, the PPF and the World Bank have produced novel natures 
in Mozambique (and wider southern Africa). Of course, the claim that the space of the 
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PPMR has been produced by a history of changing narratives of nature and political-
economic regimes is nothing new to political ecology, and my purpose has been to clarify 
the contemporary neoliberal qualities of the reserve. The PPMR is increasingly imagined and 
produced as a space for the pursuit of market-led conservation solutions. My research has 
shown how a growing number of powerful NGOs and donors are coalescing around ideas of 
development and conservation through individual entrepreneurship, alongside the scaling up 
and production of ‘landscapes of value’ and ‘tourist habitat’, positioning tourism as a key 
mechanism in land appropriation. The territorialisation of the PPMR is thus an ongoing, 
complex and ambiguous process, shaped and negotiated through the interaction between 
state and private actors in Mozambique’s neoliberalising political economy. 
As Li (2007b) has highlighted, thinking about the different sorts of power at play in 
development schemes produces a nuanced view of power relations, and I have narrated the 
contestations and complexities which characterise the PPMR by conceptualising power and 
agency at different sites in the reserve. I have demonstrated how the PPMR is a space where 
different forms of public and private authority are present, and I have shown that different 
kinds of power are necessary to manage and control the hybrid, transnational space of the 
PPMR. The first of these is privatised and state-led authoritarian power, inscribed in the 
ways in which the reserve is legally entitled to enact public authority in the reserve. The 
second is neoliberal governmentality, aimed at the production of the ‘right’ conditions 
whereby communities and the government will be incentivised to manage nature for the 
tourist gaze – the idealised ‘virtuous circle’ of neoliberal conservation. One of the key goals 
of the PPMR is to reorganise the personal sphere of life in the reserve through normalising 
individualism and entrepreneurialism, and recasting residents and visitors as self-interested 
consumers and clients. These two forms of power have had significant impacts on the lives 
of the inhabitants and users of the PPMR. Resource and livelihood regimes have been altered 
by the imposition of the Management Plan in multiple ways, ranging from the prevention of 
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fishing in the no-take areas, to the curtailing and reshaping of mobilities in the MSR, and the 
creation of new roles and opportunities in conservation along with the subject positions that 
these opportunities can create. These restrictions and opportunities both symbolise the 
reserve’s asymmetrical power over the lives of people and animals. The dynamics of 
enclosure and commodification thus sits alongside novel regimes of the management of the 
small-scale and personal, and this study has contributed to understanding how these different 
forms of power complement each other in the production of conservation space. This 
analysis illustrates the importance of attention to different forms of power in understanding 
the political ecology of conservation. 
I have also demonstrated that the utopian claims to peace and harmony put forward by the 
Peace Parks discourse are undermined by the potential relocation of MSR communities. This 
contradiction relates to broader questions over the future of trans-frontier conservation in 
southern Africa. Büscher and Ramutsindela (2016) recently reported that the overall Peace 
Parks project is currently under existential threat, caused by both by a perception that the 
removal of fences makes rhino poaching harder to prevent, and through the violent response 
of the state and the NGO to the problem. This issue is particularly pronounced in the Great 
Limpopo TFCA which encompasses land in South Africa, Mozambique and Zimbabwe (see 
also Lunstrum 2015; Shaw and Rademeyer 2016). The increasingly authoritarian crackdown 
against poachers through militarisation tactics and the removal of communities, which 
Büscher and Ramutsindela (2016: 1) label “green violence”, was certainly a prominent 
matter when I was on field work. Some of my informants reported that the TFCA regime and 
government in Mozambique was struggling to deal with poaching, and I saw how many 
conservationists blame Mozambique in particular for failing to crack down on the problem, 
and call for the fences which had separated the Kruger and the Great Limpopo to be 
reinstated. Mozambique’s new conservation law, which I discussed in chapter seven in 
connection with biodiversity offsetting and the green economy, also contains significant new 
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measures to prevent poaching and promises severe punishment for illegal taking of wildlife. 
These measures risk the Peace Park’s central goal of free movement of people and animals in 
a reserve and fundamentally contradict its broader claims to peace and harmony. As this 
thesis has demonstrated, authoritarian options were certainly a part of how the PPMR team 
governed the reserve, and although they were seldom enacted, they were often present in the 
militarised appearance and capacities of the reserve guards as discussed in chapter six. 
However, I did not find that the gap between Peace Park goals and violent authoritarianism 
was so pronounced in the PPMR as to place the whole project under threat. In contrast, my 
experiences indicated that the contradictions between authoritarian power, governmentality 
based on incentivisation and regulation, and broader utopian claims to peace and 
ecoregionality were, for the time being, being carefully managed by the reserve team and the 
wider PPF. This is in no small part down to the material politics of the situation; overall, the 
turtle poaching issue is far less intensified in the PPMR than rhino poaching in the Limpopo. 
The high value of rhino horn and its trade in organised networks (Duffy 2010) exists on a far 
greater scale than the causal, small-scale and opportunistic nature of turtle poaching in the 
reserve. Nevertheless, my study has highlighted that the contradictions which necessitate 
‘green violence’ are echoed in the Lubombo. Should the relocations of MSR communities go 
ahead against their wishes, this would constitute an act of dispossession in order to bring 
about the TFCA utopia, and would visibly disrupt the Peace Park’s central goal in the 
Lubombo if not carefully handled.  
A further contribution of this research has been to locate conservation in Mozambique’s 
extractive political economy. Crucially, it is within the context of intensifying extraction that 
supporters of conservation must negotiate and operate. This often led to the mobilisation of 
conservation ideas as providing a direct alternative to an extractive agenda. Recent media 
rumours of the resurrection of the Techobanine port project despite the reserve’s UNESCO 
designation (reported on MacauHub.com September 2016) demonstrate the continuing 
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significance of the extractive agenda to those in the conservation sector. I have used this 
study to develop a recent research agenda which explicitly considers conservation and 
extraction as sharing conceptual roots, ideological commitments and similar practices 
(Büscher and Davidov 2013; Lunstrum 2011). Conceptualising these development strategies 
as embedded in the same capitalist dynamic of frontier exploitation has been a fruitful 
research strategy, and has allowed me to demonstrate how Mozambique’s green economy 
holds vital appeal as a ‘new green deal’ or ‘fourth way’ neoliberalism. It does this by 
providing Mozambican state and donor actors with a new narrative to reshape and ameliorate 
the excesses of existing neoliberal development, as well as providing conservation actors 
with a way to make conservation legitimate and visible in an extractive state. The myths – 
the “fairy-tales” (Peluso 2012: 100) - put forward by both TFCAs and the green economy, 
though by no means identical, are there to obscure a complex history of resource 
appropriation; the unique myth of neoliberalisation being that all is needed is to create the 
correct form of natural commodity and incentive and nature will be ‘saved’. However, I have 
suggested that the green economy is unlikely to challenge the legacies of Mozambique’s 
history of uneven development in meaningful ways, as both the power structures and the 
growth-focussed discourses of previous development narratives are preserved by the 
discourse.  
8.3.2.	The	neoliberalisation	of	nature	through	marine	conservation	
Much of what I explored in this thesis was a response to a political ecology literature which 
argues that neoliberal ideas and practices saturate conservation like never before. Such 
literature often suggests that TFCAs’ central agenda is the creation of value from a 
derivative, marketed and idealised nature, and the creation of space for the purposes of 
private investment and consumption. The PPMR is just one of many TFCAs that have been 
created by the Peace Parks Foundation in recent years, and I have been able to draw out the 
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resemblances between it and similar developments in other sites, tracing the development of 
Mozambique’s particular neoliberal regulatory change and connections between local, 
regional, national and international policy frameworks (Brenner et al. 2010). Through this, I 
have linked the geopolitical conditions and pathways of Mozambique’s neoliberalisation 
with a wider geographic and political context, while also illuminating Mozambique’s 
particular experience. The multiple conflicts and crises I discussed throughout this thesis – 
from primarily national crises like Mozambique’s debt in the 1980s and contested public 
authority post-conflict, to global challenges like climate change purportedly addressed by the 
green economy, to more localised challenges of governance and material politics within the 
reserve - have all provided opportunities for successive rounds of deepening 
neoliberalisation. The strength of neoliberalisation is its ability to adapt and mutate, to 
generate sweeping promises of abundant gains (provided the right sacrifices are made and 
the correct prescriptions followed) and to thrive through the active management of 
contradiction.  
Such crises can also provide insight into the multi-scale operation of neoliberal processes, 
and, more precisely, the way in which such processes work between scales and cannot be 
reduced to ‘local’, ‘national’ or ‘global’ dynamics. For example, rather than viewing the 
licensing dispute between the PPMR and INAMAR as just consisting of a moment when the 
hybrid state-private sovereignty was resisted by the Mozambican state, this moment also 
illustrated how the rollout of TFCAs more generally involves entrenching hybrid 
governance. It represented a point in Mozambique’s ongoing neoliberalisation when a 
general process and abstract idea was negotiated and solidified in a particular institutional 
and political context. Similarly, proponents of the green economy are seeking concrete ways 
to directly address the contradictions of the extractive sector through further entrenching 
neoliberal ideologies that neoliberal capitalism can be the solution to its own problems 
(while at the same time, also using this policy experimentation to pursue many other 
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conservation and development visions). In sum, I have emphasised neoliberalism as part of a 
broader historic programme of capitalist expansion in which socionature is remade and 
recreated through capitalist processes (Moore 2015a).  
However, as Bakker (2010) has pointed out, greater attention to nature is required in these 
debates, and part of my goal here has been to explore what is novel about contemporary 
neoliberalisation of nature processes in relation to the marine context. As I suggested in 
chapter six, marine environments are materially different from land; they are dynamic, 
voluminous, three dimensional, sometimes chaotic and mobile. Though they resemble land-
based protected areas in that they often have delineated boundaries and zones areas, marine 
conservation areas require special techniques of governance and enclosure based on the 
control of choke points (to monitor and regulate what comes in and out), and the exclusion of 
people through technologies like SCUBA. As is certainly the case in Mozambique, the 
ability to access such devices is also highly circumscribed by race, class and gender. A 
further aspect of marine materiality is the affective qualities of many of its creatures, which 
for many of my research participants held a special romantic appeal. These observations 
regarding the intersection between marine materiality and conservation politics provide an 
opportunity to advance research on neoliberal marine nature. 
It is clear that marine natures are particularly susceptible to processes of commodification 
through their affective qualities and the development of lifestyle and globalised cultures like 
diving. The ability of land based parks to link up to a marine component ups the ante when it 
comes to appealing to the tourist market, demonstrating the importance of tourism-based 
commodification strategies to the neoliberalisation of marine natures. As discourses of 
development through the use of marine resources intersect with neoliberal pressures, it is 
likely that tourism-based MPAs will continue as a privileged solution. Second, this research 
has also highlighted the increasing entanglement of marine natures in discourses of natural 
capital and green (blue) growth.  Whether current financialisation trends, encapsulated in 
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Mozambique’s green economy, represent a novel form of accumulation through neoliberal 
natures or indicate a final exhaustion of capitalism’s ability to exploit ‘cheap nature’ remains 
an issue for debate. As Peluso (2012) argues, newly marketised and financialised natures 
reflect the contradictions of contemporary neoliberalism, but the underlying processes of 
enclosure, commodification and uneven power relations are embedded in historic 
socionatures. I have demonstrated that capitalist modes of development have long been at the 
heart of the production of Mozambican socionature, with successive waves of ‘grand plans’ 
for the transformation of nature (of which the green economy is undoubtedly one) 
understood in terms of particular people, histories and political-economic relationships.  
8.3.3.	Assemblage	as	political	practice		
Throughout my research, the question of what the future holds for Mozambique was often 
discussed, with many in the conservation–development nexus trying to bring about what they 
envisaged as a new Mozambique based on their vision of sustainability, biodiversity 
protection, long-term thinking and proper governance. They felt that industrial development 
had run its course, and wanted to do things differently from what they characterised as the 
mistakes of the West. Ideas of ‘selling nature to save it’ provided these actors with a means 
to make conservation relevant in a development context they felt was increasingly dismissive 
of any kind of ecological or sustainability concern. The challenges facing my research 
participants in the development-environment nexus, and Mozambique more widely are 
certainly numerous, including the ambitions of Frelimo to benefit from the lucrative 
extractives sector, and the necessity to mobilise these revenues to solve its 2016 debt crisis, 
coupled with more historic and entrenched challenges relating to an unbalanced and uneven 
economy and uneven development. For my conservation participants particularly, 
biodiversity protection in Mozambique is not so much an opportunity, but an urgent 
necessity in this context. For them, the problems and contradictions that I have pointed out in 
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this thesis will be solved by refinement and improvement to their technical development 
plans, what Li (2007b: 274) terms the “improvement of improvement”. In this sense, the 
novel neoliberal green economy discourse, in which nature is imagined as natural capital and 
ecosystem service is intended to improve and refine the practice of development and 
conservation, enabling it to address social and ecological crises as well as promise growth. 
My discussion in this thesis, particularly in chapters six and seven demonstrates the power of 
neoliberal solutions to deal with contradictions, to ‘improve improvement’ and to present a 
compelling new vision of development for Mozambique. However, such schemes fail to 
meet their promises precisely because they are unable or unwilling to directly confront their 
underlying political structures, imaginaries and power relations, despite the many promises 
they make (Ferguson 1990, Li 2007b). This leaves development and conservation bound to 
uneven economic and political structures, rather than challenging them (as is demonstrably 
and intentionally the case with green neoliberalism). 
Against this dynamic, it is challenging but also necessary to offer some thoughts on what an 
alternative future might be for conservation in Mozambique. My research has intentionally 
focussed on understanding the hegemonic conservation-development nexus and has not 
engaged directly with many of the emerging activist movements in Mozambique (apart from 
those civil society organisations directly connected to the PPMR). There are several civil 
society groups and movements working in the areas of land grabs, contesting the extractive 
model of development, and seeking peasant’s rights. For example, La Via Campesina, a 
global peasant’s movement which contests corporate agri-business and defends small-scale 
sustainable agriculture has a branch in Mozambique, Centro Terra Viva, a Mozambican civil 
society organisation has a number of prominent activists opposing land grabs for extractive 
development, and Justiça Ambiental (JA!) (Environmental Justice Now!) has been active in 
similar areas. While I am not advocating a romantic position where civil society movements 
overthrow capitalism, I do consider that paying attention to how these alternative views 
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themselves are developed, mobilised and made to cohere, how they fracture and contest 
existing assemblages, and the possibilities that lie therein is valuable. In other word, 
assemblage as political practice offers the chance to reject the idea of opposing or contesting 
a hegemonic neoliberalism (the idea of which I have, in any case, questioned in this thesis), 
and instead to seek out novel and counter-hegemonic political moments which can coalesce 
into wider assemblages. As Rose et al. (2006: 92) argue, “intellectual innovations do not fall 
out of a clear blue sky”; rather, they gain traction because they resonate with ideological 
trends and movements across different fields and spaces. In this sense, critiquing current 
neoliberal common sense and exposing its fragile and unstable foundations is part of 
assembling an alternative. 
8.4.	Looking	back	and	looking	forward:	limitations	of	the	study	
and	opportunities	for	further	research	
This thesis has raised several areas where further research would be fruitful. In many ways 
these areas map directly onto weaknesses I have identified with the study as it stands, and 
therefore I consider these issues as both limitations of the study, and opportunities for further 
research. The first area is the need to follow Mozambique’s experience with the green 
economy more closely. My engagement with the discourse so far has been to consider it at a 
very early stage. At present, Mozambique’s green economy is little more than a set of 
policies, new institutions and ideas. I have presented a case here that it represents a powerful 
ideology and set of emerging institutional and political relationships which are gaining much 
traction in the environment-development nexus. Nevertheless, my engagement with it was 
incomplete in several important ways. There are currently very few actual green economic 
projects, and sustained engagement with Mozambique’s green economy as it rolls out will be 
important. In addition, my interviews about the green economy were limited to key 
informants from Biofund and the World Bank, and clearly there are many more stakeholders 
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involved, not least from the extractives and industrial sectors that green economy proponents 
are keen to engage with, along with financial sector actors like the AfDB which has been so 
central to providing an action plan and potentially financing the plan. This wider engagement 
would reveal more about the power and resources behind the green economy, information 
which would provide insight into both the purpose and the viability of the green economy as 
a mode of accumulation. In other words, I suggest it is vital to follow green economy 
investments and programmes as they roll out. More broadly, there is a requirement for a 
comparative research agenda as green economies are rolled out across Africa and beyond to 
draw out differences, similarities and patterns in experiences with green capitalism. 
The second area concerns the need for further research into neo-extractivism in an African 
context. In brief, this debate questions whether a renewed focus on extracting valuable 
resources (especially oil and gas) is a valid development option, along with its geographies, 
its impacts and its underlying histories and political economies. Recent literature particularly 
focusses on Latin America (Burchardt and Dietz 2014; North and Grinspun 2016). While the 
contemporary dynamics of Mozambique’s pursuit of an extractive agenda along with a 
neoliberalised approach to conservation and sustainability more broadly is compelling on its 
own terms, these dynamics appear to be replicated in other locations in Africa (as I discussed 
in the introduction to chapter seven), and a more synthesised research agenda and approach 
to Africa’s possible neo-extractivism would be welcome.  
The third area for development and opportunity relates to the more-than-human in this study. 
I have given consideration to the specific affordances of marine natures and marine animals 
in relation to processes of neoliberalism, particularly in terms of their affective qualities. I 
have also focussed on the related biopolitics of human and animal life in the reserve. 
However, there is certainly scope to go further and deeper here with regards to how political 
ecology specifically can gain from geography’s ‘lively turn’. In particular, I have not directly 
considered questions of animal ethics in this study, though consideration of animal lives is 
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vital to understanding the full moral implications of neoliberalisation (Buller 2016), and, in 
turn, to conceiving a plural political ecology which recognises animals as political and 
ethical subjects (in contrast to providers of resources, commodified experiences or 
ecosystem services) is necessary for reimagining ecological futures (Collard et al. 2015). My 
partial involvement with multispecies entanglements may be considered a limitation of the 
study, and other researchers may have devoted greater attention to understanding, for 
example, dolphins and sharks as neoliberal subjects (there is no doubt an interesting line of 
research in considering their agency more deeply in commodified encounters, and their 
direct role in the co-production of the reserve). However, telling a full ‘more than human’ 
story of the reserve was beyond the scope of the study. 
The final issue is the politics of my study and me as a researcher. As I have mentioned, many 
political ecologists interested in the neoliberalisation of conservation, whose valuable work I 
draw on extensively in this thesis, often take an overtly political position that neoliberalism 
is unquestionably negative, and examples of its further entrenchment must be hunted down 
and held up for condemnation. However, although I have certainly identified several 
negative consequences of neoliberal conservation trends in Mozambique, my research has 
also demonstrated the way that neoliberal ideas can be used in different and contradictory 
ways to achieve different ends. Therefore, throughout this thesis, I have felt increasingly 
certain that the nuances and instability inherent in processes of neoliberalisation are as 
important as the patterns and generalisations. 
8.5.	Closing	summary	
This thesis has been a political ecology of the Ponta do Ouro Partial Marine reserve. 
Through three points of engagement it has traced the historical production of the reserve 
through Mozambique’s contested post-war politics which worked alongside powerful ideas 
that conservation should be reimagined as scaled-up ‘eco-landscapes’ and recreated as 
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spaces for investment and ecotourism. In this way, the PPMR is a form of biodiversity 
protection that has both been produced by, and reproduces neoliberal ideas and practices. I 
have also focussed on the small-scale and personal, showing the ways in which neoliberal 
conservation has tried to reshape the lives of people and animals in the reserve, alternately 
casting them as subjects in an idealised ‘virtuous circle’ of commodified tourist encounters, 
or as a population to be managed for the greater good despite costs to individuals. This 
analysis has reinforced the view that conservation in Mozambique is currently managed 
according to an assumption that nature is something that alternatively at risk and fragile, or a 
commodity for the so-called green international consumer, as invoked by one of my 
respondents in chapter five. Despite the well-intentioned goals of the PPMR in trying to 
reshape communities into ‘eco-tourism entrepreneurs’, the current approach to conservation 
produces marginalisation in some communities that are unsuccessful in joining the new 
regime. I have also built on accounts of a hegemonic neoliberal conservation by 
demonstrating how the PPMR has been made to cohere as a field of improvement through 
techniques of assemblage, demonstrating how neoliberalisation processes have been co-
produced, but also challenged, by Mozambique’s particular context. Finally, I have 
considered neoliberal conservation in relation to the contemporary rollout of the green 
economy, demonstrating the multiple and contradictory ways in which Mozambique’s future 
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 Role Date 
1 PPMR Reserve Management 4 October 2013 
2 PPMR Reserve Management 9 October 2013 
3 PPMR Reserve Management 9 April 2014 
4 PPMR Reserve Management 22 April 2014 
5 PPMR Reserve Management (telephone call) 9 May 2014  
6 PPMR Reserve Management (telephone call) 8 January 2016 
7 Director, Mozambican civil society organisation 24 April 2014 
8 Turtle monitor, PPMR 5 October 2013 
9 Ex-ranger in Maputo Special Reserve 10 October 2013 
10 Reserve Management - Community Relations  15 October 2013 
11 Peace Parks Foundation consultant 1 18 October 2013 
12 Peace Parks Foundation consultant 2 18 October 2013 
13 Donors to PPMR (group) 20 October 2013 
14 Academic, Department of Geography, UEM 27 September 2013 
15 Community member, MSR 12 October 2013 
17 Head of conservation NGO based in PPMR 14 October 2013 
18 Employee of dolphin viewing company 1 9 October 2013 
19 Employee of dolphin viewing company 2 9 October 2013 
20 Conservation scientist 1 26 October 2013 
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21 Dolphin customer 14 October 2013 
22 Dolphin customers (group) 14 October 2013 
23 Dolphin customers (group) 3 October 2013 
24 Dolphin customers (group) 20 October 2013 
25 Director of conservation and development NGO (Skype calls) 15, 17 March 2014 
26 Member, conservation and development NGO  27 April 2014 
27 President, conservation and development NGO  29 April 2014 
28 Member, conservation and development NGO 17 May 2014 
29 Fishing rights activist/ NGO (Skype calls over two days) 24 March 2014  
30 Conservation official  22 April 2014 
31 Conservation scientist 2 3 May 2014 
32 Conservation scientist 3 4 May 2014 
32 Conservation community official 30 April 2014 
34 Donor 1 23 April 2014 
35 Donor 2 12 May 2014 
36 Director of conservation NGO 7 May 2014 
37 Former Frelimo minister/ Biofund official 8 May 2014 
38 Senior ANAC official 17 May 2014 
39 World Bank official  18 May 2014 
40 MICOA official 14 May 2014 
 
